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 Candidate nominations in the U.S. are governed by an intricate system of laws and party 
rules that vary substantially across the states. The reasons why these laws and rules differ—and 
the considerations that motivate state elected officials and party leaders to change them—are not 
well understood. In this dissertation, I analyze the variation in enfranchisement, or the type of 
primary, focusing on primary elections for offices below the level of the presidency (e.g., 
congressional, gubernatorial, state legislative, etc.). Some states’ primaries are open to all voters, 
while other states permit participation only by those registered with the party, and still others use 
some type in between. I study potential explanations for these differences, using both 
quantitative analysis to identify aggregate patterns and in-depth qualitative investigation of 
significant cases.  
 This research enhances our understanding of the nominations process and yields insight 
into the complex nature of institutional change. Analyses of the present-day variation in 
enfranchisement indicate that the state-level contextual variables often assumed to be related to 
the type of primary in fact demonstrate little explanatory power, but this does not mean that the 
variation is merely idiosyncratic—it is still the product of reasoned choices made by state 
governments and party leaders. The causes of the initial adoption of the direct primary resist easy 
explanation because the two most commonly cited forces (pressure from progressive reformers 
and leaders acting to preserve the parties’ self-interest) were both influential, depending on the 
context. A study of selected changes in the type of primary that have occurred in recent decades 
suggests that there is a logic underlying elected officials and party leaders’ preferences for one 
type or another, but because elites’ expectations regarding the anticipated consequences of 
changing the type of primary are highly conditional, it is difficult to explain or predict changes in 
enfranchisement based on knowledge of their preferences alone. And these partisan elites are not 
the only relevant actors; both the courts and the electorate have frequently played a role in 
shaping enfranchisement, further complicating the task of predicting when or why changes 
occur. Primary elections, like many other political institutions, are prone to inertia, and formal 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1955, Connecticut enacted its first state law authorizing the use of direct primary 
elections to nominate candidates. The state was late to the primary-election party, so to speak—
nearly the last of the 50 states to adopt the direct primary.1 Since the adoption of this law, 
Connecticut has almost always held closed primaries, meaning that only voters registered with a 
political party could participate in its primary. The lone exception occurred in the 1988 elections. 
Four years earlier, the Connecticut Republican Party had modified its bylaws to allow 
unaffiliated or independent voters (as well as registered Republicans) to cast ballots in the party’s 
primary elections.2 Opening the primary to unaffiliated voters violated state law, which explicitly 
required closed primaries at the time. The party challenged the constitutionality of the statute, 
and in December 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the state of Connecticut, declaring 
that the closed-primary law infringed on the party’s right to “enter into political association with 
individuals of its own choosing” (Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut 1986). As a result 
of this ruling, the state (under unified Democratic control at the time) passed new legislation 
permitting the parties to allow unaffiliated voters in their primary elections if they wished to do 
so. Then, intriguingly, the Connecticut Republican Party changed its bylaws again, reverting to a 
closed primary after the 1988 cycle. Neither of the two major parties in the state has allowed 
independents to vote in their primaries ever since.3 
How might we explain this sequence of events? Why did the Connecticut Republicans 
choose to open their primary to unaffiliated voters in the first place? Why did the party later 
reverse its decision and return to a closed primary, particularly after securing a victory over the 
state in the Supreme Court and the subsequent passage of new legislation? Were these changes 
merely idiosyncratic occurrences, specific to the unique actors and political circumstances in 
Connecticut, or is there a general explanation for what kinds of parties favor certain types of 
                                                
1 Alaska began using primary elections in 1947 while it was still a territory. Hawaii adopted the direct primary when 
it became a state in 1960. 
2 Political scientists often call such primaries “semi-closed” or “semi-open” to distinguish them from primaries open 
only to those registered with the given party (“closed”) and those open to all eligible voters (“open”). 
3 Note that Connecticut adopted a very weak form of the direct primary in 1955. The original law established a 
“challenge primary,” meaning that primary elections were held only if delegates to the party conventions could not 
reach a consensus on the nominees. If an aspiring candidate won sufficient support at the party convention, no 
primary election occurred. This challenge-primary system remained in place for nearly 50 years. A law passed in 
2003 allowed candidates to gain access to the primary ballot either by winning 15 percent of the vote at the 
convention or by petition (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–400; Sinclair 2013). 
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primaries? More broadly, how do we explain the wide variation in primary election rules—
particularly in voter enfranchisement—across the states? Some states’ primary elections are open 
to all registered voters, while others have closed primaries like those in Connecticut, allowing 
participation only by those registered with the party in question. Still others use a mixed rule in 
between the pure open and closed types, and a few states use nonpartisan primaries, in which all 
voters are free to vote for one party’s candidate in one race and for a different party’s candidate 
in another. Political scientists currently lack a clear understanding of the factors associated with 
this variation, and accordingly, we know very little about why changes in the rules (in 
Connecticut and elsewhere) occasionally occur.  
In this dissertation, I study differences in primary-election enfranchisement (often 
referred to as the type of primary), focusing on primaries for legislative and statewide offices. 
There exists a substantial and informative literature on presidential primaries and nomination 
rules, but my research centers on nominations for offices below the level of the presidency: 
congressional, statewide (including gubernatorial), state legislative, and often county-level 
positions. These “sub-presidential” primary contests have gained more scholarly attention in 
recent years, but remain relatively understudied. For these primaries, defining which voters are 
allowed to participate is a crucial rule. Suffrage rules are also quite complex. In addition to the 
numerous possible types along the open–closed dimension, decision-making authority rests with 
different actors. In many states, the type of primary is statutory, and thus established by the usual 
lawmaking process. But in other states, the party organizations are permitted to choose their own 
type (and they need not be the same). Returning to the Connecticut example, the Democratic 
party was able to keep its primary closed even when the Republicans opened theirs. I investigate 
potential explanations for this complexity as well as reasons why elites—whether leaders of the 
state party organizations or partisan elected officials—sometimes decide to modify the type.  
Political scientists who have examined the laws and rules governing state or legislative 
primary elections have mainly pursued a single line of inquiry: the effects of different primary 
rules—and “rules” is almost always limited to enfranchisement rules only—on voters, 
candidates, and electoral outcomes. Many studies analyze the impact of enfranchisement on 
candidate ideology or partisan polarization in the legislature, for example. These scholars have 
generally viewed state laws and party rules as exogenous factors, and have not offered 
explanations for what causes them to vary. Of course, studies of causes and effects can be 
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complementary; theories explaining the effects of the rules might also provide critical insight 
into the adoption of those rules (assuming the decisions are made by rational, self-interested 
political actors). The existing literature has yielded productive findings about when and how the 
rules do or do not matter. However, it is equally important to ascertain the reasons why rules are 
adopted, abolished, or modified.  
Setting the rules is one form of the broad influence that elites exercise over candidate 
nominations, which are indisputably a source of party power. No other political institution has 
the formal authority to nominate candidates for elected office, and the parties are protective of 
their role. Studying primary election systems and the decisions underlying rule adoption is 
valuable for the insights it reveals into party elites’ strategic behavior regarding the selection of 
nominees. More specifically, it serves to enhance our understanding of how elites balance 
competing goals in this context. First, political party leaders aim to win elections and get their 
co-partisans into office; thus, we might expect that their main consideration in structuring the 
nomination system is setting rules that produce the strongest, most electable contenders. 
However, party leaders also have policy goals, and they care about their nominees’ issue 
positions and priorities—in some cases just as much as they do about their electoral appeal. A 
nomination system that produces candidates faithful to the party line is also desirable. 
Furthermore, within a party there are often factions whose members prefer different types of 
candidates (i.e., ideologically moderate vs. extreme), so competing factions may try to 
manipulate the rules to help their favored candidates succeed. These goals—electoral success, 
policy agreement, intraparty power—do not always conflict, but when they do, it would be 
useful to know if and how the rules are changed as a result. Primary election rules (at least in 
part) reflect party leaders’ motives and are a product of the trade-offs they make to resolve 
conflicts, either among their shared goals, or between rival factions within the party, or both. 
Exploring variation in the rules across states shows how differences in the political context are 
related to leaders’ decisions. 
This line of reasoning rests on the assumption that partisan elites are sufficiently invested 
in the rules to think about them strategically. The academic literature on political parties and 
institutional rules helps to justify this assumption, but, nevertheless, there are reasons to be 
skeptical about the extent to which most real-world candidates and politicians are concerned with 
primary elections at all, much less the precise rules of these elections. Many incumbents face 
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token opposition or run entirely unopposed in their primaries, though the number of primary 
challenges to sitting incumbents has increased in recent cycles, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.4  
 
Figure 1.1: Number of U.S. House Incumbents Challenged in Primaries 
 
Note: Data from Boatright (2014) and Ballotpedia 
(https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2018). 
 
Regardless of the actual frequency of contested primaries, the possibility that a credible 
challenger might emerge is ever present—though admittedly remote in many cases—and even 
seemingly safe incumbents cannot ignore the threat (King 1997). In one recent, high-profile 
example, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R, VA-7) unexpectedly lost his primary in 2014 to 
Dave Brat, a relatively underfunded and little-known challenger. In 2018, Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez defeated longtime incumbent (and fourth-ranking Democrat in the House) Joe Crowley in 
the Democratic primary in New York’s 14th district, and Ayanna Pressley similarly defeated 10-
term incumbent Rep. Mike Capuano in the Massachusetts 7th. These upsets occurred under 
varying political circumstances, and probably because of somewhat different reasons. I make 
note of these examples not to start a lengthy review of the debates over how they happened, but 
merely to show that primary challenges do happen, and not all are frivolous. Sometimes the 
                                                
4 Of course, increasing numbers of candidates do not mean that primary elections are necessarily becoming more 
competitive. It is still quite rare for a congressional incumbent to lose in a primary, or to even come close to defeat 
(e.g., winning the primary with less than 60 percent of the vote) (Boatright 2014). 
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challengers succeed, and incumbents have good reason to take this prospect seriously, even if 
few of them ever lose.  
There are also practicing politicians who are concerned specifically with primary election 
rules, and many of them believe (rightly or not) that the type of primary affects representatives’ 
behavior and contributes to partisan polarization. In an op-ed for The New York Times, U.S. 
Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) argued that partisan primaries have “contributed to the election 
of more extreme officeholders and increased polarization” (2014). Phil Keisling, a Democratic 
former secretary of state in Oregon, blamed party primary elections for “the toxic levels of 
hyper-partisanship and legislative dysfunction” in American politics (2010). Former state senator 
and lieutenant governor Abel Maldonado, who played a key role in the adoption of top-two 
primary in California, said that “with a closed system, where you keep independents from voting, 
you can be lazy…with this open primary, you have to work for the taxpayers” (Caen 2015).  
Additionally, there is anecdotal evidence that leaders of state political parties (not just 
elected representatives) are invested in the choice of primary type and think strategically about 
changing it. In the 2016 election, an initiative that would allow unaffiliated voters to participate 
in a party’s primary election (while retaining their unaffiliated status) qualified for the ballot in 
Colorado, due in large part to the signature-gathering efforts of an advocacy group called Let 
Colorado Vote. Leaders of both major parties in the state opposed the measure. Steve House and 
Rick Palacio, heads of the Colorado Republican and Democratic parties, respectively, hosted a 
joint meeting with political and business leaders to encourage opposition to the ballot initiative 
(Sealover 2016). Wayne Williams, a Republican and then-secretary of state, told Colorado 
Public Radio that “the parties have the ability to say, ‘I don't want someone who is not a member 
of my party picking my nominee’” (Verlee 2016). After voters defied this bipartisan consensus 
by approving the measure, state legislators crafting the new law included certain provisions—
over public opposition—that party leaders wanted. Namely, instead of simply mailing both 
parties’ ballots to all unaffiliated voters and allowing them to choose privately which one to cast, 
the secretary of state’s office contacts these voters prior to the election to ask if they would 
prefer to receive one party’s ballot instead of the other.5 A voter’s choice of party ballot is also a 
matter of public record (C.R.S. 1-7.5-106.5). In this case, the law opened the primaries to 
unaffiliated voters, and thus reflected the electorate’s preference in general, but it is noteworthy 
                                                
5 Colorado conducted a vote-by-mail primary election for the first time in 2018. 
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that partisan lawmakers were responsible for implementing the new policy, and therefore had the 
authority to shape the details. 
The question of which voters are allowed to participate in primary elections is connected 
to broader debates about the democratic process and the rights of the political parties themselves. 
Previous rulings by the federal courts have recognized that political party organizations have 
rights based on freedom of association, including the right to make decisions about primary-
election suffrage. State law predominantly regulates (sub-presidential) primary elections, but 
aside from exceptions to protect voters and candidates against discrimination, such as the ban on 
the so-called white primary (Smith v. Allwright 1944), state governments cannot legally compel 
the parties to use certain nomination rules. The courts have established that the parties may 
require voters to register with the party if they wish to participate in its primary—or they may 
choose to have an open primary with very few restrictions. Citizens’ right to vote in general 
elections is almost universally accepted, but primary-election enfranchisement is a different 
matter, and it raises tricky questions to which there are no easy answers.  
Advocates of open primaries argue that in a fair democratic system, all registered voters 
should have the right to participate in whichever primary election they choose, without publicly 
revealing their party preference or relinquishing their status as independents. Furthermore, 
because state governments pay for the administration of primary elections (unlike caucuses or 
nominating conventions, which are administered by the parties), some people object that the 
taxpayers in closed-primary states are forced to foot the bill for contests in which they cannot 
participate unless they affiliate with a party. Thus, the closed system is (arguably) yet another 
instance of “taxation without representation.” Those who support the top-two primary argue 
further that voters should not even be restricted to one party’s ballot, but should be able to 
choose from the candidates of one party in some races and the candidates of another party in 
other races. On the other side, party leaders argue that these freedoms violate the party’s 
fundamental right to determine who its nominees are. Advocates of closed primaries argue that 
the right to select a party’s candidates should be left to those voters who are willing to join that 
party. They also raise concerns about “raiding”: in an open primary system, voters who identify 
with or support one party could cross over and vote strategically for a candidate of the opposing 
party perceived to be a weak(er) nominee, thereby sabotaging the opposing party’s chances of 
success. The courts have ruled on multiple cases related to these issues in the past, but the 
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broader (and more challenging to answer) question of how to define the proper balance between 
the rights of the voters and the rights of the political parties has not been settled. 
The dissertation begins with a pair of chapters that together demonstrate why the 
seemingly most obvious explanations for the variation in primary election laws are insufficient. 
Chapter 2 concerns the present-day variation in primary election suffrage. After reviewing the 
nuts and bolts of primary election law, and highlighting relevant findings in the literature, I 
examine an array of state-level contextual variables that are thought to be associated with the 
type of primary. This analysis shows that there is little explanatory power in the catalog of “usual 
suspect” variables cited (informally) by others in regard to types of primary elections, such as 
geographical diffusion, the state’s overall ideology, or the level of two-party competition. The 
third chapter addresses the issue of presidential nomination rules. There is an ample literature on 
this subject, but the unique features of the presidential nomination system make it difficult to 
compare to nominations for other offices, and theories of the rule-making process for the former 
may not be applicable to the latter. I briefly discuss the history of presidential primaries and 
show that presidential primary rules are not the same as the rules of other primary elections. 
Furthermore, the explanatory variables associated with a state’s type of presidential primary (or 
caucus) are not significantly associated with the type of its other primaries. Together, the 
chapters establish a large puzzle—that an important electoral institution resists (easy) 
explanation. 
Chapter 4 shifts focus from the present to the past by exploring the initial adoption of the 
direct primary election system, which occurred in most states during the period 1900–15. Some 
scholars argue that the direct primary was imposed on the parties against their will by 
progressive forces aiming to curb the corruption of party bosses and machines. Others argue that 
the parties voluntarily adopted the reform because they believed it was in their own best 
interest—or, at the very least, that there could be some benefit to the major parties from 
democratizing the system. I assess the competing arguments with a duration model of primary 
adoption that includes all the lower 48 states, and I augment those results with a short 
supplemental analysis of an interesting single case, California. Together, the analyses indicate 
that while external pressure on the parties was a significant factor in adoption, other evidence 
suggests that the parties willingly accepted the direct primary system, depending on the specific 
provisions involved. The story of how the states adopted the direct primary system shows that 
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the type of primary has always been a key consideration. Despite some extant work claiming to 
explicate the logic of primary adoption, the invention of primaries also resists general patterns 
and simple theories. 
In the final substantive chapter, I study three examples of change in the type of primary 
that have occurred since 1990. I examine the political circumstances surrounding each rule 
change to identify common motivations. Electoral calculations are one factor that appears to 
encourage changes in enfranchisement: the party decision-makers hope to alter the laws or rules 
in such a way that the primary produces nominees with the best chance of winning the general 
election. A change might also reflect intraparty divisions, when competing actors or factions 
within the same party prefer different kinds of nominees and try to modify the system to help 
their preferred candidate. To the extent that we can generalize from these few cases, they provide 
support for the argument that changes in enfranchisement stem from party leaders’ desire to 
influence which candidates bear the party label. But this common desire to influence 
nominations is manifested in diverse ways. For example, it is not the case that party elites 
universally advocate for closing (or opening) the primaries. There is considerable heterogeneity 
across leaders’ beliefs regarding the anticipated consequences of changing the type of primary. 
The data for these analyses were collected from a variety of sources. I obtained all 
information about current (2018) primary election laws directly from state statutes and election 
codes, which are accessible online (websites for the secretary of state’s office, the state board of 
elections, etc.). I provide more details about the 2018 data in Chapter 2.  
Finding comprehensive information about the most recent or up-to-date laws is relatively 
straightforward, and multiple historical sources can be used to determine when states first 
adopted direct primary laws (though they frequently disagree about the exact timing). But 
finding reliable evidence of changes in the laws over time, between the point of adoption and the 
present day, is another matter. Most state government websites do not provide historical 
information, such as archived versions of statutes, and those that do extend back for only short 
periods of time. Certain academic and government publications, including The Book of the States 
and the America Votes series, have proven somewhat useful for tracking changes over time. 
These publications have been recording dates, deadlines, and other election-related information 
from one year to the next for decades. Unfortunately, sources of this kind vary widely in terms of 
coverage—for instance, some provide information about federal-level offices only. The more 
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serious problem is that information about primary rules is often vague (e.g., The Book of the 
States characterizes several states’ primaries as “partially closed” but does not clearly define the 
term), and there is (understandably) a limited amount of detail in these compilations.  
Several political scientists have compiled data on primary election rules, but existing 
datasets are typically circumscribed in some way—for example, they cover a short time period, 
or certain offices but not others, or they lack specificity. I discuss scholarly sources of 
longitudinal data in more detail in Chapter 5.  
With this dissertation, I hope to shift some of the focus from the effects of primary 
election laws to their causes. I offer a comprehensive description of the variation in 
enfranchisement laws and try to identify plausible reasons for this variation, using data from the 
past and the present, empirically testing explanations proposed in the literature, and examining 
specific cases to find out, simply, what party leaders and elected officials say when the rules 
change. Most of the research I present in the following chapters is descriptive, but given the 
nature of the research question and the relatively small number of existing studies on this subject, 
providing ample description is essential. Using multiple approaches to study the variation and (a 
sample of) the changes that have occurred hopefully improve our understanding of the rule-




CHAPTER 2: DESCRIBING THE SYSTEM OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS 
 
The American states have considerable flexibility in administering elections. Although 
they are bound to some degree by federal law (such as campaign finance regulations and statutes 
protecting voters from discrimination), there are numerous electoral rules and requirements that 
the states are free to decide for themselves. States determine residency and voter ID provisions, 
registration deadlines, early and absentee voting periods, direct democracy laws, redistricting 
procedures, term lengths and limits for statewide officials—the list is long, and American 
elections remain robustly federal.6 A state’s electoral system can be formed through legislation 
or outlined in the state constitution (typically the former), but either way, the authority to create, 
change, or eliminate the rules rests largely with the state. 
This broad authority extends to most aspects of primary elections as well. The national 
party organizations control significant aspects of the presidential nomination process, but state 
law prescribes the rules of candidate nominations for all other elected offices, including federal 
offices such as the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.7 States have discretion over 
who can vote in a primary election, the dates on which primaries are held, runoff election 
procedures, the rules for party endorsements, and so on. Primary election systems vary widely—
no two states have the same set of rules—and they are surprisingly complex. Even the seemingly 
straightforward question of which voters may participate in a party’s primary often does not have 
a simple answer, because those who wish to vote in a primary are required to meet multiple 
conditions. Individual laws also vary in how much they restrict voters, and a state that is 
restrictive in one sense may be permissive in another (e.g., requiring registration with a party but 
allowing voters to change their registration on election day). The complexity of the systems 
makes analysis challenging in some respects, but focusing on the state level (and nominations for 
offices other than the presidency) presents a wider range of institutional changes, varied political 
                                                
6 More federalization of election law is always a possibility. Circa 2019, the parties are approximately split, with 
Democrats strongly favoring and Republicans resisting national rules. In the 116th Congress, HR 1, the top priority 
of the new Democratic majority, was dubbed the “For the People Act,” and it included numerous provisions 
enforcing common election rules on all states. It is not, however, expected to clear the Senate. The National Popular 
Vote Interstate Compact, an ingenious plan to circumvent the Electoral College and create de facto nationwide 
plurality for presidential elections, would, if it ever became law, require standardization of many electoral 
provisions. 
7 The national party organizations have some responsibility for setting rules specific to the presidential nomination, 
such as delegate allocation and the timing or order of states’ primaries and caucuses. I discuss presidential 
nomination rules and their relevance to this project at length in the next chapter. 
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contexts, and diverse party organizations to study. The states provide the opportunity to take a 
comparative approach. 
This chapter begins with a description of primary elections for legislative and statewide 
offices, where they came from, and how they work. I explain the fundamental rules of primaries, 
and identify the key political actors responsible for making the rules. I supplement this nuts-and-
bolts explanation with a review of the legal landscape in which primaries are situated. I 
summarize the major judicial decisions pertaining to primary election suffrage and the 
constitutional rights of the political parties, the state, and the voters. Next, I examine the 
academic literature on primary election laws to clarify what we know (and do not know) about 
the causes and effects of these laws. What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing data? 
What kinds of research questions have scholars emphasized, and which ones have been 
overlooked? Lastly, I present descriptive statistics to illustrate the variation in current primary 
election laws across the states. A cross-sectional analysis of the data indicates that many of the 
state-level political variables one might expect to be related to a state’s suffrage rule in fact 
appear to be unrelated to that choice. These results lay the groundwork for the research questions 
I pursue in subsequent chapters. 
The Origins of Primary Elections 
In a direct primary election, voters cast their ballots to determine the party’s nominees for 
the general election. Nominees are thus chosen by (some of) the masses, not by party leaders or 
convention delegates. The direct primary was one of several major electoral reforms adopted 
during the Progressive Era (1890–1920), alongside the Australian ballot, women’s suffrage, the 
direct election of U.S. Senators, and direct democracy (initiative and referendum). I discuss the 
adoption of direct primary elections in greater detail in Chapter 4, but for the purposes of this 
introductory chapter, I will describe the initial form that primary elections took, and explain how 
they evolved from the nominating conventions that preceded them. They became an institution 
wholly administered by the government (rather than by the party organizations), mandatory for 
all major parties, held at regularly scheduled intervals, and used to nominate candidates for 
elected offices up and down the ballot. 
Before the advent of the state-mandated direct primary system, political parties held 
nominating conventions, and the party officials and delegates in attendance were solely 
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responsible for selecting the nominees.8 For much of the nineteenth century, candidate 
nominations were purely party affairs, and thus parties had the authority to administer them as 
they saw fit. The parties were highly decentralized, and conventions were multi-tiered; they met 
at the local, state, and national levels, and thus multiple party conventions were held in an 
election year to select candidates for different levels of office.  
According to Dallinger (1903; referenced in Reynolds [2018]), the process began with a 
party committee issuing a call for a convention (e.g., a state party committee would call a 
convention to nominate candidates for statewide office, or call a convention to select delegates to 
attend the party’s national convention). Voters were called to multiple town- or ward-level party 
meetings over the course of a year to select delegates for various conventions. The meetings 
were held at irregular times, often not advertised and with little advance notification. At these 
meetings—unsurprisingly, usually quite poorly attended—voters chose their delegates through 
different mechanisms, either informal caucuses or (indirect) primary elections.  
There were a few exceptions to the convention system during this period; for scattered 
local offices, voters selected nominees directly through the so-called Crawford County System 
(the term for the earliest form of direct primary used in the U.S.; see Ware [2002]). Also, across 
the southern states, some direct primary elections were held, but they were run by the parties, not 
the state. Aside from these exceptions, voters who bothered to attend the caucuses or vote in the 
indirect primaries were selecting delegates to attend the conventions, not candidates. 
Furthermore, slates of delegates typically were handpicked and endorsed by the party 
organizations beforehand, leaving the voter little meaningful choice.  
The main goal of the conventions was to unify the party behind the nominees. Candidates 
needed to secure a majority or super-majority of the delegate vote at the convention to win the 
nomination. Party tickets were often geographically balanced to please as many constituents as 
possible, and candidates from different subdivisions within a district often made informal 
agreements with one another to take turns (Reynolds 2018). The welfare of the party ticket as a 
whole was considered more important than the success of any one candidate. Nominating 
conventions and the high levels of elite coordination they involved helped to promote party unity 
and allowed the party to rally support for its nominees in the general election: “The consultation 
                                                
8 This section draws heavily from Reynolds (2018), which contains a detailed description of the convention system. 
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and negotiation among the party elite assured that the party’s choices would be more acceptable 
to its voting base” (Reynolds 2018, p. 41).  
However, conventions also created chaos and confusion. The nominating process was 
informal, decentralized, and only loosely regulated and administered by the parties. Candidates 
who sought but lost the nomination had a host of complaints: the hastily scheduled caucuses, 
inconsistent rules or procedures that were not officially documented or recorded, the parties’ 
complete inability to prevent unaffiliated voters from participating in delegate selection. Also, 
candidates who lost the nomination could run in the general election without the party’s 
approval, because the parties had no legal authority to stop them. On election day, people could 
create and distribute unauthorized ballots indistinguishable from the party’s “official” ballot 
(Reynolds 2018). By the end of the nineteenth century, the strain on the convention system was 
becoming obvious. 
Gradually, through a series of reforms adopted to solve the problems of informal, party-
run conventions, the parties began to use the direct primary to nominate candidates. The most 
important class of early reforms incorporated more state supervision of nominations. Early 
statutes criminalized vote fraud in the indirect primaries—though they were largely 
unenforced—and new ballot regulations (often adopted along with Australian ballot laws) 
stipulated that only official nominees of the major parties could have their names printed on the 
ballot. Other laws established standard requirements for calling conventions (e.g., regularly 
scheduled dates and places, notification in advance), and convention delegates and their 
alternates were selected according to formal sets of rules. Indirect primaries began to disappear 
as voters themselves selected nominees for an increasing number of local offices, as well as 
selecting state-convention delegates. At the conventions, the delegates’ role changed—they 
served more as representatives than powerful decision-makers. The main competition shifted 
from debates among delegates on the convention floor to primary election campaigns. The 
problem was that parties were not adequately equipped to administer primary elections, 
particularly in populous urban areas, and the increasing number of regulations meant that they 
needed to turn over some of their authority to the state governments. 
 The general narrative summarized in the preceding paragraphs is meant to give an idea of 
what the nomination process was like before the enactment of Progressive-Era reforms, and how 
the problems with this process helped lead to direct primary elections. This summary is not the 
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whole story, of course. States and party leaders had different motivations for adopting the 
primary, and the specifics of how it happened vary from state to state. Cowan (2016) offers a 
compelling account of the importance of Teddy Roosevelt in transforming the nascent 
presidential-primary system into a serious institution (temporarily, as it would turn out.) In 
Chapter 4, which is devoted to analyzing the origins of the direct primary system, I will discuss 
the competing scholarly accounts of why the primary was adopted. For now, it is important to 
understand simply that primary elections did not appear out of nowhere; like many political 
reforms, they were used in a few places at first and, as more states began to experiment with 
them, they gradually became more widespread (and mandatory). 
Types and Definitions 
Primary elections involve three main groups of actors: political parties, candidates, and 
voters. State regulations define the function and powers of each group. State laws differentiate 
the major and minor parties and determine whether a party’s pre-primary endorsements are 
formally recognized. Laws establish the qualifications for candidacy, how aspiring candidates 
can get their names on the primary ballot (e.g., signature requirements), and the format of the 
ballot. Primary voters must meet the state’s registration deadlines and (in some states) affiliate 
with or express their support for a party.  
Because primary elections within a state are governed by a system of multiple laws, one 
could argue that they should be studied as a set. However, hereafter I focus almost exclusively on 
what is arguably the most important distinguishing feature among different primary election 
systems: enfranchisement. Enfranchisement (or suffrage) laws define which citizens are eligible 
to vote in a party’s primary, and the requirements they must meet to do so. Ultimately, 
enfranchisement dictates which of the following groups of individuals is qualified to participate 
in a primary election: 1) registered members of a party; 2) members of a party and 
unaffiliated/independent voters not registered with any other party; or, 3) all registered (or, in the 
absence of registration, eligible) voters.  
Beyond these fundamental distinctions, there is no scholarly consensus on how best to 
classify the types of primary elections.9 Additional rules or conditions modify the basic party- 
affiliation requirement, complicating our attempts to define a set of clearly distinct types. For 
                                                
9 As I explained in the introduction, a state’s enfranchisement rule is often referred to as its “type” of primary (e.g., 
open, closed, semi-closed, etc.). I use these terms interchangeably throughout the dissertation. 
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instance, in order for enfranchisement to be restricted (either to party members or some other 
subgroup), the state needs a system for tracking voters’ partisan affiliation. But even among the 
states with partisan registration, there are additional differences. In some states, unaffiliated 
voters need to register with the party when they vote in the primary, while other states permit 
them to retain their unaffiliated status. Some states require voters to change affiliation in 
advance, while others allow them to change registration at the polls on election day. Even when 
there are no party-affiliation requirements, voters select their ballots in different ways. Often, 
they need to declare their choice of party ballot publicly; otherwise, they can make this choice in 
the privacy of the voting booth. An alternative way to conceptualize the measure of openness is 
to consider how difficult it is for voters to switch between party primaries from one election to 
the next, or to what extent the system allows crossover voting (which occurs when voters “cross 
over” to vote in the primary of a party they are not affiliated with or whose candidates they do 
not generally support).  
Based on this assortment of rules, scholars of primary elections have constructed 
different coding schemes for enfranchisement, varying in the number of categories. In my view, 
the main types of legislative and statewide primary elections, when defined strictly according to 
which voters are allowed to participate, can be distinguished as follows: 
• Closed primary: Only voters registered in advance with a given party can vote in that 
party’s primary. How far in advance varies across the states, so within this category there 
is also variance in how closed the primaries are—that is, how early one must take action 
to become an eligible primary voter. If voters are permitted to register with a party on 
election day, it is not, strictly, a closed primary. Of course, for a state to operate closed 
primaries, it must also have a formal system to keep track of voters’ partisan registration; 
voters typically indicate their affiliation (if any) on a form when they register to vote. 
• Semi-closed primary: Independent or unaffiliated voters are allowed to vote in a party’s 
primary without registering in advance, but usually these voters must relinquish their 
independent status (by simultaneously changing their registration when they vote). Those 
who are affiliated with a party are not allowed to vote in a different party’s primary. In a 
handful of states, a new voter who has never participated in a primary before can register 
with the party on election day. Again, there is variation in how close to election day 
voters are permitted to alter party affiliation. A few states operate semi-closed primaries 
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that are quite permissive, but the main distinguishing feature of this type is that the state 
maintains a record of the voter’s partisan registration status. 
• Open primary: Regardless of affiliation, voters may vote in the primary of any party 
they choose. The only restrictions are that voters cannot participate in more than one 
party’s primary, and one’s choice of party applies to all races on the ballot. In the states 
that currently have open primaries, voters do not indicate a partisan affiliation when they 
register to vote, and the absence of party-based registration ensures “open” suffrage. 
Within this category there is variation in how voters select a party’s ballot—in most 
cases, voters must express their choice publicly (i.e., a voter requests a party’s ballot from 
an election judge). In other states, voters receive a single ballot with all candidates listed 
by party and can therefore choose which party’s candidates to vote for in the privacy of 
the voting booth. Or, they receive separate ballots for each party and mark only one, 
privately discarding the rest. 
• Top-Two primary/Blanket primary/Nonpartisan primary: All voters, regardless of 
affiliation, may participate in a top-two primary, but (unlike in an open primary) voters 
are not restricted to voting for the candidates of one party. For example, a voter could 
vote for a Republican candidate for Senate and a Democratic candidate for governor. 
California and Washington both use a top-two primary in which all candidates, regardless 
of party affiliation, run on a single primary ballot. The two candidates who receive the 
most votes in the primary then run against each other in the general election, even if they 
both belong to the same party. The blanket primary is similar to the top-two, except that 
the candidate of each party who receives the most votes automatically advances to the 
general election. The Supreme Court ruled this type of primary unconstitutional in 2000, 
so states can no longer compel parties use it—I explain this case in more detail later—but 
the Alaska Democrats participate voluntarily in a blanket primary (Democratic candidates 
appear on a ballot with candidates from the Alaskan Libertarian Party and the Alaskan 
Independence Party).10 Louisiana uses a variation of a top-two primary that is not a 
simple primary but more similar to a hybrid general election. The initial election, with no 
restriction on the number of candidates from any given party, occurs on the same day as 
                                                
10 The Alaska Republicans use semi-closed primary elections. 
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the general election (the Tuesday after the first Monday in November). There is a runoff 
election between the two top vote-getters (of any party) only if no candidate manages to 
win 50 percent of the vote. There is some confusion in this category regarding the 
terminology—Louisiana’s primary is often referred to as a “jungle primary,” and it has 
also been called a “blanket primary” (despite the fact that a blanket primary uses different 
rules). “Nonpartisan primary” is commonly used as an umbrella term to describe the top-
two, the blanket, and Louisiana’s primary. 
 
It is debatable whether the fourth category, nonpartisan or top-two primaries, belongs on the 
same scale as the others. A top-two primary is the most “open” kind of primary in some sense, 
given that all voters may participate, and have the additional freedom to switch parties from one 
contest to the next. However, there are reasons to regard it as a distinct type, not on the same 
scale as partisan primaries. It can result in two candidates of the same party sharing their party’s 
nomination (in effect), and scholars have argued that this structure creates incentives for 
candidates and for voters that are quite different from what we observe in a traditional primary 
(Alvarez and Sinclair 2015). It is not strictly an intraparty competition like the others, but more 
similar to the first stage of a two-round general election, making it a fundamentally different kind 
of contest than a partisan primary. For most of the statistical analyses hereafter, I treat all four 
categories as points on the same scale (measuring openness), but I acknowledge the concern that 
a nonpartisan primary election might not be simply a primary in its most open form. 
These four main types represent the principal distinctions along the dimension of 
enfranchisement, but clearly there is variation within each category, and some scholars have 
classified the type of primary more finely (e.g., semi-closed vs. semi-open) based on small 
differences in the rules (see Kanthak and Morton 2001; McGhee et al. 2014; Rogowski and 
Langella 2014). It is not easy to determine the appropriate number of categories for a coding 
scheme of enfranchisement—a scale with too few or too broad categories fails to capture 
potentially informative differences between states, but a too-detailed classification scheme 
makes it impossible to group together similar states for analysis. My approach for the 
dissertation was to collect data on a wide range of primary election laws, allowing for the use of 
either broadly defined or more detailed classification schemes as needed. The dataset includes 
multiple variables to capture important differences in the relevant laws: enfranchisement, 
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registration deadlines, filing deadlines, public vs. private choice of ballot, and so on. For the 
most part, I employ the four-category scale described immediately above, but with the additional 
information in the dataset I can create different scales to measure openness and see if they yield 
different results in the analyses.11 
Distinct from (but related to) the different types of primaries is the question of who has 
the authority to decide the type: the state government, or leaders of the state parties. Currently, in 
17 states, the law does not stipulate a specific type of primary. Instead, it permits the state’s 
political party organizations to determine who may vote in their primaries, and in several cases, 
the two parties have chosen different rules.12 In the remaining 33 states, the type of primary is set 
by law, and the legislature and governor are thus responsible for making the (uniform) choice for 
all parties in the state. In these states where primary enfranchisement is statutorily determined, 
the role of the party organizations in the decision-making process is unclear; it is not apparent 
how much authority or involvement the government allows the party organizations to have, if 
any. This ambiguity is a complicating factor. When we observe the type of primary that the party 
has chosen, in some states, “the party” means a political party organization, but in other states, it 
means the government—the state legislature and governor (and presumably the members of the 
party controlling these offices).13 So, in addition to the variation in the rules themselves, there is 
variation across the states in who chooses the rule; different political actors representing different 
components of the party have decision-making authority.  
 
 
                                                
11 Other scholars have broadened the primary-election coding scheme to incorporate laws other than 
enfranchisement. Sinclair (2013) created multiple variables, including indicators of whether a state uses primary 
runoffs, allows candidates to cross-file, and a measure of “pre-primary party control” to indicate how much the state 
party can control or winnow the candidate field before the primary (p. 145). Kurlowski (2014) calculated a measure 
of “restrictiveness” for each state that is based on 10 different primary laws, from party registration and ballot access 
to the timing of the primary and endorsement rules. Each law is coded according to how much it empowers the 
parties (and restricts voters or candidates), and the scores are summed to create a single measure of restrictiveness. I 
think focusing on enfranchisement specifically (at least at first) is appropriate, given its importance, and I am 
somewhat skeptical that all laws related to primary elections belong on a single scale (i.e., that they all can be used 
to measure the same thing). 
12 The states are Alaska (R: semi-closed, D: blanket); Idaho (R: closed, D: open); Oklahoma (R: closed; D: semi-
closed); South Dakota (R: closed, D: semi-closed); and Utah (R: closed, D: open). 
13 The type of primary (or the legal authority to decide the type of primary) is almost always set by statute; it is 
usually not a constitutional provision. California is one exception: its top-two primary was established when voters 
passed Proposition 14 in 2010, a legislatively referred ballot proposal to amend the California state constitution. 
Hawaii’s open primary rule is also required by its constitution. 
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Other Primary Election Laws: Regulating Ballot Access 
Enfranchisement regulations are part of a broader system of primary election laws and 
institutions that I will briefly review here. The following laws are separate from enfranchisement 
and thus not the main focus of my dissertation, but a complete discussion of how primary 
elections work should provide an explanation of the major laws that structure the system and 
potentially influence the outcomes of primaries.  
One important class of regulations involves ballot access: what legal requirements do 
aspiring nominees need to fulfill to get their names on the primary-election ballot? Ballot access 
laws generally have greater significance for candidates and parties than for voters, but they 
undoubtedly influence the set of candidates that voters get to choose from in the primary. In most 
states, qualified citizens who wish to enter a primary election must obtain a minimum number of 
registered voters’ signatures by a certain deadline and/or pay a fee. The signature thresholds vary 
across states and across different levels of office, as do the deadlines (i.e., how far in advance of 
the primary signatures must be collected and submitted to election authorities for verification). 
Some states and parties hold conventions prior to the primary to nominate or endorse 
candidates. These pre-primary conventions vary in formality; some endorsement procedures are 
legally mandated, and determine who qualifies for the primary ballot, while others are informal, 
conducted entirely under internal party rules, and do not affect ballot access. At present, no state 
relies solely on conventions to nominate party candidates, but they remain in use (in conjunction 
with primaries) in several states.14 In the strongest form, candidates qualify for the primary ballot 
only if they win enough support at the convention, and they are denied access otherwise. 
Connecticut operated a so-called challenge primary from 1955 to 2004—the state would not 
even hold a primary election unless no potential nominee secured enough votes at the party’s 
convention. A few states, like Utah and New York, currently allow candidates to qualify for the 
primary ballot either by winning enough votes at the convention or by petition. In states with 
legally recognized conventions, winning the party’s support or endorsement at the convention 
provides benefits for the candidate. For example, a few states grant ballot access—that is, 
candidates automatically qualify for the primary ballot if they get a specified percentage of the 
vote at the party convention. The endorsed candidate might also be labeled as such on the 
                                                
14 Colorado, Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Utah use formal 
conventions. 
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primary ballot, or his or her name is listed first (i.e., before the names of non-endorsed 
candidates who qualified for the ballot by petition or other means). In states with informal 
conventions, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, the parties, under their own rules, may 
endorse a candidate for the nomination before the primary election is held. These informal 
endorsements do not carry any legal benefits (ballot access or position), but they may help to 
increase the candidate’s name recognition or fundraising capability.  
Almost all states have now adopted some form of “sore loser” law, which generally 
stipulates that a candidate who loses in a primary cannot run as an independent or as the nominee 
of another party for the same office in the general election (Burden, Jones, and Kang 2014). Like 
the rules already discussed, sore-loser laws vary in strength. Some laws explicitly ban 
unsuccessful primary candidates from competing in the general election. Other states deny ballot 
access to these candidates more indirectly through other statutes, such as filing requirements and 
deadlines. In effect, they render sore-loser candidacies infeasible without expressly outlawing 
them. Other states’ sore-loser laws take the form of prohibitions on cross-filing, or the practice of 
filing as a candidate in more than one party’s primary. The most restrictive laws forbid cross-
filing altogether. Weak restrictions on cross-filing allow candidates to run both in a party’s 
primary and as an independent candidate for the same office, or they allow candidates to run in 
more than one party’s primary (but not as an independent) for the same office (Kang 2011).  
Finally, although runoff primary elections are less common now than they used to be, 
eleven states (almost all in the south) still require a runoff primary if no candidate wins a 
majority of the vote in the initial primary. Only the top two vote-getters in the first primary 
advance to the runoff, which is typically held about three to six weeks afterward. Runoff 
primaries were originally adopted to protect the principle of majoritarianism in the one-party 
southern states. According to Galderisi and Ezra (2001), runoffs prevent a candidate (in crowded 
primary fields) from securing the party’s nomination with only a small percentage of the vote 
and, in turn, help to prevent extreme candidates from winning the nomination. And because 
winners are required to capture a majority of the vote, successful nominees who prevail in a 
runoff may seem more legitimate or deserving of unified party support. 
I will conclude this description of primary election laws and rules by reviewing the 
constitutional issues surrounding state regulation of political parties and candidate nominations. 
How have judicial rulings affected the structure and administration of primary elections? How 
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have they contributed to the diverse patchwork of laws in use across the states? What are the 
rights of states, parties, and voters in this system? 
Judicial Rulings and the Constitutional Rights of Parties  
Many significant, precedent-setting court cases over the past century have helped to 
define the boundaries of the relationship between political parties and state governments. The 
courts have delineated the extent to which internal party activities may be managed and, given 
parties’ integral role in the electoral process, how to reconcile party autonomy with the state’s 
authority to administer elections. Political parties are multidimensional, and serve different 
functions, and they frequently blur the line between public institutions and private organizations. 
In general, the high court’s decisions have affirmed that political parties have the right to 
freedom of association—and it includes the right to decide who can participate in the candidate 
nomination process. I confine the following discussion to Supreme Court cases that addressed 
questions of enfranchisement specifically. 
White Primary 
Though party organizations’ First Amendment rights have been interpreted rather 
generously overall, the courts have unequivocally determined that these rights do not extend to 
discrimination on the basis of race. In the 1890s and early 1900s, southern states and parties 
enacted white primaries, in which (as the name implies) only white voters were allowed to 
participate. Like poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses, the white primary was a legal 
institution created to disenfranchise blacks. Given the Democratic party’s electoral dominance in 
the region during the first part of the 20th century, the primary election was much more 
significant than the general election, and the southern states wanted to keep black voters from 
participating in (and potentially influencing the outcomes of) these contests.  
The Supreme Court eventually ruled that white primaries violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment protection against racial discrimination in voting rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause. In a pair of important cases, Nixon v. Herndon (1927) and 
Nixon v. Condon (1932), the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that forbade blacks 
from voting in the Democratic primary, and a subsequent statute that permitted the party 
executive committee to decide the qualifications for voting in the primary (the committee used 
this authority to ban black voters from the primary again). Later, the Democratic Party of Texas 
adopted a party rule excluding black voters from the primary, which was initially upheld in 
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Grovey v. Townsend (1935); the court ruled that it was constitutional because the party was a 
private entity. However, this precedent was overturned in Smith v. Allwright (1944). The 
Supreme Court declared that white primaries were unconstitutional, regardless of whether they 
were established by statute or an internal party rule. More generally, states could not permit 
(through delegation of authority or decision-making) a private organization to practice racial 
discrimination in an election. The court determined that because the primary was such an 
important part of the electoral process, especially in the south, it could not be treated as merely 
an internal party activity, exempt from regulation. Parties were (in effect) acting as the state in 
administering primary elections, and since the states were prohibited from discrimination, the 
parties should be, too. 
Nomination Rules 
Aside from these exceptions to protect voters and candidates against discrimination, the 
courts have concluded that states cannot legally compel parties to use certain nomination rules. In 
Nader v. Schaffer (1976), a group of voters claimed that closed primaries violated their rights 
because requiring party membership to participate in the primary was a form of state coercion. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, pointing to the party’s associational right to exclude 
nonmembers from its primary as well as the trivial burden of partisan registration. In the context 
of nominations, the associational rights of the parties typically outweigh those of the voters. For 
voters, the association in question is the right to associate with a given candidate and his or her 
supporters by voting in the primary. For parties, it is the right to define themselves and their 
membership and to decide who gets to select their nominees. Rulings in many subsequent cases 
have been consistent with Nader: the court’s decision to strike down the state law in Tashjian v. 
Connecticut (the 1986 case described in the introduction) also emphasized the parties’ 
associational rights, even though the issue at hand involved opening the primary to more voters 
rather than closing it. In this conflict between the party’s rights and the state’s authority to 
regulate elections, the court placed a higher priority on the former. The Tashjian decision was 
founded on the court’s ruling in an important case from several years earlier, Democratic Party 
of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette (1981), which concerned a slightly different 
subject—presidential nomination rules—but established the precedent of courts generally siding 
with the party (in this instance, the national party) rather than the state.  
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Two related Supreme Court cases focused on whether certain voter requirements were 
too burdensome. In Rosario v. Rockefeller (1973), the justices upheld a New York statute 
requiring voters to be registered with a party 30 days before the primary election, finding that the 
law was “a reasonable means” of preventing voters from strategically raiding the primary of an 
opposing party (Maisel and Bibby 2002). However, in the same year, the court struck down an 
Illinois law that prohibited a voter from voting in the primary of one party if (s)he had voted in 
another party’s primary in the preceding 23 months (Kusper v. Pontikes). The court held that this 
law was too restrictive because it effectively banned voters from participating in the next primary 
of their (most recent) choice.  
Party Activities 
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee (1989), the rights of 
political party organizations versus parties in the legislature were at stake. The law in question 
prohibited the parties from endorsing candidates in primary elections and set other restrictions on 
the party’s organizational structure (e.g., length of terms for committee chairs and the 
geographical region that the chair could be elected from). This case was unrelated to 
enfranchisement issues but, like previous state-imposed restrictions, the law was found in 
violation of the party’s freedom of expression. The ruling in Eu is notable because the Supreme 
Court directly addressed the state’s claim that the parties had, in effect, “consented” to the law 
because partisan members of the legislature had encouraged its passage (Persily 2000). In its 
decision, the court drew a clear distinction between partisan legislators and party organizations, 
recognizing that an elected representative’s affiliation with a party does not mean that he or she 
will always act in the best interest of the party itself. This decision is 30 years old now, but it 
underscores the current debate over who or what “the party” truly is and the fact that political 
elites, despite shared party membership, may have very different motivations.  
Blanket Primary 
The demise of California’s blanket primary in 2000 is probably the best-known recent 
example of political party organizations asserting their right to decide who can vote in the 
primary. Both the state Republican and Democratic parties challenged the blanket primary law, 
which had been adopted by ballot initiative (Proposition 198). In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down the law because it violated the parties’ right to associate with candidates of 
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their choosing (California Democratic Party v. Jones 2000).15 Recall that in a blanket primary 
system, the top vote-getters from each party advance to the general election, running as the 
nominees of their respective parties. All voters may participate in the primary and switch parties 
from one race to the next if they wish, meaning that voters who do not consistently support a 
party (or, perhaps, temporarily refrain from supporting other parties) still have the power to 
determine its nominees. Lower federal courts had upheld the blanket primary as a “reasonable 
exercise” of the state’s power to increase voter participation and the representativeness of elected 
officials, but, consistent with many of its previous decisions, “the Supreme Court sided with the 
right of the parties to determine the content of their message and the identity of their standard 
bearer” (Persily 2000, p. 304). The Tashjian ruling indicated that the state could not force a party 
to restrict participation; Jones showed that the state could not force a party to expand 
participation, either—even though the California blanket primary law was passed by voter 
initiative rather than the state legislature.16  
Whose Rights? 
More recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Clingman v. Beaver (2005) that the semi-
closed primary law in Oklahoma was constitutional. In Oklahoma’s version of a semi-closed 
primary, the political parties may allow independent or unaffiliated voters to participate, but not 
voters who are members of other parties. The Libertarian Party of Oklahoma argued that the law 
violated the party’s associational rights by preventing it from opening its primary to all voters, 
regardless of party membership. In a 6–3 decision, the court ruled that the statute was 
constitutional because it was not severely burdensome; voters could easily switch their partisan 
registration if they wished to vote in the Libertarian primary. Note, however, that this decision 
focused narrowly on the associational rights of the voters, not the party. A majority upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that it was a reasonable burden for voters, but it 
sidestepped the question of whether the party had the right to decide who could vote in its 
primary. However, in the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the party itself (not just party 
                                                
15 In the aftermath of this decision, Alaska and Washington state needed to reform their blanket primary systems, 
too. In Alaska, the Republican primary is semi-closed, while Democrats participate in a voluntary blanket primary, 
as noted previously. Washington adopted a top-two primary system. 
16 This detail is perhaps relevant for present and future efforts to change primary election laws (for example, 
Colorado’s new law allowing unaffiliated voters to participate in the primaries was also passed by ballot initiative). 
Advocates of open primaries in other states could decide that it is easier to seek reform through the citizens rather 
than the government, but the Jones ruling shows that voter-initiated changes would not be immune from court 
challenges. 
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voters) have the right to freedom of association, and a fundamental part of that right is the ability 
to define itself through its membership and its candidates (Wigton 2014). He argued further that 
any state law requiring primary elections to be open, closed, or something in between violates 
the parties’ rights, because primary enfranchisement is an internal party matter—but of course 
his was not the position of the majority of the court. 
The Clingman decision upheld Oklahoma’s law, showing that 1) there are limits on the 
associational rights of the parties, and 2) there is still some confusion or disagreement in the 
courts regarding the definition of these rights. The party’s right to freedom of association may 
conflict with the associational rights of its own members. Some justices have interpreted the 
parties’ freedom narrowly (e.g., in terms of the voters)—a perspective that tends to favor more 
state regulation of the parties, as long as those regulations are not deemed too burdensome 
(Wigton 2014). Other justices have ruled to shield most party activities from state interference. 
Overall, the courts have typically ruled in favor of the parties over the state, and they have 
established that the parties have some degree of autonomy, particularly when it comes to 
protecting their label or defining their identity (which are directly linked to primary elections). 
However, the state has legitimate interests in maintaining a fair and accessible electoral system 
as well, and the courts have not defined precisely where the balance should be struck between 
state and party interests when they conflict.  
How Is “The Party” Defined? 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have helped to define the rights of the parties and their 
relationship with the state, but the lingering confusion and points of disagreement demonstrate 
why we must be mindful of the distinctions between partisan actors (elected representatives, 
leaders of state party organizations, and voters). This ambiguity mirrors the larger debate in 
political science over who or what, exactly, constitutes “the party.” One’s preferred answer to 
that question determines, in part, the fundamental goals one ascribes to the party. According to 
Downs’ classic definition, a party is “a coalition of men seeking to control the governing 
apparatus by legal means” (1957). Essentially, each party is a team of office-seeking politicians. 
Similarly, in Aldrich’s seminal theoretical account, political parties exist mainly because 
ambitious candidates and elected officials created them (1995). Parties provide electoral benefits 
and help office-seekers reach their goals; thus, strategic politicians form and join parties. In 
contrast to these candidate-centered theories, Cohen et al. (2008) and Bawn et al. (2012) recently 
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developed a group-based theory in which the parties are conceptualized as loose networks or 
coalitions of activists. These groups have intense policy demands and aim to elect candidates to 
fulfill them; their goals extend beyond merely helping a party’s candidates win elections. 
Regardless of which of these theories is more accurate, it is clear that the term “political 
party” has different meanings for different scholars, and it depends on which roles or functions 
they consider important and whom they believe truly controls the party. For example, according 
to Cohen and Bawn and their co-authors, parties are, above all else, the means through which 
like-minded activists and groups achieve their preferred policy outcomes. Their theory of 
political parties is not without its critics or weaknesses, but it has gained widespread acceptance 
among scholars in recent years. From this perspective, candidates are not the central actors in the 
party, and they do not control it. Rather, activists use their influence to ensure that candidates 
with agreeable policy positions get nominated.  
Seth Masket (one of the authors of the policy-demanders theory) places candidate 
nominations front and center in his model (2009): party activists influence elected officials’ 
behavior mainly through the nomination process. Controlling nominations is the key to 
controlling the government. He further argues that formal party organizations have lost much of 
their ability to control nominations and have been replaced by informal party organizations 
(IPOs), defined as networks or alliances of partisan donors and activists. Specifically, Masket 
shows how IPOs at the local level act as “gatekeepers” to elected office. Aspiring office-seekers 
know that they need the endorsements and resources that IPOs provide to succeed in the primary. 
The goal of IPOs is to elect representatives who will be faithful to them while in office, and they 
reward (or punish) candidates to keep them in line. In his most recent book, The Inevitable Party 
(2016), Masket sharpens the distinction between formal and informal organizations to argue that 
efforts to rein in or control the parties have been largely ineffective because of the parties’ 
informal nature. They are loosely built around networks or coalitions and thus can adapt easily to 
changes. Major anti-party reforms, such as open primaries, nonpartisan legislatures, and 
campaign finance restrictions, typically fail to weaken the parties because these reforms are 
formal and statutory, while parties themselves are not. 
In related research, Hassell (2018) delves into the specifics of what the parties do to 
affect nominations for the U.S. House and Senate, using extensive interviews with state party 
leaders and staffers, candidates and campaign staffers from both major parties, and major party 
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donors. Like Bawn et al., Hassell views the party as a network of different actors. Party networks 
have multiple resources at their disposal and use them to “clear the field” for their preferred 
candidates. By recruiting certain candidates and dissuading others, they influence the options 
available to primary voters and can affect the outcomes of the primaries as well. Congressional 
candidates who are supported by the party (measured using campaign finance data) are more 
likely to stay in the primary race and more likely to win the nomination because they have all the 
resources the party can provide—campaign staffing, media attention, and access to donors. 
Hassell’s conception of parties differs slightly from Bawn et al.’s because, in his view, the 
formal party organizations still play an important role. They are situated at the center of the 
network of party elites and facilitate coordination among activists, donors, and other political 
professionals seeking to influence the nominations. 
The goal of the dissertation is not to stake out a position in this debate over the “true” 
definition of a political party or to produce more evidence to resolve the question. I review the 
theories here because, first, it is necessary to differentiate between the components of the party, 
especially when analyzing variation in primary election rules and laws. One cannot casually refer 
to “the party’s” goals or preferences without the risk of important ambiguity—we must identify 
the state party actors who are responsible for deciding which type of primary to use and consider 
what their motivations are (and how they might differ depending on whether they are elected 
officials or organizational leaders). Second, we should not be too quick to dismiss the role of the 
formal party organizations in nominating candidates. Other scholars have argued compellingly 
that members of the formal party have lost some of their power over nominations to the informal 
network of activists and donors, but passing primary election laws and adopting rules remains 
the responsibility of the formal party, whether partisan politicians or state party organizations. I 
emphasize again the fact that partisan actors, even those within the same party, can have 
different goals, priorities, and motivations that sometimes conflict. 
Why Should Parties Care About the Type of Primary? 
The idea that political party leaders make calculated decisions is not new. Political 
scientists have shown in numerous contexts that party elites tend to act strategically, and one 
common way that they protect themselves is by exercising their authority over the rules and laws 
(particularly in electoral institutions) that affect their interests. For example, in the legislative 
redistricting process, one of the goals of elected officials as they redraw district boundaries is to 
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try to keep seats safe for their co-partisans (Bullock 2010; Butler and Cain 1992; Cain 1985). 
Where the redistricting process includes both parties, maps are often “incumbent protection 
acts,” minimizing competition. By contrast, when members of one party alone create a new map, 
the outcome is typically a partisan gerrymander that aims to maximize the favored party’s seat 
share, conditional on support. In Congress, majority party members manipulate institutional rules 
and procedures in order to solve the majority’s collective action problems and advance its goals 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993). Leaders of ruling parties sometimes modify the electoral system to 
their benefit (i.e., to maximize their representation in the government) when new issues emerge 
or voters’ preferences shift substantially (Boix 1999). Laws and institutional rules are highly 
important because they help to determine the incentives and opportunities that both voters and 
elites face (Cain and Gerber 2002). 
Given the ample evidence of party elites’ self-interested motivations, it seems logical to 
expect that the selection of primary rules—especially determining which voters are eligible to 
participate in the nomination process—is also a strategic decision in which the elites are 
invested. Nominated candidates reflect the party’s policy positions, goals, and priorities. Cain 
and Mullin argue that “nomination rules dictate who gets to decide a party’s nominee, and by 
inference, the candidate’s ideological appeal…In the end, the question of who gets to choose a 
party’s nominee critically determines the types of candidates who prevail and even the definition 
of what a party is” (2002; p. 324).  
So, the rules or laws governing primary elections should be of general importance to 
party leaders, but it is difficult to say more specifically what type of primaries they want, or what 
type political scientists predict that rational party leaders should want. There is anecdotal 
evidence that the leaders of state political parties are invested in the choice of primary type, but 
their opinions are divided; some leaders have argued in favor of closed primaries while others 
have argued against them. There is no consensus on which type is most preferred or “best” from 
a party elite’s perspective—and perhaps we should not expect one. For example, one piece of 
conventional wisdom (that persists despite mixed empirical support) is that closed primaries tend 
to produce candidates who are strongly partisan or ideologically extreme. Assuming for the 
moment that this claim is true, it is far from obvious that strategic, far-sighted party elites should 
prefer that outcome. The most logical alternative is that they would rather nominate candidates 
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who appeal to the largest number of voters and have the best chance of winning office, even if 
such candidates are ideologically moderate or not the purest party loyalists.  
Preferences seem likely to depend in part on the electoral environment in the state—is 
one party dominant, or are the races generally competitive? In a state dominated by one party, 
are members of both parties largely indifferent about the type of primary, because one party’s 
candidates are overwhelmingly likely to win regardless of their ideological characteristics? 
Furthermore, there may be conflicting priorities depending on the office: some states are 
simultaneously safe for one party at the federal level (i.e., the presidency or the majority of the 
state’s congressional districts) but competitive at the state or district level (i.e., the governorship 
or control of the state legislature), or vice versa. Few states are completely safe for one party 
across all offices, so even loyal partisans might have different preferences for primary rules 
according to the office held, desired, or sought. Of course, party leaders might take other factors 
into consideration as well, and they might want different types of candidates depending on 
whether they are in the majority or the minority. In short, the question of why states and parties 
use different types of primaries cannot be answered simply, either from an empirical and 
inductive or a theoretical, perspective. 
A key underlying assumption is that primary election laws and rules have significant 
consequences for the parties—for their influence, their candidates, and their electoral success. 
Partisan decision-makers often choose a rule based on its expected consequences, and this can 
still be true even if they are entirely wrong about those consequences. One way to approach the 
question of what causes rules to vary or change is to try to determine who gains and who loses 
(within the party) under different sets of rules. According to political scientists, what are the 
effects of the different types of primaries? 
Effects of Enfranchisement Rules on Voters, Candidates, and Elected Representatives 
The type of primary should matter to party elites and elected representatives because (in 
theory, at least) it determines the location of the median primary voter to whom the candidates 
must try to appeal. Based on spatial models of elections, the median primary voter in a closed 
primary should be farther to the left or right than the median primary voter in an open primary, 
because the open primary electorate encompasses a much larger group of voters than just the 
registered partisans of a single party (Gerber and Morton 1998). Thus, the preferences of the 
median voter in an open primary electorate should more closely resemble the preferences of the 
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median voter in the general electorate, and one would expect potential nominees to adjust their 
ideological positions depending on the location of the median voter under the different rules. 
Despite the logical appeal of these arguments about primary voters’ ideological preferences, the 
empirical evidence that primary electorates vary significantly depending on the type of primary 
is generally weak. 
Primary Electorates 
There are two questions to consider here: 1) whether primary voters differ from general 
election voters; and, 2) whether primary voters in closed primary systems differ from those in 
open systems. Some comparisons of congressional-primary voters with general-election voters 
indicate that the former group is indeed more ideologically extreme and prefers more extreme 
candidates than the latter, and that these differences are significant (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; 
Burden 2004; Hall and Snyder 2015; Jacobson 2012). Others find only minimal differences in 
ideology and strength of partisanship between primary voters and their co-partisans in the 
general electorate (Abramowitz 2008; Boatright 2014). Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003) 
find that primary voters in states with open primary systems are generally more ideologically 
moderate than primary voters in states with closed primaries, while Norrander and Wendland 
(2016) conclude that primary voters are quite similar ideologically, regardless of the type of 
primary. Note that these two examples, like most research comparing primary electorates across 
the different types, are based on presidential rather than congressional primary voters. 
Hill (2015) examines both comparisons (primary electorate vs. general and closed 
primary vs. open primary) in his study of U.S. House elections in 2010 and 2012. He compares 
the ideologies of electorates in closed primary systems with those in all other types of systems 
and finds no evidence of large differences between the two types (and to the extent that 
differences exist, the relationship is the opposite of what we would expect—electorates in closed 
primaries appear to be less, not more, ideologically extreme). However, Hill also demonstrates 
that primary electorates, regardless of the type of primary, tend to diverge ideologically from the 
general electorate. The policy preferences of congressional primary electorates are significantly 
less centrist than the preferences of congressional general electorates, even when compared to 
those voters in the general electorate who support the party.  
In summary, the academic literature partially supports the claim that primary voters vary 
significantly in their preferences when compared to general-election voters (of the same party), 
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but it provides only mixed support at best for the notion that there are significant differences 
between voters in closed primary systems versus open ones. Furthermore, it is possible that any 
existing differences between primary voters and general election voters will soon disappear: 
Abramowitz (2008) argued that as the two parties continue to polarize, it is likely that those 
individuals identifying with either of the parties (regardless of whether they vote in the primary, 
the general election, or both) will all become more extreme, thus closing the ideological gap 
between primary and general election voters belonging to the same party. But the common view 
among practitioners and pundits is that the primary electorate is extreme, and as long as this 
notion persists, it could continue to affect decision-makers, even if it is unfounded. Many people 
who report on and work in politics believe that primary voters value candidates’ ideological 
purity above all else, while general election voters care about other attributes. This bit of 
conventional wisdom was likely fueled (at least in part) by a few high-profile upsets in the 
Republican party’s Senate primaries that have occurred in the last decade (e.g., Sharron Angle 
and Christine O’Donnell in 2010 and Richard Mourdock in 2012). In a mirror image of those 
cases, a batch of high-profile wins by comparatively extreme leftists (self-identified socialists) in 
the Democratic primaries in 2018 (especially, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez beating incumbent Joe 
Crowley in New York’s 14th and Ayanna Pressley beating incumbent Michael Capuano in 
Massachusetts’ 8th district) reinforced the belief.17 Given the emphasis on these and other 
examples, popular belief in the ideological zeal of primary voters is likely to persist, even if the 
systematic evidence suggests that the differences between primary and general election voters 
are not large, and the relationship between primary rules and voter ideology is weak. 
Crossover Voting  
Crossover voting occurs when voters belonging to one party cast their ballots for 
candidates of another party.18 There are two types of crossover voting: sincere and strategic. 
Sincere crossover voters genuinely prefer one of the candidates running in the other party’s 
primary, and want to help that candidate get elected to office. “Hedging,” or casting a vote for 
                                                
17 The most attention-getting leftist Democratic primary victors won in safe districts, and thus carried their general 
elections as well. By contrast, the memorable Republican outsiders who won surprising primary victories went on to 
defeat, and vanished from the public eye. 
18 One question that immediately arises is whether unaffiliated or independent voters “count” as belonging to a party (Wekkin 
1988)—that is, should unaffiliated voters participating in a party’s primary be considered crossover voters? What about 
independent voters who lean toward one party and consistently vote for its candidates, even if they consider themselves 
unaffiliated? The scholarly consensus is that independent “leaners” who vote in the primary of the party they lean toward are not 
crossover voters. 
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the candidate viewed as second-best, also falls under the category of sincere crossover voting 
(but see Hillygus and Treul [2014], who characterize this behavior as “positive strategic 
voting”). A voter’s strongest preference might be for a candidate of her party, but if she suspects 
that her most preferred candidate has no chance of winning office, the voter might cross over to 
the other party to vote for a more viable candidate, so at least she has a second choice that she 
somewhat prefers (Alvarez and Nagler 1997). In contrast, strategic crossover voters participate in 
the other party’s primary because they want to vote for the candidate they perceive to be 
weakest, thus undermining the opposing party’s chances of winning in the general election. This 
tactic is commonly referred to as “raiding.” It is difficult to measure crossover voting precisely, 
but research indicates that the vast majority of crossover voters are sincere (Boatright 2014). 
Raiding requires sophistication and coordination among voters to be effective, and in general, 
there are not enough strategic voters to alter the outcomes of primary elections.  
Gerber and Morton (1998) proposed crossover voting as the central mechanism through 
which different primary election laws might produce different outcomes. In theory, the laws 
affect rates of crossover voting—for example, it is more difficult for voters to cross over in a 
closed primary system than in an open one, because they would be required to change their party 
registration in a closed primary. The relative ease with which voters can cross over should affect 
the composition of the primary electorate. But the differences are not as large as one might 
expect, mainly because crossover voting does not appear to occur at high rates. Alvarez and 
Nagler (1997) studied crossover voting in presidential primaries and observed that few voters 
cross over, the frequency does not vary significantly across different types of primaries, and it is 
usually not strategic. More recently, Hillygus and Treul (2014) found evidence of higher rates of 
both sincere and strategic crossover voting in the 2008 presidential primaries, depending on the 
context; more crossover voting occurred in open primaries and in primaries that were held after 
John McCain became the presumptive Republican nominee (i.e., some primary voters responded 
to the change in context and cast votes for McCain even though their strongest preference was 
for a different Republican candidate).  
Norrander’s (2018) analysis of crossover voting in congressional primaries demonstrated 
that it occurs at low rates: voters who identify as independents usually lean toward one party or 
the other, and they almost always participate in that party’s primary. According to 2010 CCES 
data, the number of pure independents who do not lean toward either party is quite low (6 
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percent), and the proportion of true crossover voters (i.e., partisans from the opposite party and 
independents who lean toward the opposite party) is also low (5 percent). These numbers do not 
vary much based on the type of primary, either. In states with open primaries, 85 percent of 
voters reported that they either identified with or leaned toward the party whose primary they 
voted in, compared to 92 percent of voters in states with closed primaries. Because it occurs 
infrequently, crossover voting does not usually affect the outcomes of the primaries.  
Norrander also makes the important point that primary rules and party registration laws 
shape people’s partisan identification, which makes it challenging to assess their impact on 
crossover voting. In states with closed primaries, there are more self-identified partisans and 
fewer independents/leaners, and vice versa in open-primary states. Primary enfranchisement laws 
do not directly influence crossover voting but instead affect how voters identify themselves with 
the parties. 
Voter Turnout Levels 
There is a logical expectation that voter turnout should be higher in open primary systems 
than in closed ones, but few researchers have tested this hypothesized relationship between 
primary type and voter turnout in non-presidential primary elections. Accurately calculating 
voter turnout in primaries is difficult; measures of the voting-eligible population and partisan 
registration rates are not available for all congressional districts and states. Many congressional 
primary elections are uncontested, and thus are excluded because of their artificially low turnout. 
These difficulties aside, existing studies on this topic provide some evidence that 
enfranchisement laws affect turnout. Jewell (1977) found that the differences in turnout between 
closed and open primaries were not large overall, but closed-primary states with the most 
restrictive requirements (e.g., requiring voters to register with the party or change their 
affiliations far in advance of the election) had particularly low turnout, and states with the most 
open type of primary had high turnout.  
In recent work, Geras and Crespin (2018) collected data on voter turnout for all 
congressional primary elections that had at least two candidates on the ballot during the 2000–
2016 period. Controlling for other factors that likely affect turnout, such as the level of two-party 
competition in the district, strict voter ID laws, the length of time between the primary and 
general election, and the presence of an incumbent or a Senate race on the ballot, they observed 
marginal differences in turnout (measured as the total number of votes cast in a primary divided 
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by the voting age population of each congressional district) across different types of primaries. 
Contrary to expectations, Geras and Crespin’s results indicate that “hybrid” or semi-closed 
primaries tend to have significantly lower turnout than open primaries. They found no significant 
differences between closed and open primaries or between top-two and open primaries (turnout 
is lower in closed primaries than open primaries, as hypothesized, but the difference is not 
significant). One explanation the authors propose for the puzzling result that turnout is lower in 
closed primaries than in hybrid primaries is that the latter type encompasses the most confusing 
set of rules. In closed and open primaries, the rules are straightforward (participation is either 
limited to registered party members or open to all voters), but in mixed systems, voters simply 
might not know whether they are allowed to participate in the primary. 
Candidate Entry 
 It is difficult to characterize these mixed results as they pertain to voters, or draw firm 
conclusions about the effects of different types of primaries on voter behavior. Some researchers 
have uncovered certain effects, but they are often small in magnitude or inconsistent with 
hypothesized relationships. But voters are not the only important actors in primary elections, of 
course, so we must also consider whether the rules have any impact on aspiring nominees. Many 
scholars have examined their effects on candidate ideology or winners’ behavior (discussed in 
the next section), but candidate entry is the first step in any contest: do enfranchisement rules 
affect the kinds of candidates who decide to run? Primary voters, regardless of their ideologies or 
preferences, can select only from those candidates who enter the race; we should not overlook 
the fact that candidate decisions shape the voters’ options.  
Kanthak and Loepp (2018) find evidence that candidates are somewhat responsive to the 
type of primary in which they must compete. While acknowledging that primary type is only one 
of many considerations for potential candidates, they argue that a moderate candidate might be 
more willing to enter an open primary, where she knows she can appeal to voters outside of the 
party. However, the opposite result emerges when they analyze the effect of primary type on 
candidate ideology (i.e., the candidates who enter primaries). Compared to closed primaries, 
Democratic candidates in semi-open primaries are significantly more liberal, and Republican 
candidates in semi-open primaries are more conservative. Republican candidates also tend to be 
significantly more moderate in open and nonpartisan systems, but this is not true for Democrats. 
The authors also assess the ideological differences, or degree of polarization, between pairs of 
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congressional general election candidates (i.e., the candidates who won their primaries). They 
find that the ideological differences between candidates in nonpartisan and pure-open primary 
systems are smaller than those between candidates in closed primary systems. But again, 
contrary to expectations, candidates are significantly more polarized in semi-open systems than 
in closed ones.  
Ultimately, the effects of primary type are statistically significant in some cases, but they 
are always substantively small. The decision to run is based on many factors, and the type of 
primary is only one of them. And candidate ideology is just one of many factors that affect who 
wins a primary. Kanthak and Loepp conclude that the type of primary contributes to the 
ideological distance between general election candidates, but its effect is simply too small to 
make much difference. Slightly more extreme candidates are not enough to cause sizable 
differences in polarization between general election candidates. 
Candidate Ideology and Legislative Polarization 
 As noted previously, most research on the effects of different types of primaries has 
focused on questions about candidates’ ideological extremity and how these candidates (once 
they are elected) behave in office and contribute to partisan polarization in the government. 
There is some evidence that the type of primary significantly affects the kinds of candidates who 
win elections and the positions they take in office. The general intuition, as described in earlier 
sections, is that in order to win in an open, more inclusive primary, candidates need to prove 
their appeal to moderate voters, not only partisan loyalists—just as they would in a general 
election.  
Kanthak and Morton (2001) compared the ideologies of winning House candidates across 
different types of primaries (distinguishing between semi-closed and semi-open systems) and 
found that candidates who competed in semi-closed, semi-open, and nonpartisan primary 
systems were significantly more likely to have moderate positions (measured with ADA scores) 
relative to their districts’ median voters than those who won in closed primaries. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, candidates in pure-open primaries tended to be more ideologically extreme than 
those in pure-closed primaries. This finding is notable because it indicates a nonlinear 
relationship between primary openness and ideological extremity; it is not necessarily the case 
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that candidate extremity consistently decreases as primaries become more open.19 More recently, 
using ideology scores for all primary candidates in U.S. House elections from 1998 to 2010, 
Kurlowski (2014) reached a different conclusion: null effects. He finds that ideologically 
extreme and moderate candidates emerge in both the least restrictive (open) and the most 
restrictive (closed) primary systems; there is no clear pattern or relationship. 
To the extent that candidates who are more extreme ideologically tend to win under 
certain rules, primary elections have also been found to affect the degree of polarization in 
Congress (Burden 2001). Gerber and Morton (1998) analyzed the effect of different primary 
types on the relationship between winning candidates’ policy positions and the preferences of 
their constituencies. They found that U.S. House representatives who had been elected in closed 
primaries were, on average, more extreme once in office (relative to the preferences of the 
median voter in their constituencies) than those representatives who had been elected in open 
primaries. According to Grofman and Brunell (2001), states with closed primaries are more 
likely to have divided Senate delegations and, in cases where the state’s two Senators both 
belong to the same party, there is greater ideological distance between them. Bullock and Clinton 
(2011) found that after California adopted the blanket primary, newly elected representatives 
were more moderate in office than the co-partisans they replaced, and incumbents also became 
more moderate. However, this moderation occurred only in districts that were less partisan (i.e., 
where the partisan composition of voters was evenly divided); the behavior of candidates in 
lopsided or highly partisan districts did not change. Sinclair (2013) analyzed data over a longer 
period—1968 to 2012—and found that closed primaries in general yielded more moderate or 
centrist U.S. Senators (based on DW-NOMINATE scores). 
In conclusion, studies on the topic of polarization have yielded mixed, often contradictory 
results. Some studies show that open primaries tend to produce more ideologically extreme 
general election winners, while others show that closed primaries have this effect, and still others 
find no evidence of any systematic effects on candidates or legislators (Brady, Han, and Pope 
2007; Hirano et al. 2010; McGhee et al. 2014; Rogowski and Langella 2015). Thus, it is still far 
from clear what the relationship is, if any, between the rules of the nomination system and the 
                                                
19 Kanthak and Morton proposed one explanation for this finding—it could be that semi-closed and semi-open 
primaries attract unaffiliated or independent voters who tend to prefer moderate candidates, while open primaries 
may attract extreme voters, because anyone can show up and vote in the primary without having to make any kind of 
public declaration. 
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ideological extremity of elected representatives (or polarization in the legislative chambers 
where they serve). The results from this extensive body of literature, though quite useful, do not 
allow us to deduce strong hypotheses about why states or parties might prefer some types of 
primaries over others. 
Identifying the Causes of Variation or Change 
Given all of the previous research on the effects and consequences of different types of 
primaries, it is somewhat surprising how little research has been done on the causes: what 
explains the variation in primary election rules across the states, and why do the rules sometimes 
change? Jewell and Morehouse (2001) offered the following succinct answer: “The variations in 
primary voting requirements reflect the strength or weakness of party organizations at the time 
the laws were adopted, the influence of habit or tradition in state politics, the recent strength of 
party organizations, and pressure to liberalize primary voting requirements in the states” (p. 105). 
Their statement may be true, but they did not provide any evidence to support it, and some of the 
proposed factors in this explanation are rather vague (how would we measure the influence of 
habit or tradition in state politics, or quantify the pressure to liberalize voting requirements?).  
In one of the few published works on this subject, Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006) 
address the question of why states use different rules. They focus on the states’ presidential 
nomination systems (i.e., the choice of a caucus or closed, semi-closed, or open primary). They 
also focus primarily on state Democratic parties, because unified Democratic state government 
was far more common during the time period they studied (1972-2000), and they were not 
confident about testing their hypothesis with Republican parties, who in many cases had this 
decision forced on them by Democratic state majorities (meaning the Republican parties did not 
get to “choose” their type of primary). The key explanatory variable in Meinke, Staton, and 
Wuhs’ model is a measure of the ideological distance between the state’s Democratic elites and 
voters—greater distance between these groups corresponds to closed systems (such as caucuses 
and closed primaries), with the reasoning that the elites would prefer to limit participation when 
they disagree with the voters’ ideological preferences.  
In his PhD thesis, Kurlowski (2014) argues that, in general, the initial form or structure of 
a state’s (non-presidential) primary elections largely resembles the form it has now: “Primary 
laws were set on a path from their origin” (p. 89). Each state’s progressivism and partisan 
tradition shaped their initial choices, and given the lack of significant changes in primary 
 38 
election laws over time, those historical factors (what he calls “the tradition of adoption”) mostly 
explain the present-day variation in primary types. To provide evidence for the overall stability, 
Kurlowski looks for changes in primary laws at three points in time (based on availability of data 
sources): 1930, 1960, and 1990. He concludes that most systems are not significantly more or 
less restrictive now than they were at the time of their adoption. Thus, the current variation in 
primary election systems can be explained by three factors: region (southern vs. non-southern 
states), the presence of a strong Progressive tradition, and the strength of the state party 
organizations. It may be true that most states have not experienced drastic changes in their 
enfranchisement laws since adopting the primary, but it does not mean that smaller changes are 
inconsequential or unworthy of study. It is also possible that present-day political factors, not just 
the state’s history, could help us understand the variation. Kurlowski offers a reasonable 
explanation for why primary election systems vary in restrictiveness, but he does not address or 
account for changes in the laws that have occurred. 
Rather than studying the variation in primary laws at one point in time, Boatright (2019) 
documents all major changes in primary election laws (that he could identify) that occurred 
during the period from 1928 to 1970 and assesses the evidence for competing claims about why 
these changes were made. He studies changes not just in enfranchisement laws but also changes 
in laws governing party control over primaries and in ballot access requirements, analyzing the 
relationship between the timing and direction of these changes (e.g., expanding vs. restricting 
popular participation) and the characteristics of the states in which they occurred. He finds that 
states made frequent adjustments to their primary laws during this period, but there was no 
systematic or consistent movement across the states to either expand the primaries or make them 
more restrictive.  
The first claim Boatright evaluates is that states with strong progressive movements 
should be more likely to change their primary election laws. “Progressive” states are categorized 
as those that adopted direct democracy (the citizen initiative) between 1898 and 1918. It appears 
that these states were somewhat more likely to tinker with their laws, and they tended to make 
“expansive” changes that made the primaries more open, especially in the early half of the period 
(1930 through the 1940s). Another claim is that states changed their primaries if there were 
defects in the original law, or difficulties implementing the primary. The evidence for this claim 
is mixed; states with primaries that were problematic did change the laws to address the 
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problems, but the directions varied—some made small changes, while others (temporarily) 
abandoned the primary, and still others were apparently unable to pass any revisions. States 
where the Nonpartisan League and its sponsored candidates had a strong presence would also be 
expected to change their primary laws, with the reasoning that states would change their laws to 
try to prevent the NPL or other outside groups from gaining power. However, Boatright finds 
little evidence to suggest that changes in the laws were related to the Nonpartisan League’s 
efforts. Lastly, increased two-party competition should provoke changes in the laws (Boatright 
uses the balance of party power in the state legislatures as a measure of competition). Again, the 
results are mixed, and the number of cases is too small to draw firm conclusions. It seems that 
changes in partisan competition are related to both expansive and restrictive changes in primary 
laws, but it is difficult to interpret these findings because “many states that made no changes to 
their primary laws went through changes that resemble states that did change their laws” (p. 
155).  
Grouping states based on their shared characteristics is a useful approach, but Boatright 
notes that we should also examine states that did not pursue reforms when we would have 
expected them to do so. It is somewhat risky to identify causes of change based on similarities 
among states where the changes occurred—we simply cannot be sure that the presence of similar 
institutions or similar contexts means that statutory changes happened for the same reasons. It is 
even harder to know what legislators were thinking when they made these decisions: “The 
relevant question in any instance of change is whether we are looking at a change brought about 
by legitimate problems in the law, by bipartisan consensus, or by partisan maneuvering” (p. 155). 
But Boatright’s data collection efforts are impressive, and the difficult analyses he undertook 
revealed some suggestive patterns based on the changes that states have made.  
The literature on the causes of variation in primary laws is quite small and inconclusive at 
present, and the literature on the effects or consequences of this variation has generally yielded 
mixed evidence, but perhaps the notion of anticipated consequences still provides a useful 
framework for thinking about change in primary election systems. Partisan officials and elites 
likely have expected consequences in mind (i.e., changing X law will have effect Y), and these 




Primary Election Enfranchisement Laws Across the States, 2018 
I conclude the chapter with a descriptive analysis of the types of primary elections 
currently in use (i.e., as of 2018). I show first that there is substantial variation across the states, 
and then evaluate factors potentially related to this variation. The analyses that follow rely on 
cross-sectional data and cannot answer the underlying questions of why states have different 
types of primaries or why changes occur—I make no causal claims based on the results. But, at 
minimum, the results allow us to assess the plausibility of some of the most “obvious” 
explanations for the variation in type of primary, and provide guidance for further tests. The 
findings contribute to the analysis of the adoption of the direct primary system in the U.S. 
(Chapter 4) and help to frame the narratives about specific instances of change in 
enfranchisement laws (Chapter 5). 
Unlike historical data about state laws, which often require quite a lot of in-depth 
searching to find, it is easy to obtain detailed information about the laws currently on the books. 
To determine the types of primaries used in the 2018 elections, I consulted each state’s election 
code—all of which are accessible to the public through state government websites. Most states 
also publish online voter guides or include election FAQs on their websites, explaining in plain 
language (not legalese) who may vote in primary elections and what the rules and requirements 
are. I used state election codes because the level of detail contained in the statutes allows for 
more accuracy in coding the different types of primaries than secondary sources such as The 
Book of the States or America Votes.  
At present, the states (and state parties) employ a variety of enfranchisement rules. A 
majority of states have primary elections that are at least somewhat open—either open to 
independent voters or to all registered voters—but a sizable minority of them (about one-third) 
have closed primaries: 
• Closed primaries: 17 states (13 states plus the Republican parties in Idaho, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and Utah) 
• Semi-closed primaries: 12 states (9 states plus the Alaska Republicans, and Democrats in 
Oklahoma and South Dakota) 
• Open primaries: 22 states (20 states plus the Democrats in Idaho and Utah) 
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• Top-two primaries/other: 4 states (3 states plus the Alaska Democrats)20 
The information in Table 2.1 provides a more detailed picture of the variation in primary 
elections across different categories of states. “South” is defined here as the set of 11 southern 
states in V.O. Key’s seminal text (1949). The “party choice” label encompasses the states in 
which the party organizations are allowed to decide who may participate in their primaries, while 
this decision is determined by statute in the “state law” states.  
 
Table 2.1: Types of Primary Elections, By Region and Decision-Maker 




CT, KS, ME, 
MD, NY, OR, 
ID Reps, OK 
Reps, SD Reps, 
UT Reps (10) 
NE, NH, WV, 
AK Reps, OK 
Dems, SD 
Dems (6) 
ID Dems, UT 
Dems (2) 
AK Dems (1) 19 
South 
 





DE, KY, NV, 
NJ, NM, PA (6) 
AZ, CO, MA, 
RI, WY (5) 
HI, IL, IN, IA, 
MI, MN, MO, 
MT, ND, OH, 
VT, WI (12) 
CA, WA (2) 25 
South 
 
FL (1) None GA, MS, SC, 
TX, TN, VA (6) 
LA (1) 8 
Total 17 12 22 4 55 
 
 A cursory examination of the table reveals a couple of patterns: first, most of the southern 
states use open primary elections, and second, there is a tendency toward closed primaries among 
the party-choice states. Aside from these surface-level observations, are there other factors that 
help to explain why the states are grouped this way (i.e., are there key similarities among the 
states with closed primaries and among the states with open primaries)? 
 
                                                
20 The number of “states” here adds up to 55 instead of 50 because there are five states in which each party uses a 
different type of primary, and the unit of observation is, conditional on within-state variation, the state-party.  
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Explanatory Variables 
The few existing studies that have addressed similar questions about states’ nominating 
systems can help to inform the selection of independent variables, but only to a point. Kurlowski 
(2014) and Boatright (2019) both argue that the states’ political histories and traditions have 
shaped their primary election laws. Recall that Kurlowski emphasized three explanatory 
variables: region (south); the presence of a progressive tradition in the state; and the strength of 
the state party organizations in the early 1900s. Boatright similarly focused on the strength of the 
progressive movement, and both authors operationalize “progressive” states as those that 
originally adopted initiative and referendum laws at the beginning of the 20th century 
(approximately). Boatright also found mixed evidence that changes in partisan competition 
motivate changes in primary election laws, suggesting that a state’s level of two-party 
competition could be related to its type of primary. Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs’ model, though it 
focuses on presidential-nomination systems, included similar explanatory variables capturing 
characteristics of the state’s political system—two-party competition, party organizational 
strength, and region (2006). The literature does not yield a long list of explanatory variables or 
strong hypotheses, but it provides a starting point, and although my approach here is mainly 
inductive, I include a variable in the regression models only if I have reason to expect it to be 
associated with the type of primary in some way.  
First, based on Kurlowski’s and Meinke et al.’s research, I incorporate variables in the 
model that measure the organizational or bureaucratic strength of the state parties. Meinke and 
his colleagues found that states with stronger parties tend to have open presidential primaries, but 
earlier evidence is inconsistent with this result (Goldstein 2002; Walz and Comer 1999), and 
other scholars (e.g., Kurlowski) argue that we should expect states with strong party 
organizations to keep their primaries closed. I hypothesize that stronger, more organized parties 
will be associated with closed primaries, because I expect their organizational strength gives 
them more of a presence in state politics (and thus they assert more authority in their relationship 
with the state government). However, this hypothesis also requires the assumption that strong 
parties prefer closed primaries, and I do not know if that is true. I include both a historical 
measure of strength—Mayhew’s traditional party organization scores (1986)—and a more recent 
measure based on surveys of state party executives and chairs during the period 2000–2001 (La 
Raja 2008). (All independent variables are explained in detail in the list below.) 
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The level of two-party competition in the state seems likely to be associated with 
enfranchisement, though the expected direction of the relationship is not obvious. In a one-party 
state, would we expect the dominant party to prefer closed primary elections, for example? And 
why would this be the case? It is suggestive that, in the five party-choice states where the parties 
have opted for different rules, the dominant (Republican) parties have selected closed rules, 
while the weaker parties have selected open ones. But it is risky to generalize from those five 
cases. Another important issue here is accurately characterizing how competitive a state is, given 
the numerous levels of elective office to consider. To measure competition (or, more accurately, 
degree of partisan control) at the state-government level, I use the Ranney index as well as a 
variable counting the number of shifts in majority party control of the state legislature in recent 
decades. I use recent presidential-vote margins in the state as a measure of competition at a 
higher level of office. I expect to find that more competitive states have more open primary 
elections, because in a competitive context, it seems that both parties should be trying to 
encourage more voters to participate in their primaries.  
Finally, I include a measure of direct-democracy laws in the states. This variable is 
considered important in historical studies (mainly as an indicator of progressivism in the state’s 
politics, at least in the distant past), but it is unclear whether the existence of citizen initiative and 
referendum processes is directly related to the present-day type of primary. Currently, 26 states 
have adopted some form of direct democracy (two allow voter referenda only, with no initiative 
power for citizens). Using a stricter coding of the variable, 21 states permit citizens to initiate 
statutes and/or constitutional amendments directly, without needing to submit proposals to the 
state legislature first. I hypothesize that states with direct democracy laws, particularly citizen 
initiatives, will also (tend to) have open primary elections, on the loose logic that encouraging 
citizens to participate in policy-making that bypasses elected representatives entails a 
commitment to a less constrained, more powerful citizenry.  
The following is a list of the independent variables with specific descriptions: 
• Party strength: To estimate the organizational or bureaucratic strength of the state 
parties, I employ La Raja’s (2008) party-organizational strength scores, which he 
calculated based on the results of surveys he conducted with state party executives and 
chairpersons in 2000–2001. Scores are assigned to the Democratic and Republican parties 
in each state (they need not match, of course). These scores range in value from 0.125 
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(weak organization) to 0.625 (strong organization). The score encompasses three 
dimensions of party organizational strength: 1) programmatic, such as the capacity to 
conduct polls or provide campaign training; 2) recruitment, including drafting new 
candidates or contributing to House challengers; and 3) bureaucratic, such as the 
organization’s operating budget and number of staff. The second variable I use to capture 
party strength is more historical in nature than La Raja’s scores: the state’s TPO score 
(Mayhew 1986).21 According to Mayhew, a traditional party organization (TPO) is 
defined as any organization operating at the local level (county, city, ward, etc.) that has 
substantial autonomy, has lasted a long time (decades or generations), has a hierarchical 
internal structure, works to nominate candidates for varying levels of office, and relies 
substantially on material incentives, not purposive, to get people to work for or support 
the organization (1986; pp. 19-20). The TPO score indicates the prominence of these 
local-level party organizations in the state’s politics during the late 1960s. Scores range 
from 1 to 5. States at the high end of the scale had “especially prominent traditional 
organizations” that were active in candidate nominations, including those at the statewide 
level of office.22 By contrast, states at the low end of the TPO scale were characterized by 
“individualistic” politics, where local candidates commonly sought and won office on 
their own, without influential nominating organizations. As previously noted, scholars 
have reached different conclusions regarding the relationship between party 
organizational strength and type of primary, but I expect that greater organizational 
strength will be associated with closed primary elections. 
• Two-party competition: To estimate the level of competition between the Democratic 
and Republican parties in a state, I employ three different variables. One is a folded 
Ranney index (a simple conversion of the original Ranney index).23 Folded Ranney 
                                                
21 I use both variables in the regression models. La Raja’s party organizational strength scores and Mayhew’s TPO 
scores are not correlated. 
22 Mayhew clarifies that TPOs and party machines are not synonymous. All local machines are TPOs; not all TPOs 
are machines. A machine is a TPO that exercises overall control of a city or county government—not all TPOs are 
able to wield this level of control. 
23 The Ranney index is a calculation that takes the average of the following four measures: the average percentage of 
the popular vote won by Democratic gubernatorial candidates, the average percentages of seats held by Democrats 
in the state senate and in the state house, and the percentage of all gubernatorial, senate, and house terms held by 
Democrats. It measures the degree of Democratic or Republican control of the state government, ranging in value 
from 0 (Republican control) to 1 (Democratic control). I use the most recent scores, which are based on the years 
2012–2017 and reported in Table 3-2 in Gray, Hanson, and Kousser 2017. 
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scores quantify the level of two-party competition for control of the state government. 
Higher values indicate a higher level of competition; it ranges from 0.5 (one-party 
dominant) to 1.0 (very competitive). The second variable I use is the number of shifts in 
majority party control of the state legislature over the past few decades—more flips of the 
legislature suggest that there is more competition between the two parties in the state. 
This measure is from Hinchliffe and Lee’s dataset (2016). For each state, they counted 
the number of times that partisan control of the upper or lower chambers switched during 
the period 1985 to 2013, and I sum the two numbers (the count for the lower chamber and 
the count for the upper chamber) to create a variable with the total number of shifts. It is 
somewhat similar to the folded Ranney score; it is more simplistic but covers a longer 
period of time. Note that both variables are based on partisan control of the state 
government and thus capture only that aspect of competition. I include a third variable 
based on the presidential vote to estimate electoral competition in a state. According to 
Hinchliffe and Lee, “voting behavior in presidential elections is often used as a gauge of 
a state electorate’s partisan and ideological balance” (2016; p. 181). For each state, I 
calculated the winning presidential candidate’s margin of victory (percentage) for 2012 
and 2016, and I use the average of the two elections as an independent variable. States in 
which the candidates won narrowly are considered more competitive. I estimate models 
using each of these three variables because they correspond to distinct concepts or 
elements of competition; one is not obviously a more appropriate measure than the 
others, and it is likely that they will not all be related to the type of primary in the same 
way. I hypothesize that states with higher levels of partisan competition will tend to have 
more open enfranchisement, because I expect that when both parties are competitive, 
both would want to encourage more voters to participate.  
• Direct democracy: This variable indicates whether a state allows citizens to initiate state 
statutes and/or constitutional amendments, bypassing the legislature completely (coded 1 
if this practice is permitted, 0 otherwise). At present, 21 states allowed citizen-initiated 
statutes (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). I also estimate models using 
an alternative version of this variable that indicates whether the state first adopted direct 
democracy during the years 1900–1920, capturing the “progressive tradition” that other 
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scholars have emphasized. I expect a state that legally allows this form of expanded 
citizen participation in the lawmaking process to have more open primary elections. 
• State law: This variable indicates whether the type of primary is statutory and determined 
by the government (coded as 1), or the party organizations are allowed to choose the type 
of primary for themselves (coded as 0), as is the case in 17 states. I hypothesize that when 
parties have the choice, they tend to opt for closed primaries so that only voters registered 
with the party have the right to participate in the nomination process—because, in 
general, I expect leaders of party organizations to be more concerned (than, say, partisan 
legislators) with preserving and protecting the identity or definition of the party. 
However, as noted previously, it is equally easy to think of situations where strategically 
minded party leaders might prefer open primaries if they had the choice.  
• Southern states: This variable is an indicator coded 1 for each of the 11 states in the 
South, as defined by Key (1949). The southern states thus defined are Virginia, Alabama, 
Tennessee, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Texas. (Recall that most of them, 8 of the 11, have open primary 
elections.) 
Results 
I estimated a series of ordered logistic regression models using the state’s type of primary 
in 2018 as the response variable. This variable has four ordered categories: 1 = closed, 2 = semi-
closed, 3 = open, 4 = top-two/other.24 The data comprise state election laws for one year only, so 
each model is based on 50 observations (states). Because there are several states in which the 
parties use different types of primaries, I estimate separate models for Democrats and 
Republicans—for example, Idaho’s type of primary is coded as closed in the Republican model 
and coded as open in the Democratic model.25 I also estimate models with the cases in the top-
                                                
24 As I noted earlier in the chapter, one could easily argue either that 1) the “top-two/other” type of primary should 
be treated as the end category on this scale of openness, or 2) it should be treated as a separate entity. In some 
respects, a top-two primary is the most open type of primary, but because it is nonpartisan, perhaps it does not 
belong on the same scale with the others. As shown, I estimated ordered logit models with the top-two/other 
category included (coded as a 4), and other models with the cases in this category omitted (AK Dems, CA, WA, and 
LA.)  
25 It seems inappropriate to treat each state party as an independent observation, since both parties use the same type 
of primary in most states. Nevertheless, the results of other specifications are reported in the appendix to this 
chapter, including models with 100 observations (pooled sample) and 55 observations, reflecting all states plus the 5 
in which each party uses a different type of primary. The appendix also includes results of models using different 
independent variables. The coefficients vary somewhat depending on the sample and which versions of the 
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two/other category omitted. Excluding the “other” type strengthens the claim that the categories 
of the dependent variable are truly ordered, but this omission does not strongly influence the 
results. Coefficients and standard errors are displayed in Table 2.2. This set of findings is 
representative of the relationships overall, but for further verification, the estimates from many 
other model specifications are provided in Appendix A. 
 




n = 50 
D 
(“other” omitted) 
n = 46 
R 
(all types) 
n = 50 
R 
(“other” omitted) 
n = 47 
Southern state       2.15 ** (0.81) 
    2.40 * 
 (1.01) 
   2.06 * 
(0.81) 
     2.44 * 
  (1.00) 
State law      1.85 ** (0.68) 
    1.84 * 
  (0.72) 
     2.46 ** 
 (0.69) 
       2.34 ** 
  (0.72) 
Presidential vote margin     0.07 *  (0.03) 
  0.06 
  (0.03) 
 0.02 
 (0.03) 
  0.01 
  (0.03) 
Direct initiative power  1.20  (0.65) 
  0.73 
  (0.70) 
 0.41  
 (0.65) 
–0.03 
  (0.68) 
Party strength  5.03  (2.75) 
  2.60 
  (3.17) 
–2.47  
  (3.87) 
–4.14  
  (4.82) 
TPO score –0.26   (0.20) 
–0.27 
  (0.21) 
–0.22 
  (0.20) 
–0.22 
  (0.21) 
Threshold coefficients     




  (2.10) 
–1.11 
  (2.49) 











Cells are ordered logit coefficients from a cumulative link model, with standard errors in parentheses.  
** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05 
 
These analyses reveal a few statistically significant relationships, though not all of them 
have an intuitive explanation.26 First, as noted at the beginning of this section, the southern states 
                                                
independent variables are employed, but the differences do not appear to be meaningful—I think the results are 
simply sensitive to changes because of the small sample size. 
26 The coefficients in an ordered logistic regression model require careful interpretation. A positively signed 
coefficient indicates an overall positive relationship with the dependent variable, but one assumption is that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups (e.g., closed–semi-closed and semi-closed–open, etc.) is the same. 
That is, according to the parallel slopes assumption, the coefficient estimates that describe the relationship between 
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(except Florida) have more open primaries, so it is not surprising that the regression coefficient 
for the region variable is positive and statistically significant across models. However, this result 
by itself cannot explain why states in the south generally have open primaries. Scholars 
frequently point to the Democratic party’s long domination of southern state politics as an 
important factor, though there is no well-defined argument for why that should have any relation 
to the type of primary. It is true that, for decades, the Democratic party primaries were often the 
only elections with any practical significance throughout the region, but why would that lopsided 
competitive environment be linked to a preference for open primaries? Perhaps all voters wanted 
to have the opportunity to participate in the all-important Democratic primaries, but why would 
the governments and parties give it to them? Partisan dominance of the South has also shifted 
over time from the Democratic party to the Republican party—why did primary election 
enfranchisement laws remain largely the same during that important and well-documented 
transition? Furthermore, if the lack of two-party competition fully explains the prevalence of 
open primaries in the region, then we should also find open primaries in one-party-dominant 
states outside the South, but as we will see, that is not always the case. 
Next, the results confirm that in states where the type of primary is set by state law and 
not left up to the parties themselves, open primaries tend to be the norm (a pattern we observed 
in Table 2.1). The coefficient is positive and statistically significant across the models. Again, a 
statistically significant coefficient cannot demonstrate why the relationship exists, but it seems 
reasonable that state governments, compared to the parties themselves, would be less inclined to 
impose restrictions on voter participation in primary elections. It is also easier and less costly 
from a logistical standpoint for the state to administer open primary elections (i.e., no need to 
maintain a party voter registration system or confirm voters’ partisan affiliation at the polls). 
I expected to find that the level of two-party competition in the state is significantly 
related to the type of primary, though I was less certain about the direction of the relationship. 
The coefficient on the presidential vote margin variable is positive and statistically significant 
(marginally) in the Democratic models, indicating that less competition is associated with more 
open primaries, but the coefficient on this variable does not approach statistical significance in 
the Republican models, which is puzzling. The other two measures of competition, the Ranney 
                                                
closed and semi-closed primaries are the same as the coefficients that describe the relationship between closed and 
open primaries. 
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index and the number of shifts in party control of the state legislature, are not related in any 
consistent manner to the type of primary (see appendix). The fact that the vote-margin variable 
appears to be slightly more related suggests that measures of electoral competition, rather than 
measures of partisan control of the state government, should be used as indicators of competition 
in this context.  
There is little evidence of relationships between the remaining explanatory variables and 
the type of primary. The coefficient on the citizen-initiative variable is (usually) positive, which 
is consistent with my hypothesis that states that allow more citizen participation in the legislative 
process also have more open primary elections, but the association is not statistically significant 
in any model, regardless of how the variable is coded. Similarly, the measures of party 
organizational strength yield weak and inconsistent results. Mayhew’s TPO score is negatively 
related to the openness of primaries, while La Raja’s party organizational strength score is 
positively related to the openness of Democratic primaries but negatively related to the openness 
of Republican primaries. None of the coefficients is statistically significant. Contrary to 
expectations, the presence of strong, organized state parties is not associated with closed 
primaries.  
 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict some of these results, to give a stronger feel for the limited 
domain of substantively important effects. Figure 2.1 is based on a model of Democratic primary 
types, while Figure 2.2 is based on a model of Republican primary types; cases in the “top-
two/other” category are excluded from both. Each figure contains plots of the cumulative 
estimated probabilities for each type of primary as the presidential vote margin increases, for 
states in the South and outside of it, and for states where the type of primary is set by state law 
and for those where the party organizations are allowed to choose. All other explanatory 
variables are held constant at their means. In other words, the vote margin is varied for each level 
of the “southern state” variable and the “state law” variable (both dichotomous), and the 
predicted probability of a state being in each category of primary type is calculated. In these 
plots, the predicted probabilities for each type are “stacked”—together, they show the overall 
relationship between the presidential vote margin and increasing openness of primary type, for 
the different combinations of region (southern states vs. non-southern states) as well as the state 
institution that chooses the type of primary (the government vs. the parties). 
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative Predicted Probabilities (Republicans) 
 
 
In the Republican models, plainly, there are panel-to-panel differences, but little sign of an 
electoral-closeness effect. For the Democratic primaries, by contrast, the association between 
open rules and large margins is evident, except for the special case of southern states with state 
law rules (top left), where variance in the dependent variable is severely limited. 
Discussion 
The goals of the analyses in the chapter were modest: to identify any patterns in the data 
and determine if there are specific factors associated with the cross-state variation in primary 
election enfranchisement laws. The results presented here, even though they should not be taken 
as evidence for strongly causal arguments, indicate that the variation is not merely idiosyncratic. 
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The findings suggest that the variation in type of primary is, at least in part, the product of 
deliberate or reasoned choices made by state legislatures and state parties.  
However, the somewhat weak or underperforming models presented in this chapter also 
demonstrate that much of the underlying story about the variation in primary types is still 
unknown. I included variables that I (as instructed by extant political science) expected to have 
some relationship with type of primary, but it is entirely possible that, in my inductive approach 
to variable selection, I left out other factors—related to state politics or government, the parties, 
or the voters—that would have been informative. One way to improve this aspect of the research 
is to try to deduce what partisan leaders’ preferences are under different electoral circumstances. 
A clearer understanding of what party leaders want would yield more concrete expectations or 
predictions. 
Of course, it also possible (even likely) that the true problem is not inappropriate model 
specification or omitted variables but rather attempting to understand the variation using 
statistical methods in the first place. My data consist of a relatively small number of 
observations. There may be trends or relationships that are not discernible in the results of a 
regression model but are still important, and if so, a qualitative approach or a study that focuses 




CHAPTER 3: THE RULES OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS 
 
In this chapter, I shift focus (temporarily) from enfranchisement in legislative and 
statewide primaries to the rules of presidential nominations. The process of nominating 
presidential candidates differs from the process of nominating other elected representatives in 
many important respects, but because my dissertation concerns enfranchisement, I confine this 
chapter mainly to a discussion of the various types of delegate-selection contests that states use 
to decide presidential nominees—caucuses and primaries—and the role of voter participation in 
these contests.  
Most aspects of presidential nominations fall outside the scope of the dissertation, but it 
would be unwise to ignore them completely, so I attempt to account for the influence or effects 
of suffrage rules in presidential nomination processes as necessary while keeping other candidate 
nominations squarely in focus. The main issue, for my purposes, is determining whether the 
variation in the enfranchisement laws of sub-presidential primaries can be easily explained 
merely by looking at the rules of states’ presidential caucuses and primaries. That is, do they all 
vary in tandem? Is the same set of factors associated with the rules of both presidential and sub-
presidential primaries? It is possible that the answer to these questions is yes, and the same 
considerations that affect state partisan actors’ choice of an open or closed legislative primary 
also affect their choice of a presidential caucus or primary. However, we know that presidential 
nominations are unique among American elections, and (I suspect) the rules and procedures that 
make them unique also make it unlikely that the variation in types of presidential nominating 
contests solely determines the variation in types of primaries for other offices. Enfranchisement 
is arguably the defining rule or characteristic of primary elections for offices below the 
presidency, but it is just one of many rules governing presidential nominations. Although 
scholars and practicing politicians have occasionally focused on enfranchisement in presidential 
primaries and caucuses, it is evidently much less important compared to other rules in this 
context, such as timing (a state’s decision of when to hold its caucus or primary) and methods of 
awarding delegates to candidates based on the results of state contests, which have received far 
more emphasis and attention. But these claims are based more on intuition and conjecture than 
knowledge, so to assess their validity, I compare the cross-state variation in types of presidential 
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caucuses and primaries with the variation in types of primaries for other offices, and examine the 
relationship between them.  
In the first section, I summarize the nation’s early system of presidential nominations, 
which were originally decided by closed conventions of party elites but gradually opened to 
rank-and-file voters. The use of presidential caucuses and primaries has fluctuated over time, and 
while the timing of their initial adoption in the early 1900s coincides with the adoption of direct 
primary elections for other offices, the latter became widespread more quickly, and presidential 
primaries, after their original introduction, had little further impact on outcomes until after 1968. 
I also explain the features of the presidential nomination process that distinguish it from other 
candidate nominations—the role of the national parties, sequential contests, delegate allocation 
methods—and review the current academic literature about the effects of different nomination 
rules.  
In the empirical section, I describe the variation in the types of nominating contests that 
were used for the 2016 presidential election, and compare them with the current types of 
legislative/statewide primary elections I analyzed in Chapter 2. I estimate similar regression 
models using state- and party-related covariates to see if they are associated with the type of 
presidential nominating contest (and if so, whether the associations differ in direction or strength 
from those in the previous chapter). Finally, I replicate the analysis of state delegate-selection 
rules in Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006), replacing their response variable (caucus/closed/semi-
closed/open presidential primary) with my measure of the types of sub-presidential primaries. I 
find that their main substantive result does not hold. As in the previous chapter, I do not make 
any causal claims based on the results of these descriptive analyses; they cannot prove that 
legislators and party leaders view the enfranchisement rules of presidential contests and the rules 
of other primaries differently. But the findings show that: 1) presidential nominating contests 
developed somewhat later and in a different manner; 2) states and parties sometimes use 
different enfranchisement rules for their presidential and sub-presidential contests; and, 3) a state 
or party may modify its rule or type of contest for the presidential nomination while leaving the 
rule for its other primaries unchanged. 
History of Presidential Nominations 
The consensus among political scientists and historians is that the presidential nomination 
system in the United States has proceeded through five stages of development since the nation’s 
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founding. Mayer (2010) helpfully summarizes the salient features of each stage. The brief 
“Framers’ System” (1787–1792) was not really a system at all; it seems most of the framers gave 
little consideration to what the mechanism should be for nominating presidential candidates. 
Some of the framers who did ponder the issue simply assumed that the electoral college would 
perform this function—that is, they expected that in most future presidential elections, no 
candidate would be able to secure a majority, and thus the decision would go to the House of 
Representatives, where members would choose from the top five candidates. According to 
Mayer, there is some evidence to suggest that the framers also believed a natural consensus 
would emerge; the country’s political elites would simply know who all the best presidential 
candidates were and gradually coalesce around one or two of them.  
Next came the era of congressional caucuses (1796–1828, approximately), which were 
also not terribly well organized (it is not clear when the first one was held). Essentially, a party’s 
members in the U.S. House and Senate would gather to decide on the presidential nominees. The 
congressional caucuses lacked formal rules and procedures, and the process was highly 
inconsistent from one election to the next. They were also unpopular, because many people were 
distrustful of what they saw as an attempt to combine the powers of the legislative and executive 
branches. As congressional caucuses fizzled out, the parties began using national party 
conventions to select presidential candidates during “the pure convention era” (1832–1908). 
Mayer describes the system succinctly: “Every four years, delegates representing the state 
affiliates of each national party gathered in a centrally accessible city to nominate a presidential 
ticket, adopt a national platform, and perform a small number of other housekeeping tasks” (p. 
189). Convention votes were divided among the states in proportion to their number of electoral 
votes. Delegates were appointed by state party committees or chosen at the parties’ state 
conventions. In some years, the national conventions merely ratified the consensus—a 
presidential candidate was nominated on the first ballot with two-thirds of the vote—but 
conventions in other years required multiple rounds of balloting and sometimes produced 
nominees who had won less than 20 percent of the vote on the first ballot.  
The states began to use presidential primary elections under the “mixed” system (1908–
1968), and for the first time, voters were given some opportunity to express their preferences. 
During the early 1900s, many states adopted legislation establishing primaries for presidential as 
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well as other candidates.27 By 1912, almost all states had laws in place that allowed for either the 
direct election of national-convention delegates or at least a preferential, “beauty contest” kind of 
primary (Davis 1997). During former president Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign for the 
Republican nomination in 1912, he advocated the use of direct primary elections (a key issue for 
progressives) to “let the people rule” (Cowan 2016). Roosevelt won 9 of 13 Republican 
primaries that year, including those in Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, and President William 
Howard Taft’s home state of Ohio—victories that were an indication of his continued popularity 
among the people. However, his success in the primaries ultimately did not allow him to secure 
the nomination. The preferential primaries held in many states permitted voters to cast their 
ballots for candidates directly, but the results were non-binding in the sense that they were not 
used to allocate delegates to candidates. Authority over the allocation of delegates remained with 
party elites, and their rules varied—they often did not decide how to allocate delegates until after 
the primaries were over, and many delegates, though they had been selected in primary elections, 
went to the conventions uncommitted to any candidate (Dwyer 2012). As a result, presidential 
primaries played a limited role in the 1912 Republican contest (despite Roosevelt’s best efforts) 
and during this period more generally. The contests allowed some voter input and participation, 
and they served as a measure of candidate popularity that was sometimes useful for elites (Cohen 
et al. 2008), but the results were largely inconsequential, especially after 1916 (Davis 1997). 
Candidates were still “chosen in ‘smoke-filled’ back rooms by party regulars, with little input 
from ordinary citizens and the results of the primaries having no direct bearing on who became 
the nominee” (Dwyer 2012, p. 38). As long as party leaders retained control over large blocs of 
convention delegates, racking up primary-election victories could not guarantee the presidential 
nomination. In 1952, Sen. Estes Kefauver of Tennessee won 12 of the 13 Democratic primaries 
he entered, but “had so little support among party leaders that he never won more than 30 percent 
of the total convention vote” (Mayer 2010, p. 191). 
The Modern System of Nominations 
The fifth stage takes us to the present: beginning in 1972, the “plebiscitary system” (also 
commonly referred to as the “modern” or “post-reform” era of presidential nominations) was 
                                                
27 Although there was a flurry of new legislation early on, there was also a lengthy period during which no new 
presidential primary laws were enacted. From 1917 to 1945, only Alabama passed a presidential primary law; 
meanwhile, several other states repealed their existing laws (e.g., Iowa, Montana, Indiana, Michigan) (Davis 1997). 
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initiated by the events and aftermath of the turbulent 1968 Democratic national convention. Two 
candidates, Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, had won most of the presidential primary 
elections, but Democratic party leaders did not like McCarthy (according to Mayer’s account), 
and Robert Kennedy was assassinated on the final night of the primaries, so the nomination went 
to LBJ’s vice president, Hubert Humphrey. He had not competed in a single primary election and 
was a supporter of the Vietnam War. “As the Democratic convention approached, part of the 
antiwar forces’ anger focused on the process that, in their view, had denied them a nomination 
they won in the primaries” (Mayer 2010, p. 191).  
The McGovern-Fraser Commission 
At the convention, the Democratic party authorized a special commission to rewrite the 
delegate selection rules for the 1972 convention. The Commission on Party Structure and 
Delegate Selection (aka the McGovern-Fraser Commission, named after its co-chairs, Sen. 
George McGovern of South Dakota and Rep. Donald Fraser of Minnesota) produced a 
comprehensive set of recommendations that completely changed the rules for delegate selection, 
convinced the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to accept them, and, most notably of all, 
got all 50 states to comply with the new guidelines (Mayer 2010).  
The new rules empowered the national party, and allowed it to regulate state procedures 
to a much greater extent than before; state parties could no longer select their delegates in any 
fashion they wanted. If they wanted to have their delegates seated at the convention, the state 
parties were required to use selection processes with “explicit, written rules” (McGovern and 
Fraser 1970). The commission’s guidelines forbid proxy voting, the unit rule (which allowed the 
majority of a state delegation to cast all of the delegation’s votes for one candidate), and ex 
officio delegates. State party meetings needed to be held on “uniform dates, at uniform times, 
and in public places of easy access,” with adequate public notice of these meetings issued in 
advance. The delegate selection process in each state also had to be conducted entirely within the 
calendar year of the convention. In describing the tremendous importance of the commission’s 
new guidelines, Mayer writes, “Where the old rules had often been set up with the deliberate 
intention of assisting the party regulars, the new rules sought to strip away all such advantages. 
‘Full, meaningful, and timely’ participation was the commission’s goal and mandate, that swept 
everything else before it” (p. 192). Mayer also notes that every state was in violation of at least 6 
of the 18 guidelines at the time they were issued. 
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A main result of the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s reforms was a significant increase 
in the number of presidential primary elections: in 1968, the Democrats held 17 primaries; the 
number increased to 23 in 1972, 29 in 1976, and 33 by 1988 (Hagen and Mayer 2000). State 
party leaders were uncertain about which nomination processes would meet the new standard of 
“full, meaningful, and timely” voter participation, and many believed that primary elections were 
the best way to achieve compliance and avoid the unseating of the state’s delegates at the 
national convention (Walz and Comer 1999). Note, however, that the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission did not explicitly require or prohibit any system—state parties could continue to use 
primary elections, precinct caucuses, or party conventions. The key difference was that voters 
now needed to have real decision-making power in these processes. Convention delegates had to 
be awarded to candidates based on voters’ support for that candidate. If primaries were held, 
delegates would be allocated based on the results of these primaries. State parties could continue 
to use precinct caucuses and conventions to select delegates, but the caucuses needed to be open 
to any Democratic voter who wished to participate, with none of the special advantages for party 
insiders or organizational leaders that were part of the old caucuses. Finally, convention 
delegates were no longer independent—they had to vote at the convention for the candidate that 
they were committed to support, based on the results of the primaries and caucuses (Cohen et al. 
2008).  
The Democratic Party continued to reform its nomination process after 1972. Nominee 
George McGovern was soundly defeated in the 1972 presidential election, and in each of the 
next four election cycles, the Democrats established new special commissions tasked with 
modifying the rules of their predecessors (Dwyer 2012). Some reforms helped to bolster the 
voters’ influence over nominations, while others shifted the balance of power in favor of party 
elites. Overall, there has been a trend toward greater democratization. After many years of 
tinkering with the rules for delegate allocation, the Democratic Party has, since 1992, mandated 
that all states use a proportional-representation rule with a minimum threshold of 15 percent. On 
the other hand, the creation of “superdelegates” in 1981 is a prominent example of a counter-
reform—the Hunt Commission established this new category of delegates consisting of 
unpledged party leaders and elected officials, specifically because it feared that voters had too 
much power to decide the nomination.  
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What about the Republican Party? 
Although the national Republican party in 1968 did not experience a crisis similar to the 
Democratic Party’s, it did establish a special commission at its 1968 convention, and the 
commission recommended a number of rule changes and guidelines that were formally adopted 
at the next convention in 1972. A key difference, however, is that the national GOP never 
attempted to impose any of these changes on the state Republican parties, leaving them free to 
continue making their own choices—that is, until state laws started to change (Walz and Comer 
1999). There is some evidence that the Republican Party felt pressured by voter demands to 
reform and democratize its nomination process (Dwyer 2012), but the main reason why state 
Republican parties also began using more presidential primaries during this period is because 
changes in state laws applied to them, too. Compliance with the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s 
guidelines often required changes in the states’ election laws, and when (mostly Democratic) 
state legislatures rewrote the laws of the primaries, they simply applied the laws to both parties, 
thus forcing the Republicans to abide by the new rules. The Democratic Party initiated the 
reforms and, in the process, the Republicans’ nomination system was also altered substantially. 
This review of the history of presidential-nomination reform underscores a few important 
points. First, although presidential primary elections have been in use since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, their outcomes were mostly irrelevant until after 1968, and they became 
widespread (and consequential) largely as a result of the national Democratic Party’s drastic 
reforms. By this point, primary elections for other offices had already been mandatory in almost 
all states, for years or decades. Second, the McGovern-Fraser reforms illustrate the extent to 
which the national party is involved in and maintains authority over presidential nominations. In 
imposing the commission’s guidelines (and implicitly threatening to unseat convention 
delegates), the national party clearly asserted its power over the state parties. Despite the overall 
trend toward democratization, the national party has also acted multiple times to diminish the 
voters’ influence over nominations. This is another respect in which the nomination process for 
the presidency differs fundamentally from the process for other candidate nominations: the 
national party does not set or interfere with the rules of legislative and statewide primaries. 
Lastly, the continuous attempts to modify the presidential nomination system showcase the 
importance of rule-making authority. Party leaders have used their control over the rules to 
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accomplish their goals and preserve their influence, even as voters have gained a voice in the 
nominating process.  
The Process of Nominating Presidential Candidates Is Unique 
The rules of presidential nominations are incredibly complex, and they vary a great deal 
over time, across states, and between the two major parties. This wealth of rule variation 
provides endless fodder for research, and scholars of U.S. presidential primaries have studied 
numerous aspects of the rules. Specifically, scholars have examined the causes and effects of 
different methods of delegate allocation, the frontloading of the presidential primary/caucus 
calendar, the use of caucuses versus primary elections, and changes in campaign fundraising 
restrictions. In this section, I summarize several of the most-emphasized features that distinguish 
presidential nominations from others. 
Timing 
It is common knowledge that Iowa and New Hampshire have the privilege of holding the 
first contests of the presidential-nomination season, and aspiring candidates spend quite a lot of 
their time and money campaigning in these two (small) states. The heavy emphasis on the Iowa 
caucuses and the New Hampshire primary highlights the importance of candidate “momentum” 
and the underlying reason for it: the sequential nature of the nominating process. Put succinctly, 
“momentum as conceptualized by Aldrich (1980) is an increasing (but not inevitable) chance of 
winning the nomination which results from exceeding expectations in primary outcomes,” 
thereby producing “an increase in resources and a gain in accumulated delegates in comparison 
to other candidates” (Norrander 2010, p. 516–517). The politics of sequential elections differ 
markedly from those of simultaneous elections (Aldrich 1980; Morton and Williams 2001) 
because the outcomes of early contests have the potential to affect subsequent contests. Voters, 
as well as donors and party elites, can judge a candidate’s viability and electability based on how 
they perform in Iowa, New Hampshire, and other early primaries and caucuses—and can then 
adjust their behavior based on this information. Winners receive considerable amounts of 
publicity and favorable media coverage, so voters become more familiar with them. Voters also 
tend to gravitate toward the frontrunner through specific mechanisms such as cue-taking, 
contagion, and the desire to support a winner and feel like they are part of the consensus (Bartels 
1988; Mutz 1997).  
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Frontloading the Calendar 
Sequential nominating contests have also led to frontloading of the calendar. To increase 
the importance of their contests for the eventual outcome, states generally have been moving 
their delegate-selection contests earlier and earlier in the season, as close to the start of the period 
as allowable by the national party’s rules (Mayer and Busch 2004). For obvious reasons, a state 
would like its contest (and its voters) to be influential in choosing the nominee (Morton and 
Williams 2001). All the emphasis on early contests and victories also tends to winnow the 
candidate field. As more primaries and caucuses are held early on, it is possible for candidates 
who win the first few contests to secure a majority of delegates months before the convention, 
and accordingly, losing candidates withdraw early (for financial reasons and/or when a loss 
seems inevitable—it is merely a question of how long some candidates are willing to hang on).  
Another consequence of frontloading is that presidential nominations are no longer 
decided by delegates at the national conventions. Historically, there was often some level of 
suspense or bargaining by the front-runners who came to the convention without having secured 
a majority of the delegates. But with fewer uncommitted delegates available, and most 
candidates dropping out early in the season, the eventual party nominee typically achieves a 
majority well before the convention (Mayer 2010). 
The 2008 Democratic presidential nominating contest is a notable exception. The primary 
calendar was considerably frontloaded that year, with 38 states holding caucuses and primaries 
by the end of February. Michigan and Florida even held their primaries in January, violating the 
national party’s rules. Despite the large number of early contests, by March (the month in which 
John McCain clinched the Republican nomination), the race between Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton remained close, and the two Democrats continued to battle for delegates until June. This 
prolonged campaign somewhat modified the conventional wisdom regarding the gains from 
frontloading. That is, if the race for the nomination is close (one candidate has not already 
accumulated a majority of delegates), then holding a nominating contest relatively late in the 
season, especially if it is the lone contest on that day, can be beneficial for a state. The 2008 
Democratic primaries in Pennsylvania (April 22), and in Indiana and North Carolina (May 6), 
received more attention from the candidates and the media than they would have in a typical 
nomination season, when they would have occurred too late to change the outcome. In fact, two 
days before Obama won the May 20th Oregon primary (one of the last contests of the season) 
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and thus secured enough pledged delegates to claim the nomination, he held a campaign rally in 
Portland with an estimated attendance of 72,000 people—the largest crowd for a political rally in 
the state’s history (Casey 2008). 
Synchronization of Presidential and Sub-Presidential Primaries 
This discussion of the frontloading phenomenon indicates that there are some incentives 
for states to hold presidential nominating contests early in the season, but any incentive to hold 
sub-presidential primary elections early would be different in kind (e.g., incumbents and 
challengers might differ on whether early or late primaries are preferred). Thus, it is common for 
states and parties to hold their primaries or caucuses for president and their primaries for other 
offices on different dates, with many presidential nominating contests held in February or March 
and sub-presidential primaries in August or September. Asynchronous contests are particularly 
common when the state parties opt for presidential caucuses, which, as noted previously, are not 
administered by the government. Given the higher administrative costs of holding primary 
elections on different dates, as well as the potential negative impact on voter participation—
turnout in presidential primaries is generally higher than in primaries without a presidential race 
at the top of the ballot—one might expect to see a trend over time toward consolidation. 
However, based on the last 5 presidential elections, the number of states holding their 
presidential and sub-presidential primaries on the same day has stayed roughly the same. In 
2000, 20 states held primary elections for all levels of office on the same day. The number was 
about the same in 2004 (19 states), and dropped to 16 in 2008, a year when the presidential 
calendar was heavily frontloaded. It rose back to 20 states in 2012, and in 2016, 18 states 
(including two state parties) held all primaries on the same day (refer to the primary-election 
dates listed in Table B.1 in the appendix). It is possible that more consolidation will occur if 
states continue to replace caucuses with primary elections, but note that Colorado and 
Minnesota, two states that have abandoned caucuses for the 2020 election, will hold their 
presidential primaries in March while continuing to hold sub-presidential primaries in the 
summer months (June and August, respectively). 
Delegate Allocation and Selection (Type of Contest) 
Similar to the literature on sub-presidential primary elections, much of the research about 
the rules of presidential nominating contests focuses on the effects of different rules, particularly 
methods of delegate allocation. As explained earlier in the chapter, the use of proportional 
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representation rules has been mandatory in the Democratic Party since 1992. The national 
Republican party is more flexible on this point, permitting some winner-take-all contests, but 
with conditions; in 2016, states that held Republican contests during the first two weeks of 
March were required to allocate their delegates on a proportional basis (with minimum 
thresholds no higher than 20 percent), and candidates in the winner-take-all contests held later 
needed to win at least 50 percent of the vote to secure all of the delegates (Kurlowski 2018).  
Studies have yielded inconsistent evidence regarding the impact of various delegate 
allocation rules. Some scholars have found that differences in the rules have significant effects: 
for example, in her study of the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential primaries, Dwyer (2012) 
demonstrated that changing the allocation rules would have altered the delegate totals of the 
candidates and, in some cases, would have put a different candidate in the lead (all else equal). 
She also found that proportional-representation rules are associated with higher turnout in the 
primaries and more competitive contests. Additionally, others argue that the Democrats’ use of 
proportional-representation rules tends to prolong the intraparty contest and winnow the 
candidate field more slowly (Steger, Hickman, and Yohn 2002). Still others find no significant 
effects (Norrander 2006); it is difficult to determine whether the slower winnowing on the 
Democratic side is the result of proportional-representation rules or the fact that the Democratic 
electorate tends to be more divided than the Republican electorate (or both). 
Regarding the electorate, some of the research on voters in presidential primaries and 
caucuses yields little evidence that they hold divergent preferences or are more extreme 
ideologically than general election voters (e.g., Abramowitz 2008; Geer 1988; Norrander 1989; 
Sides and Vavreck 2013). However, other scholars have shown that the type of presidential 
caucus or primary (open vs. closed) affects voter participation—both the level of turnout and the 
kind of voter who turns out (Hillygus and Treul 2014; Kaufmann et al. 2003; Norrander and 
Smith 1985). Because caucuses require in-person meetings and discussion and thus demand 
more of the voter than simply casting a ballot in a primary election, caucuses generally have 
lower levels of voter participation, and those who show up tend to be more ideologically extreme 
than the average primary voter. Presidential primaries with open rules are associated with higher 




The Role of the National Parties 
One final significant difference between presidential nominations and nominations for 
other offices is that the national parties undeniably play a much larger role in setting the rules of 
the former than the latter. This statement immediately raises questions about exactly how much 
power the national party wields and the source of this power. Since the passage of the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms, the general perception is that the national (Democratic) party 
reasserted its power over the states, relying largely on its rule-making authority to exercise 
control, but the variation in the rules discussed previously indicates that the state parties still 
have some flexibility. How does the national party convince state parties to comply with its 
rules, and how much latitude do the states possess? 
For the most part, the national party uses its authority to seat delegates at the convention 
to keep state parties in line (Walz and Comer 1999). Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cousins v. Wigoda (1972), which upheld the right of the national Democratic party to refuse to 
seat delegates who were chosen in a manner not compliant with its rules, the states have 
understood that the national parties are serious about punishing violators. The fear of having 
one’s state delegates unseated as a punishment for noncompliance is not trivial, and in general, 
state parties would prefer to avoid this risk. But even though the national parties clearly have 
power in this system (again, a power they do not exercise over other nominations), it is also true 
that certain rules are controlled by state governments and parties, and the national party can only 
do so much to convince them to change.  
For example, the national party has only limited ability to change the primary-election 
calendar, because state legislatures set the dates of primaries, and state parties decide when to 
hold their caucuses. The national parties have granted special recognition to four early-contest 
states—Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada—but beyond threatening to unseat 
the delegates from states who jump the line, they cannot force states to change their dates. The 
Democratic Party grants delegate bonuses to states that hold their primaries in April or June, as 
well as an additional bonus when three or more contiguous states cluster their primaries on the 
same day. A few states took advantage of these incentives by changing the timing of their 
contests between 2012 and 2016, but others sacrificed the delegate bonuses in order to move up 
in the calendar (Kurlowski 2018). 
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Similar limits on the national parties apply when it comes to enfranchisement, or what 
Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006) refer to as the “delegate selection rules” for presidential 
contests. Meinke and his co-authors argue that the McGovern-Fraser reforms undoubtedly 
affected state parties’ decisions regarding delegate selection rules (and “structured the choice sets 
of party leaders”), but state governments and state party elites ultimately determine how open or 
closed the rules are. There has been an overall trend toward primaries and away from caucuses, 
but with plenty of exceptions—some, but by no means all, states have adopted open rules. 
During the period that Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs study (1972–2000), some states even changed 
to primary elections but reverted to caucuses in the next election cycle. The authors conclude that 
state party leaders’ authority to choose delegate selection rules allows them to protect their 
influence over presidential nominations. 
This section has outlined the important ways in which presidential nominations differ 
from others. Phenomena that have received a lot of attention in presidential contests—
momentum, frontloading, delegate allocation, pressure from the national parties—are simply not 
an issue for other candidate nominations. However, enfranchisement rules are necessary for all 
nominating contests, regardless of office, and, like sub-presidential primaries, presidential 
primaries vary in type. The same decision-makers (state governments or state parties) who set 
the enfranchisement law or rule for sub-presidential primaries are responsible for determining 
enfranchisement in presidential contests, too, and the same considerations could influence the 
decision at all levels of office. In the analyses in the following section, I compare the states’ 
enfranchisement rules for presidential and sub-presidential primaries and investigate the 
explanatory factors associated with them. 
Types of Presidential Nominating Contests in 2016 
The enfranchisement rules available to the states and parties vary somewhat between 
presidential nominations and other candidate nominations; a top-two or nonpartisan primary is 
not an option for presidential nominating contests, and state parties do not use caucuses to 
determine their nominees for any elected offices other than the presidency. Additionally, while 
state governments are responsible for administering primary elections, caucuses and conventions 
are administered by the parties. And because state parties may choose (from one presidential 
election cycle to the next) to hold caucuses instead of participating in primaries, within-state 
differences between the two parties are more frequently observed among nominating contests at 
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the presidential level—that is, there are more instances of one party in a state holding a caucus 
while the opposing party uses a primary, for example. For sub-presidential primaries, the option 
of using different enfranchisement rules is limited to parties in the “party-choice” states 
identified in the previous chapter.  
 Table 3.1 lists the states and state parties according to the type of contest or 
enfranchisement rule they used for presidential nominations in 2016. Despite the overall shift 
toward primary elections since 1972, there is still considerable variation in the type of contest. 
Eleven states (plus 4 state parties) used caucuses in 2016. Ten states (plus 7 state parties) used 
closed primaries—approximately the same number of states that used open primaries (16). The 
table also shows that the states in the south use open contests, with very few exceptions. No 
southern state employs a presidential caucus. Recall that we observed the same pattern with the 
southern states’ sub-presidential primaries in the previous chapter. 
 
Table 3.1: Types of Presidential Nomination Contests in 2016, By Region 
Caucus Closed Primary Semi-closed Primary Open Primary 
Non-South 
AK, CO, HI, IA, KS, 
ME, MN, NV, ND,  
UT, WY, ID Dems,  
NE Dems, WA Dems,28 
KY Reps (15) 
 
AZ, CT, DE, MD,  
NM, NY, OR, PA,  
KY Dems, CA Reps,  
ID Reps, NE Reps,  
OK Reps, SD Reps,  
WA Reps (15) 
 
MA, NH, NJ, RI, WV, 
CA Dems, OK Dems, 
SD Dems (8) 
 
IL, IN, MI, MO, MT, 
OH, VT, WI (8) 
 
South 
None FL, LA (2) NC (1) 
AL, AR, GA, MS, 
SC, TN, TX, VA (8) 
 
Totals 
15 17 9 16 
 
The next form of variation to consider is how states’ types of presidential nominating 
contests compare to the types of sub-presidential primaries that they use. This comparison is 
displayed in Table 3.2, based on state rules used in the 2016 elections. One might expect to find 
that the same enfranchisement rule applies to all nominating contests in a state, and this is often 
                                                
28 The Democratic parties in Nebraska and Washington used a combination of caucuses and a nonbinding/advisory 
presidential primary. 
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true—for example, all states that used an open primary election for presidential nominations also 
had an open primary for their other candidate nominations. In some states, it is simply not 
possible to use one enfranchisement rule for presidential primaries and another for sub-
presidential primaries (e.g., if a state does not have partisan registration, it cannot enforce a 
closed rule, regardless of the contest), and a consistent rule probably also makes election 
administration easier. However, the information in Table 3.2 indicates that the states and parties 
do not always employ the same enfranchisement rule for all of their nominating contests. Of 
course, in many cases the source of the differences is the fact that caucuses are used only at the 
presidential level, and top-two/nonpartisan primaries are used only at the sub-presidential level, 
but there are other differences. For example, Arizona uses a closed primary election for president 
but a semi-closed rule for its other primaries, while New Jersey does the reverse (a semi-closed 
primary for president but a closed primary for other nominations). Several of the states and 
parties that use caucuses for president also use closed primaries to nominate their other 
candidates, as one would expect,29 but a few of the caucus states use open primaries for 
nominations below the presidency. 
 
Table 3.2: Types of Nominating Contests, Presidential vs. Sub-Presidential, 2016 
Sub-presidential Presidential Caucus Closed  Semi-Closed  Open  
Closed  KS, ME, NV,  
KY Reps,  
UT Reps 
CT, DE, FL,  
MD, NM, NY,  
OR, PA, KY 
Dems,  
ID Reps, OK Reps, 
SD Reps 
NJ None 
Semi-Closed  CO, WY,  
NE Dems,  
AK Reps 
AZ, NE Reps MA, NH, NC, RI, 
WV, OK Dems, 
SD Dems 
None 
Open  HI, IA, MN, ND, 
ID Dems,  
UT Dems 
None None AL, AR, GA, IL, 
IN, MI, MS, MO, 
MT, OH, SC, TN, 
TX, VT, VA, WI 
Top-Two/Other  AK Dems,  
WA Dems 
LA, CA Reps,  
WA Reps 
CA Dems None 
                                                
29 Caucuses and primary elections are quite different in nature, but scholars usually rate caucuses as the most closed 
type of nominating contest (more restrictive than a closed primary), so we would generally expect states with 
presidential caucuses to have closed sub-presidential primaries, assuming the rules of the contests at these different 
levels are indeed related. 
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Changes in the rules of presidential nominating contests occur more frequently than 
changes in the rules of other primaries, in part because many changes in presidential rules (e.g., 
holding a caucus instead of a primary, moving up the date of a caucus, changing the minimum 
threshold in delegate allocation) merely require action by the national or state parties rather than 
the passage of new legislation, which is generally more difficult to achieve. Missouri 
Republicans held a caucus in 2012 but then used a presidential primary in 2016; Nebraska 
Democrats bound their delegates through a primary election in 2012 but used a caucus in 2016; 
such changes are fairly common and do not affect the laws of sub-presidential primary elections. 
Another recent example occurred in Michigan in 2011. The state modified its laws to require 
voters to make a written declaration of their party membership before being allowed to vote in a 
party’s presidential primary. Michigan does not have partisan registration, and the Michigan 
Secretary of State’s Office clarified that no official membership was required to participate in the 
presidential primary. Still, some viewed the written declaration as equivalent to affiliating with 
or joining a party formally (Kurlowski 2018). Importantly, this new law did not apply to the 
state’s legislative and statewide primaries—only the presidential primaries. I make note of these 
examples to show that the rules of presidential nominating contests are modified more 
frequently, and changes in presidential-nomination rules do not always produce corresponding 
changes at the sub-presidential level. 
Analyses 
First, I repeat the cross-sectional regression analysis from Chapter 2 to see whether (and 
how) that same set of independent variables is associated with the variation in enfranchisement 
rules for presidential nominating contests. The results could be very similar, suggesting that the 
same state-level measures help to explain the variation in enfranchisement rules for all candidate 
nominations. Dissimilar results would suggest that the level of the contest matters, and that the 
factors related to the rules of primaries for presidential candidates differ from those related to 
other primaries—another feature contributing to the distinctive character of the presidential 
nominating process. The key difference in the following models is the response variable: instead 
of the type of sub-presidential primary in 2018, the dependent variable here captures the state’s 
type of presidential nominating contest used in 2016. It is also an ordered variable, ranging from 
caucuses (coded 1) to open primary elections (coded 4). To account for the fact that the 
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Democratic and Republican parties used different enfranchisement rules in seven of the states in 
2016, I estimate separate, ordered logistic regression models for each party.  
For the most part, I use the same state-level explanatory variables that I used in the 
models in Chapter 2: indicator variables for region (south), states where the type of primary is 
statutory, and direct democracy; a measure of current party organizational strength as well as the 
state’s traditional party organization (TPO) score; and multiple variables measuring competition 
(the folded Ranney index, presidential vote margin in 2012, and the number of changes in 
partisan control of the state legislative chambers during 1985–2013). The results of selected 
models are presented in Table 3.3. Additional results can be found in Appendix B (Tables B.2 
through B.4). 
 
Table 3.3: State-Level Variables Associated with Type of Presidential Nominating Contest, 2016 
 Dems n = 50 
Dems 
n = 50 
Reps 
n = 50 
Reps 
n = 50 
Southern state       3.28 ** (0.90) 
     3.16 ** 
(0.94) 
     3.65 ** 
(0.96) 
     3.28 ** 
(0.96) 







Shifts in party control 0.18 (0.14) 
___ 
 










  (0.03) 













  (4.03) 
TPO score      0.59 ** (0.21) 
   0.53 * 
(0.21) 
    0.65 ** 
(0.21) 
    0.54 ** 
(0.21) 
Threshold coefficients     






  (2.15) 














Cells are ordered logit coefficients from a cumulative link model, with standard errors in parentheses.  
** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05 
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The coefficient of the region variable is, as expected, positive and statistically significant 
for both parties, just as it was in the previous chapter’s models. Nearly all of the 11 states in the 
South use open primary elections for president and for other candidate nominations—but, as 
before, a statistically significant coefficient does not tell us why this is the case. 
The organizational strength of the state party appears to be positively associated with 
open enfranchisement rules for presidential contests among the Democratic parties and 
negatively associated with open rules among the Republican parties, but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant in any model. Again, these results are consistent with the results I 
observed previously (using the measure of types of sub-presidential primaries).  
Another similarity between the results shown here and the results in Chapter 2 is that 
there appears to be no consistent or significant relationship between the measures of two-party 
competition and the enfranchisement rules of presidential nominating contests. The presidential 
vote margin from the previous election has a negative coefficient (i.e., overall, less competitive 
presidential elections in the state are associated with more closed rules), and it is not statistically 
significant for either party. In the models of sub-presidential primary rules, the variable for 
presidential vote margin had a uniformly positive coefficient and was statistically significant in 
just one model (for Democratic parties). A different measure of competition, the number of shifts 
in party control of the state legislature, has a positive coefficient (meaning more shifts in control, 
or higher levels of competition, are positively associated with more open rules) and is 
statistically significant in the model for Republican parties, but it is not significant in the 
Democratic model. These results for shifts in party control are generally consistent with what I 
found in the models of sub-presidential primary rules. Overall, it is difficult to draw any strong 
conclusions from the results for the measures of competition—either for the enfranchisement 
rules of presidential nominating contests or the rules of other candidate primaries. The 
coefficients on these variables are rarely statistically significant, and the signs on the coefficients 
change depending on which variable is used (the folded Ranney index, presidential vote margin, 
or shifts in party control),30 whether the sample consists of Democratic or Republican parties, 
and whether the dependent variable is types of presidential nominating contests or types of sub-
presidential primary elections. Again, the level of two-party competition seems like a variable 
                                                
30 The coefficient on the folded-Ranney variable does not approach statistical significance in any model, regardless 
of the other variables used. 
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that should matter, but it is also not clear what the expected relationship is (a higher level of 
competition could be associated with closed rules or open rules—either is plausible). 
One interesting difference between the results of the models for presidential nominating 
contests and the results of the models for other candidate primaries can be observed by 
comparing the coefficients for the state’s TPO score across models. As shown in Table 3.3, the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that states with higher scores (i.e., 
where TPOs had a stronger presence in the 1960s) generally use more open enfranchisement 
rules for their presidential nominating contests. This result is surprising—the coefficient was 
consistently negative and not statistically significant in the results reported in Chapter 2, and 
furthermore, I would not expect the parties or legislatures in strong-TPO states to choose an open 
rule for primary elections (for any office). It is also interesting that “early initiative,” an indicator 
variable for states that adopted legislation permitting the use of direct citizen initiatives early 
(1900–1920), consistently has a positive coefficient (meaning early adoption of citizen-initiative 
laws is associated with more open rules) and is almost-but-not-quite statistically significant in 
these models.31 In the Chapter 2 results, the relationship between this variable and the response 
variable differed across models (sometimes positive, sometimes negative), and the coefficient 
never approached statistical significance. The two historically oriented variables, TPO score and 
early adoption of citizen-initiative laws, appear to be associated with the enfranchisement rules 
of presidential nominating contests but not the rules of primary elections for other offices. These 
are puzzling findings. One could guess that the variables are capturing some substantive aspect 
of the state’s political tradition, but I am not sure why they are significantly related to one set of 
rules but not the others. 
Again, I would not make any strong causal claims based on these results. They differ 
from the results in Chapter 2, yes, but there are plenty of possible reasons why the statistical 
relationships are different, and perhaps the reasons are not substantive. As noted before, the 
sample size is small, and it remains likely that important explanatory variables have been 
omitted. However, if we accept that the results here are at least somewhat accurate or 
informative, they indicate that the variation in enfranchisement rules for presidential nominating 
contests is indeed different. Explanatory variables that were not remotely significant in the 
                                                
31 The measure of present-day direct democracy laws—an indicator variable for states that currently allow citizens 
to initiate legislation—is not statistically significant in any of the models I estimated.  
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previous chapter’s analyses are clearly significant in the presidential models, and the directions 
of the relationships differ. It is not the case that the same factors account for the variation in the 
rules for both presidential and sub-presidential primaries. 
A logical next step is to combine the analysis summarized in Table 3.3 with its Chapter 2 
companion (see Table 2.2). I estimate the models again, this time using a different dependent 
variable that captures the openness of a state’s nominating contests at both levels (presidential 
and sub-presidential) in 2016. Presidential nominating contests are assigned a value ranging from 
0 to 1, according to the type (caucus = 0, closed primary = 0.25, semi-closed primary = 0.75, 
open primary = 1). Sub-presidential primaries are assigned similar values (closed primary = 0, 
semi-closed primary = 0.25, open primary = 0.75, top-two/nonpartisan = 1). These two values 
are then summed to create a single measure that accounts for the openness of a state’s contests at 
presidential and sub-presidential levels. Note that each contest is given equal weight in the 
measure (i.e., the openness of the presidential contest is not treated as more important). Using 
this new dependent variable and the same independent variables, I estimate additional models—
selected results are displayed in Table 3.4. There are nine states in which the two parties have 
different composite scores, so I estimate separate models for each party as well as a model with 
















Table 3.4: Variables Associated with Type of Nominating Contest (Composite Measure), 2016 
 Dems n = 50 
Reps 
n = 50 
Both Parties 
n = 100 
Both Parties 
n = 100 
Southern state        0.77 **  (0.22) 
       0.81 ** 
  (0.20) 
       0.77 ** 
  (0.14) 
     0.75 ** 
(0.15) 
State law     0.37 *  (0.18) 
       0.52 ** 
  (0.16) 
       0.42 ** 
  (0.12) 
     0.44 ** 
(0.12) 
Shifts in party control ___  
     0.08 * 
  (0.04) 
     0.07 * 
  (0.03) 
___ 
 







Direct initiative   0.20   (0.18) 
  0.06 
  (0.17) 
  0.13 
  (0.12) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
Party strength   0.74    (0.76) 
–0.76  
  (0.96) 
–0.12  
  (0.54) 
0.02  
(0.57) 
TPO score   0.03   (0.06) 
  0.07 
  (0.06) 
  0.06 
  (0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Intercept –0.10   (0.49) 
  0.22 





     
Adj. R-squared 0.20   0.36   0.32 0.27 
Cells are coefficients from OLS models, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable ranges from 0 
(where the state party uses a caucus and a closed primary) to 1.75 (where the state party uses an open primary for all 
nominating contests). 
** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05 
 
 These models yield results similar to those discussed previously: the coefficient for the 
southern-state indicator variable is positive and statistically significant, as expected, because 
most of the states in this region use open primary elections for all levels of office. The only other 
statistically significant variable is the “state law” indicator. Its coefficient is consistently positive, 
indicating again (as in Chapter 2) that states where the type of primary is set by statute instead of 
the parties tend to have open primary elections. 
Replication of Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006) 
Another approach I take to compare the variation in enfranchisement rules for 
presidential nominating contests with the variation in the rules of other primaries is to replicate 
the study by Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006)—one of the few published works on this subject. 
The authors investigate why presidential delegate selection rules (i.e., enfranchisement rules) 
vary across the states and over time: Why would state party elites ever open the delegate-
selection process to voters, particularly those who are not even members of the party? Meinke 
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and his co-authors frame their argument in terms of trade-offs: leaders have organizational goals, 
such as preserving the party’s ideological identity and guarding their control over nominations, 
but they also have an interest in mobilizing voters and nominating electable candidates. Opening 
the process (i.e., moving from a caucus-convention to a primary election, or from a closed 
primary to an open one) could result in electoral benefits by engaging more voters, but it could 
also diminish leaders’ influence. Party elites should be less willing to make this trade-off as the 
loss of influence becomes more costly—that is, ceding control to voters through an open rule 
grows risky as the preferences of elites diverge from the preferences of the electorate, and this 
outweighs the potential electoral benefit. When their preferences are closely aligned, there is 
little risk, so a more open delegate-selection process is likely.  
Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs’ analysis is limited to the post-reform era (1972–2000), 
allowing them to control for the general trend toward primaries motivated by the McGovern-
Fraser reforms. They employ two dependent variables; one is binary (caucus vs. primary), and 
the other has six ordered categories to capture the types of contests and enfranchisement rules 
that the Democratic parties used during this period (ranging from closed to open): caucus-
convention, caucus-convention with nonbinding primary, direct delegate primary, closed 
primary, semi-closed primary, and open primary. The unit of analysis is the state-year: one 
observation for each state Democratic party in each election cycle. To measure their key 
independent variable, ideological divergence, they use indicators of citizen ideology (scores from 
Berry et al. 1998) as well as elite ideology for all states (the mean ideological score of the 
Democratic congressional delegation in the state). The measure of ideological divergence is the 
absolute value of the difference between the state citizen ideology score and the Democratic elite 
ideology score.  
The authors estimate separate models that include only states that had unified Democratic 
government during this period, and others that include all states (but with interaction terms for 
unified Democratic government, to see how it conditions the effects of the other independent 
variables). Using the ordered, six-category dependent variable, they estimate ordered probit 
models, with robust standard errors to account for heterogeneity in the error structure across the 
states. They account for temporal dependence in the data by including a count variable (“stable 
years”) representing the number of calendar years since the last change in the dependent 
variable. They expect the measure of ideological divergence to be related most strongly to the 
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enfranchisement rule when unified Democratic government is in place. Their results generally 
support their hypotheses: in states where there is greater ideological divergence between citizens 
and elites, the state government is less likely to choose a primary over a caucus. The probabilities 
of using either closed or open primaries decrease, and the probability of an open primary drops 
more steeply. 
Meinke and his co-authors provided their dataset upon request, and my first step was to 
ensure that I could replicate their original results. The published results and those of my 
replication are identical, and, most importantly, I was able to reproduce the key finding in all 
models. The original, published results and the replication results are displayed in Table 3.5. The 
coefficient on the ideological-distance variable is negative and statistically significant in the 
model using the restricted sample (states with unified Democratic government), and the 
coefficient on the corresponding interaction term (unified Democratic government interacted 




















Table 3.5: Results from Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs (2006) and Results of the Replication 
 (1) Unified Dem. n = 119 
(2) Full Sample 
n = 378 
(3) Replication 
Unified Dem. 
n = 119 
(4) Replication 
Full Sample 
n = 378 
Ideological distance   –0.032 * (0.013) 
–0.004 
  (0.010) 
 –0.032 * 
(0.013) 
–0.004 
  (0.010) 
Party organization    0.344 * (0.175) 
  0.053 
  (0.139) 
0.344  
(0.175) 
  0.053 
  (0.139) 
Party competition 1.085 (1.687) 
–0.057 




  (1.033) 
Home-state candidate    0.528 * (0.264) 
–0.023 
  (0.243) 
   0.528 * 
(0.264) 
–0.023 
  (0.243) 
South 0.447 (0.306) 
  0.648 
  (0.469) 
0.447 
(0.306) 
  0.648 
  (0.469) 
Uni. Democratic govt. ___  
–1.112 




  (1.235) 
UD × Distance ___  
   –0.023 * 
  (0.011) 
___ 
 
   –0.023 * 
  (0.011) 





















UD × South ___  
–0.218 




  (0.377) 
Time counter     0.171 *  (0.078) 
      0.139 ** 
 (0.051) 
    0.171 * 
 (0.078) 
      0.139 ** 
 (0.051) 
Stable years –0.011   (0.016) 
–0.018 
  (0.010) 
–0.011 
  (0.016) 
–0.018 
  (0.010) 
Threshold coefficients     



































Cells are ordered probit coefficients from a cumulative link model, with robust standard errors, clustered by state, in 
parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 are reproduced from Table 4 in Meinke et al. 2006 (p. 189). ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. 
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After replicating their original models, I estimated new models using the enfranchisement 
rules of sub-presidential primaries as the dependent variable while keeping all of the original 
independent variables (except for the home-state-candidate indicator variable, because it applies 
to presidential nominees only). I also limit the sample to state Democratic parties, as Meinke et 
al. did. This analysis is intended to check whether their key substantive finding—that greater 
ideological divergence between elites and citizens is negatively associated with more open 
rules—is also true for the enfranchisement rules of sub-presidential primaries.32 For the results to 
be consistent with Meinke et al.’s results, the coefficient on the ideological distance variable 
should be negative and statistically significant in the models using the restricted sample (states 
with unified Democratic government). In the models that use all states, the coefficient for the 
“unified Democratic government × distance” interaction term should be negative and 
statistically significant. As shown in Table 3.6, my analyses yield different results. The measure 
of ideological distance between a state’s citizens and its Democratic elites is not statistically 
significant, and the sign is positive rather than negative. As in Chapter 2, I also estimated models 
excluding Louisiana and states that used blanket primaries during this period, but doing so does 













                                                
32 To code the dependent variable for the years 1972–2000, I used measures from McGhee et al.’s dataset (2014) and 
data reported in Kanthak and Morton (2001). 
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Table 3.6: Variables Associated with the Type of Sub-Presidential Primary, 1972–2000 
 Unified Dem. n = 119 
Full Sample 
n = 379 
Unified Dem., 
Blanket excl. 
n = 111 
Full Sample, 
Blanket excl. 
n = 354 
Ideological distance    0.016   (0.015) 
  0.002 
  (0.010) 
  0.018 
  (0.020) 
  0.007 
  (0.012) 
Party organization   0.022   (0.201) 
–0.217 
  (0.210) 
–0.153 
  (0.285) 
–0.086 
  (0.215) 
Party competition –2.189   (2.162) 
  0.522 
  (1.397) 
–0.920 
  (2.357) 
–0.804 
  (1.463) 
South   0.927   (0.539) 
  0.645 
  (0.334) 
  1.070 
  (0.630) 
     1.062 * 
  (0.519) 
Uni. Democratic govt. ___  
  0.682 




  (2.116) 
UD × Distance ___  
  0.014 
  (0.018) 
___ 
 
  0.010 
  (0.022) 
UD × Party org. ___  
  0.214 




  (0.327) 
UD × Party comp. ___  
–2.420 
  (2.167) 
___ 
 
  0.058 
  (2.326) 
UD × South ___  
  0.294 
  (0.393) 
___ 
 
  0.083 
  (0.472) 
Time counter   0.026   (0.094) 
  0.033 
  (0.049) 
  0.015 
  (0.108) 
  0.035 
  (0.057) 
Stable years   0.018   (0.028) 
–0.005 
  (0.012) 
  0.012 
  (0.031) 
–0.018 
  (0.015) 
Threshold coefficients     
Closed | Semi-closed –1.057   (1.722) 
–0.443 
  (1.201) 
–0.434 
  (1.921) 
–1.129 
  (1.363) 




  (1.905) 
–0.629 
  (1.368) 







Cells are ordered probit coefficients from a cumulative link model, with robust standard errors, clustered by state, in 
parentheses. ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05. 
 
 I will repeat my caveats: it is difficult to say that the lack of a statistically significant 
coefficient proves anything. The replication of Meinke, Staton, and Wuhs’ analyses was intended 
as a “check”—an additional piece of evidence to supplement the description earlier in the chapter 
and offer further comparison of presidential nominating contests with other primaries. It was 
another way of looking for similarities and seeing if the relationships found in one context 
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(presidential) were also present in the other. Based on these findings, limited though they are, it 
appears the relationships are not the same. Elite–citizen ideological divergence helps to explain 
the variation in enfranchisement rules for presidential nominating contests, according to the 
results of Meinke and colleagues’ original study, but it appears to be not significantly related to 
the rules of sub-presidential primary elections. 
Discussion 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to explain why the types of legislative and 
statewide primary elections vary, and it is reasonable to think that an examination of presidential 
rules could be helpful for this purpose—that it might yield insights about how the rules of sub-
presidential primaries are set and why they change. Given the importance of presidential 
nominations, it would be foolish to ignore them. However, because they are so important, and a 
unique part of our electoral system, we also have reason to expect that the same explanations will 
not apply outside of the presidential context.  
I have spent much of the chapter explaining how the process used for presidential 
nominations is different from the nomination process for other candidates. I used multiple 
approaches to illustrate these differences. I reviewed the history of presidential nominations to 
show that binding presidential primaries became widespread more recently than other primary 
elections and developed for different reasons. I explained that in the presidential system, rules 
other than enfranchisement have received a great deal of attention (timing, delegate allocation)—
rules that are inapplicable to other nominations. The national parties also exercise some control 
over the rules of presidential nomination rules, while they have little or no involvement in other 
primary election laws. Cataloging the rules of state primaries and caucuses in 2016 and 
comparing them to the types of sub-presidential primary elections shows that states often use the 
same enfranchisement rules for all of their nominating contests. They are clearly associated, as 
we would expect, but they do not always match. And changing the rules for presidential 
nominations does not require changing the rules of other nominations, as several examples show. 
Despite these differences, enfranchisement is a necessary rule for all nominating contests, 
even if it receives less emphasis in presidential ones. It is important to determine whether the 
variation in types of presidential primaries is the same (and can be explained by the same factors) 
as the variation in types of other primaries. The results of the regression analyses provide some 
evidence to suggest that this is not the case. If the results had turned out differently—if I had 
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instead found that all states use the same enfranchisement rules for all of their primaries—it still 
would not have given us an answer to the underlying question: why some states use open rules 
and others use closed rules. The results do not tell us what specific factors state politicians and 
party leaders think about when they consider changing the enfranchisement rules, or whether 
they are thinking about the presidential contest first and other contests second. 
Some scholars argue that the leaders of party organizations have retained their influence 
over presidential nominations, even as the reforms have empowered the electorate, through their 
control of the rules. If their preferences run counter to the voters’, party leaders can manipulate 
the rules to favor certain candidates and perhaps even alter the outcome of the nomination. These 
arguments might help us understand rule-making in the context of sub-presidential primaries. In 
a later chapter, I investigate the possibility that changes in enfranchisement laws and rules are 




CHAPTER 4: THE ADOPTION OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY 
 
In this chapter, I study the conversion from party-controlled nominating conventions to a 
legally mandated system of direct primary elections at the turn of the twentieth century. The 
adoption of primary elections is notable for several reasons. First, it involved a significant 
transfer of power. Instead of a party’s leaders or elites choosing who its nominees would be, the 
direct primary gave the masses (or some subset thereof) the authority to elect candidates. Why 
would party leaders allow their control over nominations to pass to ordinary citizens? Second, 
despite extensive research on the subject, the main causes of this shift in power remain a matter 
of dispute. Several scholars have argued that the direct primary was imposed on the parties 
against their will by progressive, anti-party forces aiming to stop corruption (Burnham 1970; 
Epstein 1986; Key 1956; Merriam 1923; Merriam and Overacker 1928; Ranney 1975). Others, 
however, argue that the establishment of primary elections was akin to regulatory “capture”; that 
is, the parties voluntarily adopted the new system because they believed it was in their own best 
interest (contrary to appearances) (Ware 2002). A similar argument is that party leaders 
recognized the drawbacks of reform but expected the benefits to outweigh the costs: 
democratizing the system would require giving up some (but by no means all) control, and it 
would bolster the parties’ democratic legitimacy among the public (Galderisi and Ezra 2001). 
None of these arguments has been proven conclusively right or wrong, and it remains unclear 
which political factors were most important in prompting or facilitating this reform. Finally, 
understanding the adoption of the direct primary would contribute to our understanding of 
broader, key issues: how do party leaders define or perceive the party’s self-interest? What are 
the best ways to preserve it? Does allowing more democratic participation in the nominations 
process necessarily mean giving up power? If so, are there political or electoral gains that offset 
the sacrifice? Have the two major parties usually (or always) seemed to agree on how changing 
nomination rules would alter the general election, in which they normally compete on a zero-sum 
basis? 
 Previous research has yielded mixed evidence that sometimes supports (or refutes) the 
competing accounts of the change from conventions to primary elections (i.e., either party 
leaders were forced to cede to the desires of reform-minded progressives, or they willingly made 
the change because they had clear incentives to do so). However, until recently, much of the 
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analysis was qualitative in nature, relying mostly on case-study evidence from a small number of 
states and municipalities (Epstein 1986; Galderisi and Ezra 2001; Key 1956; Ware 2002). 
Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler (2013) addressed this gap in the literature with a quantitative 
analysis wherein they explicitly modeled the timing of states’ adoptions of the direct primary. 
Their more systematic approach to the question is a significant advancement, and it helps move 
toward adjudication between the different explanations offered by previous scholars. However, 
their models are sparse, their measures are imprecise and of questionable validity, and their 
results are neither robust nor conclusive. Why the American states adopted primary elections at 
all, and in the precise sequence that they did, warrant much further research.  
This chapter begins with a replication of Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler’s analysis. I 
then report the results of further analysis to assess the breadth and reach of their findings. I 
expand their restricted sample of cases to include all of the lower 48 states (they excluded the 
deep South and late adopters). I also explore different estimation methods to model the time 
dependence in the data. I supplement the duration analysis with a case study of a single, 
interesting state: California. Given the gradual or discontinuous nature of the transition from the 
caucus-convention system to the direct primary in many states, focusing on the details is key to 
understanding how it happened. Analysis of roll-call data from the California state legislature’s 
vote to adopt the direct primary sheds further light on the forces at work and the degree to which 
top-down and bottom-up pressures were at play. This analysis combines the two approaches used 
in previous research—a single case, with quantitative data—and allows one to examine which 
legislators voted for or against the reform. These results identify the party members or factions in 
the legislature that were most responsible for enacting the direct primary law. 
The full story of how states came to adopt direct primary elections is very likely too 
complex for any of the single explanations offered by previous scholars to capture adequately. 
The direct primary was not wholly forced on the parties, but it also had negative consequences 
that party leaders neither envisioned nor intended. Characterizing it as either a reform that party 
leaders strategically embraced or as a reform they were pressured into adopting oversimplifies 
the issue. These two accounts can be complementary, making it difficult to separate cleanly the 
evidence for either. There were incentives to adopt the primary under certain political conditions, 
but these conditions varied widely by state. Party leaders were also more willing to accept 
primary elections when they had greater flexibility to set the rules and structure the process as 
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they chose. They could allow voters to participate in nominations while still implementing 
restrictions to ensure that their influence would be limited. 
A Similar Reform: Direct Democracy 
Given the evidence of political party leaders’ self-interested motivations and willingness 
to manipulate the rules to their advantage (discussed in Chapter 1), it seems logical to expect that 
reforming the nomination system was also a strategic decision in which they were deeply 
invested, and it raises reasonable questions about why the direct primary was the reform of 
choice. Why would party elites ever willingly sacrifice their power over nominations? Absent a 
convincing answer to this question, and because we expect political elites to try to maintain their 
power under nearly all circumstances, it must be that they did not surrender it voluntarily—they 
must have been somehow forced to cede, or else they must have given up less than first meets 
the eye. (Or, perhaps, nomination power was shifted to the public first in cases where elites were 
sufficiently divided, indicating that the common shortcut of treating the party as a single, unified 
entity is itself misleading.) If we assume that party leaders did not give up this power willingly, 
then what political pressures were strong enough to compel them to do it?  
Smith and Fridkin’s analysis of another important institutional reform, the states’ 
adoption of direct democracy measures, yields insights that are applicable to the case of primary 
elections (2008). Allowing ballot initiatives required state legislators to defer some of their 
lawmaking authority to the citizens, which at first glance suggests that this change must have 
been imposed on the legislators. But Smith and Fridkin’s study indicates that state legislators 
willingly accepted the initiative process for electoral reasons, and with critical heterogeneity in 
expectations of the effects of changes. For example, in many states, majority-party members 
sincerely believed that supporting reform would help them retain their majority, while members 
of the minority believed that it would help them win control of the legislature. Furthermore, in 
practice, legislators were able to maintain significant control over the initiative process, 
inhibiting citizen efforts and preserving much of their lawmaking authority while appearing to 
empower the masses.  
This account of how the ballot initiative was adopted is instructive for the case of the 
direct primary. For both reforms, what seems at first like an obvious example of political leaders 
being forced to accept a loss of power (one to which strategic, self-interested actors would never 
voluntarily agree) becomes a more complicated story upon closer examination. The case of the 
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ballot initiative also demonstrates the importance of the details: pro-reform forces “won” the 
passage of new direct-democracy legislation in the states, but its practical impact was often 
limited, depending on how legislators implemented the reform. For years after Utah and Idaho 
adopted direct democracy measures, citizens could pass a constitutional amendment by ballot 
initiative, but the amendment was effectively meaningless if legislators refused to pass the 
legislation necessary to enable or execute it. I argue that the process by which states adopted 
primary election laws is similarly complex. A single narrative is unlikely to fit every state. 
Previous Theories: Did Progressives Impose Reform on the Corrupt Parties? 
Most states transitioned from party nominating conventions to the direct primary election 
system during a relatively short period of time (1900–1915). It was a formal change—states 
enacted new legislation mandating the use of primary elections to nominate candidates. As 
mentioned previously, political scientists and historians have presented different arguments for 
why this change occurred, and it is still not immediately apparent which one, if any, is most 
accurate. Although it oversimplifies the question to characterize it as merely a matter of 
weighing two competing, mutually exclusive explanations and deciding which one is correct, the 
“two competing explanations” framework is useful for organizing the existing literature on the 
adoption of the primary.  
The most prominent scholarly accounts of the conversion from party conventions to 
direct primaries describe it, above all else, as a significant loss of influence for the political 
parties (Key 1956; Merriam and Overacker 1928; Ranney 1975). In states outside of the South, 
direct primary elections were largely intended to empower voters and individual candidates 
while diminishing the power of party machines and bosses (some of whom were elected, office-
holding partisans and others not), who essentially controlled nominating conventions and often 
handpicked the nominees. Progressive reformers intended to democratize and increase the 
transparency of the parties’ nomination processes through the adoption of the direct primary. 
According to progressives’ arguments at the time, allowing voters to decide nominations would 
eliminate the corruption and blatant abuses of power that occurred so frequently under the 
convention system (Galderisi and Ezra 2001; Key 1956). 
Others have argued that the parties voluntarily switched to the primary system because it 
was in their best interest to do so, not because progressive reformers unilaterally forced the 
choice on them (Galderisi and Ezra 2001; Ware 2002). Rather, party elites had incentives to 
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institutionalize or formalize their nomination processes. For example, party leaders believed that 
they could increase organizational power and effectively ward off third-party or insurgent forces 
by adopting the primary. Candidates who lost the nomination in a primary election would no 
longer be able to claim that they were victims of an undemocratic system, and thus would lose 
some justification for mounting a third-party challenge. The primary was also popular among 
voters and increased the parties’ perceived legitimacy. However, the increased electoral 
accountability (or the appearance of it, at least) that the primary system provided was worthwhile 
only as long as the parties knew they ultimately retained control over nominations. According to 
some observers, parties were willing to embrace the primary, but only because their power was 
not seriously at risk, and they were confident that they would still get the electoral outcomes they 
desired (Galderisi and Ezra 2001; Luce 1918).  
Alan Ware (2002) offers the most comprehensive treatment of the question of how and 
why states adopted the direct primary, and since his theory runs contrary to the more widely 
accepted explanation (i.e., progressives imposed it on the parties), it is necessary to consider the 
main elements of his argument in some detail. Importantly, Ware argues that progressive 
reformers did not control the state legislatures and thus were in no position to impose mandatory 
primary election laws on the parties; partisan politicians themselves had to pass the legislation. 
He identifies only a few states in which the conflict could be accurately characterized as 
“reformers versus parties” (Wisconsin, New York) and indicates that there was partisan 
consensus on the issue more often than not (e.g., New Jersey). When primary legislation was 
first introduced in the states that contained the 5 largest cities in 1900 (Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Missouri, Illinois, and New York), an urban-machines-versus-antiparty-reformers 
fight did not occur in any of them, with the exception of New York. According to Ware, the 
progressives’ real impact was their ability to narrow the set of available options—they succeeded 
in presenting the direct primary as the best and only reform to implement.  
Ware argues further that political pressure from progressives was just one of several 
reasons that the direct primary became the nomination reform of choice. For one, primary 
elections would increase democratic participation in the parties—a widely appealing feature with 
overwhelming public support. Any potential reform that would have restricted public 
participation would never have been politically feasible. However, Ware cautions against 
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assigning too much importance to public opinion: it played a role, but it alone was not enough to 
bring about the adoption of the primary. 
 Regarding the sequence, Ware argues that it was mostly the eastern states that adopted 
the primary early on, because those states were more urbanized and had stronger, more 
established parties and thus faced the most problems under the old nominating system.33 After 
1906, however, it was the western states that took more frequent and substantial legislative 
action to adopt the direct primary, and the eastern states caught up again after 1911. 
“Insurgency” was the most important motivator in the western states: insurgents, by Ware’s 
definition, were primarily concerned with the too-cozy relationship between politicians and 
major economic interests (e.g., the railroad companies). Discontent over this issue was more 
prevalent in the Midwest and the West, and for the most part, insurgents wanted to adopt the 
primary in order to diminish the influence of economic interests over the parties: “Because of the 
domination of the parties by economic interests in the ‘new’ states, there was much more 
obviously a dual track approach by their opponents to break the power of the interests directly 
and to transform the parties in ways that would put them beyond the reach of these interests in 
the future” (Ware 2002, p. 126).  
It is important to note that all of these explanations for the adoption of the primary 
(Ware’s included) have been applied only to states outside the South. Scholars have argued that 
the political dynamics were fundamentally different in the southern states: advocates of the direct 
primary were not anti-party reformers seeking to eliminate corruption but were merely trying to 
maintain the Democratic Party’s political dominance in the region (Jewell and Morehouse 2000). 
Proponents in the southern states argued that adopting the direct primary would legitimize the 
nominees and help to resolve intraparty conflicts, unifying the party behind its candidates before 
the general election and further weakening the Democrats’ already negligible political opposition 
(Kousser 1974). Progressive reformers are central to the theories previously discussed (either 
arguing that the progressives were the most important factor in primary adoption or just one of 
many), so these theories exclude the South based on the assumption that progressive reformers 
did not have a significant presence in the region. 
                                                
33 Note that Ware defines the “East” as states that had congressional representation before 1840—the distinction is not 
really geographical but age-based. He classifies states as eastern or western according to how long they have had 
statehood; hence, he considers Wisconsin a western state. More recent settlement or statehood seems to be associated with 
more support for institutional change. 
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Incorporating Quantitative Analysis: Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler (2013) 
A common feature of the studies cited in the previous section is that they rely largely on 
qualitative evidence: journalistic accounts and other eyewitness descriptions of the political 
forces at work in select states and cities during the early 1900s. Some information to support the 
competing arguments about the adoption of the direct primary system can be found in all of these 
sources, but Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler advanced the research on this subject by taking a 
quantitative methodological approach not used in any earlier studies.  
To test the argument that progressives were largely responsible for the adoption of the 
primary, the authors collected data on state-level measures of reformist or progressive pressure 
and anti-party sentiment: the share of the vote won by third-party candidates for governor, 
urbanization (a proxy for the state’s level of political corruption), and the presence or absence of 
other anti-party political reforms in the state, such as direct democracy and office-block ballots 
(instead of party-column ballots). To test the argument that parties adopted the primary out of 
self-interest, Lawrence et al. constructed measures of party leaders’ incentives to accept or even 
embrace the direct primary system: the number of candidates from the two main parties (to 
capture levels of intra-party division), and the average margin of victory in elections (a measure 
of the level of two-party competition).  
As in earlier studies, Lawrence and his co-authors excluded the southern states from their 
sample, noting briefly that other scholars have established clear differences between the politics 
of primary elections in the South and those in the rest of the country. They argued that reformist 
pressure from the progressives would not have been a relevant factor in the southern states; 
instead, different political motivations drove the adoption of the direct primary there, such as 
discrimination against black voters and the Democratic party’s desire to maintain its electoral 
dominance in the region. They also excluded four states that adopted the primary relatively 
late—Utah, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Connecticut—thus limiting their sample to the 33 
non-southern states that adopted the direct primary during the years from 1900 to 1915. 
Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler estimated what they described as a discrete-time event 
history model, using logistic regression and clustering by state. They found weak evidence to 
support the “self-interested parties” argument: voting for minor parties was positively related to 
primary adoption and statistically significant, but the coefficients for average vote margin and 
the average number of candidates were not significant (though the signs were in the expected 
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direction). The model yielded a bit more evidence for the “progressive reformers” argument: 
states that had existing initiative and referendum processes and states that were already using 
office block ballots were significantly more likely to adopt the direct primary early. Based on 
these results, the authors concluded that there was greater support overall for the claim that 
external pressure on the parties from progressive reformers brought about the adoption of the 
direct primary.  
However, there are several reasons why Lawrence et al.’s results should not be taken as 
the final word on the matter. The authors themselves acknowledged both the limitations of their 
explanatory variables and the fact that their analysis yielded mixed results that were consistent 
with both theories. External pressure to reform the system appears to have played a role in the 
conversion from conventions to primary elections (probably more so in some states than others), 
but there is also evidence that the parties had organizational incentives to adopt the primary, and 
the decision to change was not merely a sign of party weakness or a progressive demand to 
which the parties were forced to cede. The authors’ decision to focus on states outside of the 
South is consistent with earlier studies, but it would be useful to know how their model performs 
and how the effects change (or not) when all states are included in the sample. Their results are 
sufficiently inconclusive to justify further study—and, more generally, it is always preferable to 
have multiple quantitative studies of any phenomenon to become confident that the findings are 
robust. Very rare is the single piece of research that answers an interesting question about a 
complicated political event conclusively and in full.  
Replication and Extension 
I begin the empirical analyses in this chapter with a replication and extension of 
Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler’s model. My analysis employs the same dependent and 
independent variables that they used, but it incorporates the southern and late-adopter states they 
left out (only Alaska and Hawaii are not included). The goal is not to disprove Lawrence et al.’s 
results but simply to extend their work and determine if any of the relationships they observed 
are consistent across all states. There may be some justification in the literature for excluding the 
South based on the region’s distinctive political culture, but it is much more informative to test 
for these differences than assume them, and to confirm empirically whether the exclusion of the 
southern states is warranted. With regard to the independent variables, the South is not as 
different from the rest of the states as one might think, because most of those variables do not 
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concern the strength (or weakness) of the Republican party. The point that nearly all of the 
competition was on the Democratic side at the general election does not answer the question of 
why primaries might have arisen in the South.  
Table 4.1 shows the year in which each of the lower 48 states adopted the direct primary. 
These data are used to construct the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4.1: Year of Adoption of First Statewide, Mandatory Primary Law 
Year State 
1901 Minnesota, Oregon 
1903 Delaware, Wisconsin 
1904 Alabama 
1905 Illinois, Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, Texas 
1906 Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania 
1907 Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Washington 
1908 Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma 
1909 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, Tennessee 
1910 Colorado, Maryland 
1911 Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Wyoming 
1912 Kentucky, Virginia 
1913 Florida, New York 
1915 Indiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia 
1933 Georgia 
1937 Utah 
1939 New Mexico 
1947 Rhode Island 
1955 Connecticut 
Dates for the non-southern states are from Lawrence et al. (2013). Dates for the southern states (in italics) are 
from Galderisi and Ezra (2001). 
 
Using the full sample of states, my hypotheses with regard to the explanatory variables remain 
the same as Lawrence and his co-authors’ (i.e., I also expect average vote margin to be 
negatively associated with adoption of the direct primary, and I expect third-party voting to be 
positively associated with adoption, etc.). The following is a list of the explanatory variables 
with brief descriptions: 
• Average vote margin: This variable is a measure of the degree of competition in the state 
in a given election year. It is the average margin of victory in the state’s U.S. House 
elections (note that it is an “average” of the lone value for states apportioned only one 
U.S. House seat). 
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• Average number of candidates: This variable also serves as an indicator of competition. It 
is the average number of candidates running in the state’s U.S. House elections in a given 
election year.34 
• Third-party vote for governor: This variable is the percentage of the vote for governor 
that was won by candidates affiliated with parties other than the Democratic or 
Republican parties.  
• Initiative or referendum process: This indicator variable identifies states that already had 
direct democracy institutions in place before adopting the direct primary. Dates of 
initiative and/or referendum adoption are drawn from data gathered by the Initiative & 
Referendum Institute (www.iandrinstitute.org). 
• Office block ballot structure: This indicator variable identifies states that were already 
using office-block ballots by the time they adopted the direct primary. The data are drawn 
from Engstrom and Kernell (2005) and Ludington (1911).  
• Urbanization: This measure is based on Census data identifying the percentage of the 
state’s population living in urban areas (absent a direct measure of political corruption). 
• Year of statehood: This variable controls for the year that a state was admitted to the 
union; Lawrence et al. (and Ware [2002]) argue that “newer states are less likely to have 
entrenched political parties” and would therefore have an easier time adopting anti-party 
reforms. 
Model Estimation and Results 
Following Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler, I estimate a series of logit models with 
cluster-robust standard errors (to account for the presence of repeated observations for each 
state). The authors do not explicitly state the starting point or year in which states enter their 
dataset (perhaps 1900?), but according to their coding, the first two states to adopt a direct 
primary election law, Minnesota and Oregon, both adopted in 1901, so I chose 1898 as the 
                                                
34 In their article, Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler characterize this variable as a measure of intraparty competition. 
For example, in describing its hypothesized effect, they write that “where there were growing numbers of 
candidacies from the main parties we should see greater impetus to accept reform by party bosses” (p. 9, emphasis 
mine). This description implies that in the original study, the “average number of candidates” variable measures the 
average number of candidates who ran in the primaries, not the general election. However, Lawrence et al. do not 
cite any sources for this variable, and compiling primary election returns from the early 1900s is no easy task. (I 
believe Ansolabehere et al. [2010] have collected this information, but their data are not available.) For the purposes 
of this analysis, I calculated the average number of U.S. House candidates who competed in the general election (a 
more feasible undertaking), but this is likely not the same variable that Lawrence and his co-authors used. 
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starting point for the dataset. The full time period, then, is 1898 to 1956; Connecticut is the last 
state in the sample to adopt the primary, in 1955. The dependent variable is binary—either 0 or 1 
depending on whether a state adopts the direct primary in a given two-year time period, and 
states drop out of the dataset after they adopt the reform. Because several of the independent 
variables are based on electoral measures and thus observed every two years rather than 
annually, each state observation appears in the dataset in even-numbered years only.  
 To account for the temporal dependence in the data, I also include time polynomial 
variables in the model that measure the time to adoption (t), the time to adoption squared (t2), 
and the time to adoption cubed (t3) (Carter and Signorino 2010). To my knowledge, Lawrence 
and his co-authors did not employ this approach in their analysis, nor did they include time 
dummy variables or splines, which are alternative options for modeling time dependence in 
binary data. It is unclear what approach they used, if any, but given the temporal nature of the 
data, it is essential to account for that dependence in some fashion (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004). 
The results of several different models are displayed in Table 4.2. I reprint the original 
results from Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler’s article in column 1, and I report the results from 
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t3   0.004 (0.009) 
0.003 
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Cells are logit coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, except for column 1, which has t-
statistics in parentheses (as reported in Lawrence et al.’s Table 1, column 2, p. 12). (n = 258; n = 215; n = 215; n = 
292; n = 381) 
 
Clearly, I am unable to replicate the original results. For several of the coefficients in my 
replication model, the signs and/or statistical significance differ from those reported in Lawrence 
et al.’s article.35  
In the third column are results from the replication model with the time polynomials 
added. None of the substantively important independent variables are statistically significant in 
this model. The fourth and fifth columns contain the results from logit models based on 
                                                
35	Lawrence and his co-authors did not provide a replication dataset through Party Politics and were unable to send me the 
data directly when I requested it. The article itself is rather light on description, with no appendix. Thus, I am uncertain 
about the exact details of the coding, measures, and model estimation used in the original analysis—any of which might be 
causing the failure to replicate.  
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expanded samples (first with the late-adopting states, and then with the southern states as well). 
These results also differ from the original ones. Even when the sample is still somewhat 
limited—as in the model that includes the late adopters (censored in the original analysis) but 
still excludes the southern states—the original results from Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler’s 
analysis are not repeated. They are not robust even when the sample is limited in this way (i.e., 
omitting the group of states that might be too different theoretically).  
In general, these results yield little substantive information. The coefficients on many of 
the variables are small and do not approach statistical significance, and in some instances, the 
direction of the relationship is the opposite of that observed in Lawrence et al.’s results. The 
statistically significant effects that they found (for direct democracy provisions, office block 
ballots, and third-party vote share) do not appear to hold up consistently when the temporal 
dependence in the data is accounted for or when the full sample of states is included.  
Overall, then, the large-n analysis reveals mostly null effects. There are several potential 
reasons why the results do not appear to be robust. It is quite likely a problem of imprecise 
replication. It could be that the effects do not apply to the southern states or late adopters, as 
Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler originally claimed in their article. It is also likely that the 
aggregate-level analysis obscures evidence of interesting relationships or effects within 
individual states. By its nature, the quantitative analysis unfortunately does not capture any of the 
nuances or contextual details that formed the basis of Ware’s research. 
Closer examination of selected variables helps us to better understand the data and why 
the statistical relationships are strong (or weak). Recall that the states that had previously 
adopted office-block ballots were found to be more likely to adopt the direct primary, both in 
Lawrence et al.’s original results and in two of the expanded models. To study this effect more 
closely, I plot the number of states that adopted the primary over the entire period, separating the 
states based on the presence or absence of office-block ballots. As shown in Figure 4.1, sixteen 
states had started using the office-block ballot format prior to adopting the primary, and all of 
those states also adopted the primary by 1915. There are more states that 1) adopted the primary 
by 1915 and 2) were not using office-block ballots at the time. The plots indicate that the outliers 
(late adopters) may be driving the relationship—the late adopters make it appear as if the non-
office-block states overall adopted the direct primary later than the office-block states did. The 
coefficient on the variable is positive and significant (at least partly because of the late-adopter 
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states), but it is unclear if this is a direct effect or if the adoption of office-block ballots is simply 
a proxy for a legislature that is more willing to reform or experiment with the state’s election 
laws. 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of States Using the Direct Primary, Separated by Ballot Format 
 
 
Other simple comparisons of two states on a single explanatory variable help to illustrate 
why some relationships appear weak in the results of the logit models. For example, as shown in 
the left-hand panel of Figure 4.2, Indiana and West Virginia exhibit quite different trends in the 
average margins of victory in U.S. House elections, but both states adopted the direct primary in 
1915. In the right-hand panel, it appears that Illinois and Vermont have similar values over time 
for gubernatorial third-party vote share, but Illinois adopted the primary relatively early (1905), 










Figure 4.2: Comparing Selected States 
 
 
Finally, merely coding the dependent variable—the year that a state passed its first 
primary election law—can be a much more complicated decision than it seems. Choosing a 
single, precise moment for the change (from no primaries to primaries) is a bit of an 
oversimplification because primary laws varied across states regarding coverage by office 
(statewide vs. municipal), coverage by geography (select cities vs. the entire state), specific rules 
such as candidate or voter affiliation requirements, and legal uncertainty and judicial rulings that 
made it necessary to pass successive laws.36  
Case Study: Adoption of Direct Primary Elections in California 
Previous research on the adoption of the direct primary frequently includes broad 
statements about abstract “forces” and certain political pressures appearing to be more powerful 
than others, and it is difficult to test the validity of these statements. By narrowing the focus to a 
single case, one can begin to describe more precisely what those competing forces looked like 
and how they directly affected primary adoption. Those responsible for making the decision were 
typically state legislators, so in this part of the analysis I examine a legislative roll-call vote on 
the adoption of the primary in one state, California, and identify factors related to lawmakers’ 
                                                
36 For example, Lawrence, Donovan, and Bowler code the year of primary adoption in Illinois as 1905. A closer 
examination of the history shows that the 1905 law was actually declared invalid by the Illinois Supreme Court before it 
could be put into effect. The legislature approved a new law in 1906, which was used in the 1906 primary election but then 
struck down by the court in 1907. The third primary law, passed in 1908, was struck down in 1909. This cycle continued 
until a sixth primary law was passed in 1927 and allowed to stand (Blair 1960). 
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votes on the issue. This analysis of the decision in a single state combines two approaches—an 
in-depth case study, with quantitative data.  
The first attempt to establish mandatory primary elections in California occurred in 1897, 
but the law was struck down in court prior to its implementation (Gaines and Cho 2002). Similar 
laws passed in 1899 and 1900 were also declared unconstitutional; the courts ruled that the state 
legislature had limited authority to regulate the political parties (Young 1943). To address the 
constitutional barriers, an amendment to California’s constitution was proposed: Assembly 
Constitutional Amendment (ACA) 3 stipulated that “the legislature shall enact laws providing for 
the direct nomination of candidates for public office” (The Marin Journal 1908). The 
amendment was approved by large margins in both chambers of the legislature and then referred 
to the public as a ballot proposition in the 1908 election, where it passed with overwhelming 
support—76.6 percent to 23.4 percent (Statement of the Vote of California 1908). The 
ratification of ACA 3 practically ensured that the legislature would pass some manner of primary 
election law, but the wording of the amendment was quite vague, setting the stage for several 
distinct fights between pro- and anti-primary forces over finer points in the language.  
The 1909 legislative session included lengthy battles between a progressive/anti-
machine/pro-primary coalition and a pro-machine/anti-primary coalition (both bipartisan) in the 
Assembly and the Senate. A primary election law ultimately passed after an extremely 
complicated series of events—amendments approved by one chamber but not the other, close 
roll-call votes, procedural maneuvering, and vote-switching by individual legislators—and 
established closed, partisan primaries for statewide offices. Those who opposed the primary had 
been able to craft a narrow measure with weak provisions that produced minimal change. Almost 
immediately afterward, in the 1910 session, the legislature voted to open the primaries, and 
cross-filing (allowing candidates to seek multiple party nominations) was established in 1914. 
The public voted on a measure to make primaries nonpartisan in a 1915 special election, but it 
failed. In the 1917 session, the legislature again amended the direct primary law with a new 
requirement: candidates had to win their own party’s nomination in order to win the nomination 
of any other party. Efforts to make the primaries nonpartisan, as well as counter-efforts to 
eliminate cross-filing altogether and close the primaries again, continued for decades afterward 
(Gaines and Cho 2002). 
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In summary, California’s history with primary elections further illustrates the point that 
singling out one moment of change may not be fully informative: Lawrence, Donovan, and 
Bowler and other scholars identify 1909 as the year of primary adoption in California. That is 
technically accurate, but in reality, the state experienced multiple failed attempts to establish 
primaries and then, after they were created, further lengthy political battles over the details of 
implementation. Even after they were enacted, there were attempts to repeal or weaken the laws. 
Where does California rate on the independent variables that Lawrence et al. found to be 
significant in their analysis, such as the adoption of office block ballots and direct democracy 
laws (initiative and referendum)? Regarding timing, California adopted all three reforms within a 
short period of time, but it actually established the direct primary first and adopted the other two 
reforms in 1911. So, neither office-block ballots nor direct democracy had been legally 
established in California at the time it adopted primary elections (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3: California Adopts Office-Block Ballots in 1911 
 
 
According to the authors’ theory, office-block ballots and direct democracy are indicators of a 
state’s progressivism, and their results show that the presence of these institutions is 
significantly, positively associated with adopting the primary. But California is not considered a 
progressive state in their data because it adopted the primary and thus “exits” the duration model 
before establishing office-block ballots and direct democracy. Regarding the other statistically 
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significant variable in Lawrence et al.’s model, third-party voting, Figure 4.4 shows that the 
percentage in California is roughly consistent with the national average (with the exception of 
1900) in the years leading up to adoption in 1909. The pattern does not suggest that the rate of 
third-party voting precipitated the state’s adoption of the primary. 
 
Figure 4.4: California’s Third-Party Vote Percentage Compared to the National Average 
 
 
Roll Call Data from the California Assembly 
Roll call data for votes on key issues during the 1909 legislative session are available and 
can be used to investigate which individual legislators supported or opposed the direct primary 
election law. Specifically, the data for this analysis come from The Story of the California 
Legislature of 1909, one of several books in a series written by Franklin Hichborn, who was a 
legislative reporter for the San Francisco Examiner during this period. As part of his work 
covering the state legislature, he compiled a volume of voting records after the end of each 
legislative session, assessing the legislature’s achievements, summarizing the history of 
important bills in that session, and rating members based on their votes. Hichborn himself was an 
outspoken, unabashed progressive who viewed party machines as the main source of political 
corruption and abuses of power. The votes he identified as important were ones that clearly 
divided along pro-machine and anti-machine lines, and he scored legislators according to how 
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they voted on these issues (either “on the side of progress and reform” or against it).37 Hichborn 
was certainly more than just a disinterested observer, but that is not necessarily problematic—his 
rating of legislators is similar to modern-day ADA scores (which are also obviously one-sided). 
He knew which issues and votes were most important to progressive advocates, and his score 
accurately reflects legislators’ support for the cause. 
Hichborn’s progressivism score is based on legislators’ votes on 11 key issues in the 
1909 session of the California Assembly (lower house). Substantively, the votes cover a range of 
battles against entrenched political interests, particularly big business, as well as votes for 
institutional and social reforms meant to increase transparency in government (e.g., a vote on a 
measure removing the party circle from the election ballot, a vote on an anti-racetrack gambling 
bill, and a vote to impose new regulations on the railroads). An Assembly member’s score is 
simply the proportion of times he voted the “right” way—that is, in support of the progressive 
side—on these issues. This progressivism score serves as an important explanatory variable in 
the roll-call analysis. 
Regarding the direct primary election law, the crucial vote for Hichborn was the 
Assembly’s vote on an amendment that (though perhaps not technically a “killer” amendment) 
substantially weakened the primary law to the point of rendering it essentially meaningless. In 
Hichborn’s view, Assembly members’ votes on the primary law itself were not as informative 
because legislation establishing a primary of some kind was almost guaranteed to pass, so simply 
recording who voted for or against this legislation was not the best measure of who was really a 
progressive or not. Rather, it was the vote on the amendment that was truly meaningful.38 In the 
following analysis, I predict legislators’ votes on this amendment to the direct primary law (as 
recorded by Hichborn) instead of their votes on the original legislation. 
 
                                                
37 Hichborn was deeply, openly critical of “the machine” in his writing. On the subject of railroad regulation: “With weak 
and corrupt men as Railroad Commissioners, and machine-dominated Legislatures which have neglected to pass laws 
which would have made the Commission effective…California has been left helpless to oppose any extortion which the 
railroad might see fit to exact” (p. 122). In summarizing the 1909 session, he writes, “The machine, at the legislative 
session of 1909, by trick and clever manipulation succeeded in preventing any very effective reform legislation going on 
the Statute books” (p. 192). 
38 The amendment, proposed by “the machine,” changed the direct primary bill so that either a majority or high plurality 
vote would be required to nominate candidates at the primary election. In the event that no candidate received enough of 
the vote, the nomination was to be made under the old system, with a party convention. The fear under this provision was 
that the machine would simply nominate many candidates so that no one would win a majority, and then would have to 
use the convention. And, with the passage of this amendment (the vote was 38 to 36), the primary that was established was 
not really a proper primary in Hichborn’s view. 
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Analysis and Results 
I estimate a probit regression model using an Assembly member’s roll-call vote on the 
“killer” amendment to the direct primary as the dependent variable. The variable is coded such 
that the model predicts a “no” vote on the amendment, because it was meant to weaken the 
primary substantially; thus a vote of “no” here is equivalent to supporting the primary. As noted 
previously, the key explanatory variable in the model is the legislator’s progressivism score (a 
simple count of how many times he voted on the progressive side of the important issues 
Hichborn identified in the session).39 Other explanatory variables include the legislator’s party 
(Republican, Republican-Union Labor, or Democratic), margin of victory in the previous 
election, NOMINATE score (Masket 2004; available for Assembly members only), seniority, 
age, and an indicator variable for region. This variable distinguishes Assembly members 
representing San Francisco (where the machine was most active) from the others. I estimated a 
similar model of the killer-amendment vote in the California Senate. 
As shown in Table 4.3, the coefficient on the progressivism score is positive and 
statistically significant in both models, indicating that legislators with higher scores were more 
likely to vote “no” on the amendment to weaken the primary. It is the only statistically 
significant variable in the Senate model. In the Assembly model, the coefficient on the region 
variable is also significant but negative, which suggests that members representing San Francisco 
districts (a machine stronghold) were less likely to vote against the amendment. (The results of 
alternative specifications can be found in Appendix C.) 
The coefficients on the other explanatory variables in the Assembly model are not 
statistically significant. I estimated alternative models that omitted the progressivism score; the 
coefficient on the NOMINATE variable approaches significance without it, but the rest of the 
coefficients are largely unchanged. Perhaps surprisingly, the progressivism score and the 
NOMINATE score are not correlated, indicating that these scores measure two distinct concepts 




                                                
39 Hichborn’s progressivism score originally included the killer amendment to the direct primary as one of the 11 key 
votes, but for the purposes of this analysis, I omit that vote from the legislators’ scores to avoid circularity. 
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Table 4.3: Votes on Amendments to Direct Primary Law in CA Assembly and CA Senate 
 Assembly n = 77 
Senate 
n = 32 
Hichborn progressivism score  4.82 (1.03) 
5.88 
(2.95) 
NOMINATE score 0.31 (0.71) 
___ 
Republican–Union Labor 1.12 (0.76) 
0.10 
(1.73) 
Democratic 0.65 (0.77) 
–1.04 
(1.79)  
San Francisco –1.67 (0.75) 
–0.55 
(1.45) 
Margin of victory in previous election –0.24 (1.50) 
0.01 
(4.20) 
Number of terms served –0.08  (0.26) 
___ 
Age 0.01 (0.02) 
–0.02 
(0.06) 
Intercept –2.83 (1.19) 
–0.31 
(4.54) 
Cells are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 




There are several implications that can be drawn from these results. First, support for a 
meaningful direct primary law was clearly not a partisan issue. Factions within both of the major 
parties, Republican and Democratic, were for and against the primary. It was not a particularly 
ideological issue, either, based on the coefficient of the NOMINATE variable. The main division 
appears to be between progressive, reform-minded members of the Assembly versus members 
who were aligned with the party machines. This result lends support to one of the theories 
discussed previously—that the adoption of the direct primary was motivated by external pressure 
from progressives aiming to reform the parties’ corrupt nominating conventions. Interestingly, 
though, these results do not wholly support the “bottom-up,” driven-by-the-masses theory of 
primary adoption, because it seems that pressure from the electorate was not a significant factor, 
at least in this case. Electoral vulnerability did not make a legislator more likely to support the 
primary (i.e., to vote “no” on the killer amendment). The lack of a vote-margin effect suggests 
that legislators did not vote for the primary merely because they wanted to pass a popular law, or 
out of fear of crossing the voters.  
Discussion 
The replication and extension of the large-n analysis conducted by Lawrence, Donovan, 
and Bowler (2013), together with the analysis of the California Assembly’s vote, yield a complex 
but intriguing story about the adoption of the direct primary. Lawrence et al.’s original results do 
not appear to be robust across the full sample of states or in models that account for the temporal 
dependence in the data. Again, the purpose of the extension was not to refute their findings but 
rather to explore whether a different approach to the question might be necessary. The mostly 
null results are not a bad thing, but one possibility they suggest is that the aggregate, state-level 
analysis misses some important details. The results of the California Assembly roll-call analysis 
(specifically, the significant effect of the progressivism score) are actually consistent with 
Lawrence et al.’s overall conclusion that progressive reformers played a bigger role in bringing 
about the primary than the self-interest of the parties. However, these results also show that it is 
useful to examine directly the choices and votes of those responsible for making the decision, 
wherever possible. Doing so allows one to draw more confident conclusions about how and why 
the reform happened.  
Future work at the level of the state should strive to identify the most appropriate model 
estimation and incorporate new and more precise variables. Although Lawrence and his co-
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authors obtained some statistically significant results, they were still far from conclusive, and it 
seems that much of the underlying story about the adoption of the direct primary remains 
unknown or unspecified. It may be that Lawrence et al.’s variables are the best available proxies 
for the historical factors they are trying to measure, but it is important to test other variables. For 
example, recall that in Lawrence et al.’s model, the competitiveness of a state is captured by 
taking the average of the vote margin in its U.S. House elections. It is not easy to measure 
competitiveness, of course, and there are multiple valid measures that are more or less 
appropriate in different contexts, but the average vote margin across a state’s congressional 
districts seems like a somewhat crude measure in this case—perhaps it would be more useful to 
look at the vote margins for state legislators instead, since they were the ones deciding whether 
to adopt the primary.  
Finally, these analyses demonstrate the importance of the details: it is simply not the case 
that states underwent a sharp, clearly defined change from party nominating conventions to a 
statewide system of legally mandated primary elections. The process of change was often 
gradual or discontinuous. Furthermore, the states adopted primary elections in many different 
forms. Some of the first primary laws were closed and restrictive, like California’s, while others 
allowed more open participation and gave more meaningful authority to citizens. The 
complicated history of primary election laws in California helps to illustrate why one broad 
theory of primary adoption will likely not fit all states. It is true that the California legislature 
passed its first direct primary election law in 1909, but the lengthy political fight underlying its 
passage and the weakness of the resulting law indicate that the explanation is not as 
straightforward as (for example) “progressives were able to use their political power to force this 
reform on the party machines.” Progressives surely played a role, and they may have gotten what 
they wanted overall—the passage of a direct primary election law—but the members of the party 
machine were strong enough politically to amend and lessen the impact of that law. They won 




CHAPTER 5: CHANGES IN THE TYPE OF PRIMARY 
 
In the previous chapters, I examined state primary-election laws and party rules in the 
aggregate. I described the types of primary elections currently in use, demonstrating that there is 
substantial variation in how states administer primaries, which is perhaps unsurprising given the 
complex systems of laws needed to regulate primary elections and the fact that each state has 
considerable authority over its system. A similar description applies to the presidential-
nomination system, which has its own unique and complex set of rules and procedures (distinct 
from nominations for offices below the presidency). In short, variation in enfranchisement exists 
but does not appear to have a simple or straightforward explanation, and the generally null 
results suggest that there may be an overlooked factor (or set of factors), or relationships that are 
not clearly demonstrated by the results of the analysis. I looked to the original adoption of the 
direct primary system as another potential source of answers, reasoning that if there was a clear-
cut story behind the states’ adoption of this major reform, the evidence could also help to explain 
why enfranchisement varies today. The findings presented in the earlier chapters, taken together, 
suggest a complicated story about enfranchisement laws and rules—one that we could 
understand better by taking a different approach. 
This chapter supplements the others, but instead of analyzing the variation in laws or 
rules, I study several cases individually to identify the reasons why state governments (or state 
party organizations, depending on which set of leaders has decision-making authority) have 
sometimes changed the rules to either allow more voters to participate or to limit participation to 
party members. In the past several decades, changes of this kind have occurred infrequently, 
which makes a large-n analysis challenging (though certainly not impossible). More importantly, 
I think focusing on the details of a few cases allows us to better understand the concerns and 
motivations of the party elites who were responsible for changing the type of primary. By 
examining the debates surrounding this question—how open or closed should the party’s primary 
election be?—in different states, we can start to develop an understanding of why changes occur, 
which considerations are more important (and when), and how partisan leaders make trade-offs 
among their priorities.  
In the first section, I describe sources of data and the process that other scholars have 
used to identify changes in primary election laws and rules, and I provide a list of the changes in 
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primary-election enfranchisement that I have verified for the 1990–2018 period. I select three 
cases where changes occurred and offer narratives to describe what happened and why, based on 
media coverage and public statements from elected officials and party leaders. I use these cases 
to identify the factors that motivated these leaders either to open the process to more voters, or to 
close it off. Some changes appear to have been driven by electoral calculations, as partisan 
decision-makers altered rules in the hope that their subsequent nominees would have better 
chances of winning general elections. In other cases, leaders seemingly altered the rules in an 
attempt to preserve the ideological consistency of their party’s candidates. Yet another path 
involves changes originated by the electorate—via direct democracy—or the courts, potentially 
in defiance of both major parties’ wishes. It is true that in many states the status quo has changed 
very little over time, particularly if the focus is limited to changes in voter enfranchisement only 
and not changes in other primary election rules that have occurred. And maybe, as some recent 
political science literature suggests, these rules do not have significant effects (despite 
conventional wisdom). I conclude by discussing the relevance and implications of these cases for 
other states, and for the dissertation as a whole. 
Identifying States Where Changes Have Occurred 
As I explained in Chapter 1, it is fairly simple to find detailed information about states’ 
current primary election laws or rules (election codes are easily accessible through state 
government websites, for example), but historical information about state laws is another matter. 
Data on sub-presidential primary laws over long periods of time—even basic data, such as the 
type of primary—are not conveniently recorded in a single resource (e.g., the Almanac of 
American Politics, the Book of the States, or similar publications), so it is not immediately 
apparent if, when, and how states have changed their laws over the past several decades. 
Information on internal party rules (usually not as well-documented as statutory changes) is even 
more difficult to obtain. Thus, analyses are limited to those states where I can verify that a 
change in the type of primary has occurred. The availability of information about these changes 
varies widely; sometimes there is ample media coverage of the issue, or legal documents from a 
court case can be accessed, but in other instances the changes were not publicized or widely 
debated.  
The first step in the process of identifying when and where changes in the type of primary 
have occurred was to examine data previously collected by other scholars. Specifically, I 
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consulted Andrew Sinclair’s dissertation (2013), where he summarizes the major changes in each 
state’s primary election laws from 1945 to 2012 (or those changes he was aware of, at least). For 
his data collection, he relied primarily on other academic sources (Bott 1990; Jewell 1977; 
Kanthak and Morton 2001; Lubecky 1987; McNitt 1980), but he verified the information using 
state-specific sources or by consulting election officials when there was a conflict or time gaps in 
the data (Sinclair 2012). 
My other main scholarly source was McGhee et al.’s dataset (2013), wherein they record 
the type of sub-presidential primary used in every state during the period from 1992 to 2010. 
They categorize the types of primaries more finely, based on minor distinctions in the rules (e.g., 
requiring public declaration of partisanship or formal affiliation with the party), and this level of 
detail is helpful. Unfortunately, their data are incomplete. For example, they have data on the 
type of primary for only four states in 1992, fifteen states in 2008, and two states in 2010, with 
other missing data points scattered throughout. McGhee et al.’s data collection methods were 
also somewhat haphazard. In the appendix to the article they published using these data, they 
explain that they contacted election officials and/or party leaders in each state to verify both the 
current type of primary and whether that law or rule had changed during the period of study. If 
none of the officials could recall whether there had been a change, the researchers relied on 
Kanthak and Morton’s (2001) coding of primary election types from the late 1990s to confirm 
that no change had occurred. They also obtained archived versions of the state’s election code in 
some cases, but only to resolve inconsistencies. 
Sinclair and McGhee et al. use different coding schemes, and in some cases their datasets 
are inconsistent with each other. McGhee et al. did not identify the Kansas Democrats’ move to a 
semi-closed primary in 2004, while Sinclair did; McGhee et al. identified the Maryland 
Republicans’ change in 2000 while Sinclair did not. These inconsistencies demonstrate the 
difficulty of obtaining and verifying information about the type of primary, particularly over long 
periods of time, and some cases require making judgment calls. All changes listed in Table 5.1 






Table 5.1: Changes in Type of Primary Election, Sub-Presidential, 1990 to 2018 
State (Party) Year Change 




Blanket primary to open 
Open to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to (voluntary) blanket 
Alaska (R) 1992 
1996 
2000 
Blanket primary to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to blanket 
Blanket to semi-closed 




Closed primary to blanket 
Blanket to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to top-two 
Colorado 2016 Closed primary to semi-closed 
Idaho (R) 2011 Open primary to closed 
Kansas (D) 2004 
2014 
Closed primary to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to closed 
Louisiana 2008 
2012 
Nonpartisan primary to closed  
Closed to nonpartisan * 
Maryland (R) 2000 
2002 
Closed primary to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to closed 
New Hampshire 1992 Closed primary to semi-closed 
North Carolina (D) 1996 Closed primary to semi-closed 
Oklahoma (D) 2015 Closed primary to semi-closed 
Oregon (D) 1998 
2002 
Closed primary to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to closed 
Oregon (R) 1990 
1992 
Closed primary to semi-closed 
Semi-closed to closed 
South Dakota (D) 2010 Closed primary to semi-closed 
Washington 2004 
2008 
Blanket primary to open 
Open to top-two 
West Virginia (D) 2008 Closed primary to semi-closed 
West Virginia (R) 1992 Closed primary to semi-closed 
Note: If no party is specified, the change applied to both parties in the state. * Changes in Louisiana applied 
to its congressional primaries only. 
 
From this list of changes, I selected three cases that happened under different 
circumstances. First, I discuss the case in Maryland, where both parties generally hold closed 
primary elections, but the state Republicans chose to open their primary to unaffiliated voters 
just once, in 2000. They did so by changing an internal party rule. In my second case, 
Republicans in Idaho successfully challenged a long-standing state law mandating open 
primaries, and after the court’s ruling, a new law was passed allowing them to close their 
primaries to registered party members only. In Colorado, citizens approved a ballot initiative that 
granted unaffiliated voters the right to vote in a party primary without having to affiliate. Both 
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state parties opposed the change but were required to comply with the new law.40 I review only 
three examples, but given their differences, I hope that they together represent some of the 
important, diverse paths to change that are available to state elected officials and party leaders, 
and provide a sense of the range of motivations underlying these decisions. 
Maryland: “We Must Reach Out to Independent Voters” 
In Maryland, the two major parties have historically held closed primary elections, 
allowing only those individuals who are registered with the party to participate.41 However, 
Maryland is also a party-choice state: according to a statute passed in 2002, the parties retain the 
authority to modify this rule from one election year to the next. Specifically, each state party’s 
central committee may choose to open its primary to unaffiliated voters, with the sole condition 
that they notify the State Board of Elections of the change at least six months before the primary 
(Code of Maryland, §8–202c). While the Maryland Democratic Party has shown little interest in 
bringing unaffiliated voters into its nomination process, the Maryland GOP has been more 
inclined to tinker with this rule: in 2000, the party opted to permit these voters to cast ballots in 
the presidential primary, reasoning that the change would boost turnout by drawing in some 
independents and, critically, increase their odds of supporting Republican candidates in the 
subsequent general election. At the time, registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans 
approximately 2-to-1 in the state (and they still do), but unaffiliated voters were clearly the 
fastest-growing group. Given this political environment, state Republican leaders—planning 
their strategy for the 2000 elections, and searching for ways to overcome their sizable 
disadvantage in partisan registration—believed it was in their best interest to court independent 
voters, many of whom felt unfairly excluded from the primaries. 
A Change Worth Trying 
The effort to open the 2000 GOP primary election to unaffiliated voters was spearheaded 
by Richard D. Bennett, chair of the Maryland State Republican Party, and the running mate to 
Ellen Sauerbrey in 1998, when she lost a re-match with Democratic incumbent Parris 
                                                
40 California (or Washington or Alaska) may seem like obvious candidates for study, but entire books have already 
been written about California, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, and the blanket and top-two primary systems 
(both adopted by ballot initiatives). I don’t know how much new material I can contribute to explanations of the top-
two primary, so I choose to focus on other changes that have occurred but received less attention. 
41 Any voter may vote in primary elections for nonpartisan offices, such as school board positions. Unaffiliated or 
“independent” voters are those who decline to register with any of Maryland’s recognized political parties on their 
voter registration form. 
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Glendening, 55 to 45 percent (in 1994, with a strong nationwide Republican tide, Glendening 
had defeated Sauerbrey very narrowly, 50.2–49.8%).  Bennett, who argued that it was crucial for 
Republicans to reach out to the state’s independent voters, proposed the rule change shortly after 
he was elected head of the party. “We’re trying to make this a two-party state. It’s a step in 
reaching independent voters…they are important voters in Maryland,” Bennett said (quoted in 
Garland 1999).  
This argument persuaded the members of the Republican State Central Committee, who 
passed a resolution allowing unaffiliated voters to participate in the primary at a party convention 
on May 22, 1999. The new rule applied to Republican party primaries for federal offices (i.e., 
presidential and congressional races, but not state-level ones) and was to be used for the 2000 
election year only, as a one-time trial. However, some party leaders, including Bennett and the 
party’s executive director, Paul Ellington, welcomed the idea of enacting a broader or more 
permanent change, depending on the results of the 2000 election. Bennett said that the party 
would “decide later whether it wants to open future primary elections, including those for state 
offices” (Garland 1999).  
Proponents of the rule change emphasized the Republican party’s electoral concerns. 
Tired of their candidates’ persistent losses, Republican leaders were willing to consider all 
options, and given the lopsided partisan-registration numbers, they believed that they needed to 
attract more unaffiliated voters in order to have a chance at winning any statewide office. David 
R. Blumberg, chairman of the Baltimore City Republican Party from 1982 to 1998, said, “I think 
after 1998 [state GOP election losses], Republicans need to look at different ways to get a wide 
range of voters participating in the party as early as possible in the election process” (Garland 
1999). Bennett and his allies thought that independent voters would reward the political party 
that permitted and encouraged their participation—not the party that forced them to register as 
partisans and relinquish their independent status in order to take part in candidate-selection. “My 
view is that for the 12 percent of the voting population that does not give in to that pressure, 
many of them will be more inclined to support Republicans,” Bennett said (Hill 2000). Martin 
Madden, the Maryland Senate Minority Leader, agreed that the likely result of the rule change 
would be that “independents who vote for Republicans in the primary will come back and vote 
for them again in the general election” (1999). By showing unaffiliated voters that the GOP 
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valued their voices in the primary, leaders expected to gain their loyalty and thus improve 
Republican candidates’ chances in November. 
Another argument for opening the primary rested on a widely held assumption: that open 
primary elections produce higher voter turnout in the general election. In an op-ed published in 
the Baltimore Sun, Sen. Madden wrote, “In states with open primaries, independents tend to turn 
out in greater numbers for primary and general elections,” comparing the 60 percent voter 
turnout in Maryland in 1994 to the turnout levels in two open-primary states, Missouri and 
Hawaii (75 and 77 percent in 1994, respectively). It is understandable, he continued, that 
independents have historically voted at much lower rates than partisans, considering that they 
have been completely excluded from the primaries. This line of reasoning is distinct from, and 
broader in nature, than the party-self-interest argument—it is not exclusive to Maryland 
(supporters of open primaries make similar claims, regardless of the state) and not narrowly 
tailored to appeal to Republicans’ desire to win elections. Instead, it makes the case that opening 
primary elections to unaffiliated voters would bring greater fairness to the process and increase 
overall citizen participation and engagement. According to this logic, if independent voters are 
allowed to participate in primary elections, many of them will. And, in turn, more of them will 
fall into the habit of voting, so that their participation levels in the general election will also rise. 
As previously noted, while this concerted effort to open the primary was occurring on the 
Republican side, Maryland Democrats largely dismissed the idea. The state GOP’s counterparts 
in the Democratic Party (unsurprisingly) felt no such pressure to open their primary elections to 
unaffiliated voters. “Our position is that to vote for a Democratic candidate, you should be a 
member of the Democratic Party,” said Rob Johnson, then-executive director of the Maryland 
Democratic Party (German 2000). He further claimed that the Republicans’ rule change was 
“really an act of desperation” because Democrats defeated them every time. Given their 
advantage in partisan registration, state Democrats were in a position of strength, and thus party 
leaders were confident in their choice to keep the primary closed to party members. The very 
close shave in the 1994 gubernatorial election, noted above, might have caused Maryland 
Democrats to reassess just how safe was their grip on the state. Instead, they seem to have 
concluded that if they could survive a year as bad for their party as 1994, they had no need to 
court independents or fret about Republicans wooing that growing bloc. 
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Did it Work? 
In short, the Maryland Republican Party decided to open its primary election to 
unaffiliated voters because they expected that the change would increase turnout among this 
rapidly growing bloc of the electorate. Unfortunately for Republicans, however, turnout among 
independent voters in the 2000 GOP primary was not as high as predicted. Of the approximately 
324,000 unaffiliated voters in Maryland, about 52,000 of them (16 percent) voted. The state’s 
Republican party leadership provided little explanation afterward for why independent voters did 
not drastically increase turnout in the primary, but the presidential primary contest appears to 
have played a role. Some accused Bennett and other Republican leaders of not doing enough to 
interest independent voters in the election or turn them out, because (like most of the state’s 
party leaders and Republican elected officials) they supported George W. Bush, whose campaign 
did not target independent voters to the same extent as the campaign of John McCain (Baltimore 
Sun 2000). Party leaders who had pushed to open the primary in the first place—Bennett (a Bush 
delegate), Sauerbrey, future governor Robert Ehrlich—focused mainly on turning out Republican 
voters in 2000 instead. “Obviously, when you run a political campaign, you go drilling for oil 
where the oil is, and for us that’s the frequent-voter Republicans,” Sauerbrey said (LeDuc 2000). 
Aside from a few counties that sent GOP sample ballots to independents, it seems that very little 
was done to advertise the fact that independents could vote in the primary for the first time. “The 
state party changed its mind,” said former GOP chair Joyce Lyons Terhes (quoted in LeDuc 
2000). “After they saw the role the independents played around the country in helping 
McCain…there was a conscious decision they wouldn’t spend money to get out the vote. I don’t 
think those independents knew they could vote.”  
Though it was regarded as a one-time (and only marginally successful) experiment, the 
notion of opening the primaries has persisted among the state’s Republican party leaders, who 
gave it serious consideration again in 2013. With the 2014 midterm elections in mind, the party 
formed a task force to research the possibility in summer 2013. However, there was not strong 
support from the central committee, and they ultimately concluded that there was not enough 
time to implement a rule change before the upcoming elections (Fritze 2015; Sessa-Hawkins 
2014). Current Republican leaders are still debating the issue; though the likelihood that they 
will open the primary again in the future is small, the idea persists. 
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Recent discussions echo many of the same themes and arguments used during the 
previous debate in 1999. Among proponents, the assumption remains that opening the primary 
will cause more unaffiliated voters to participate. They continue to be the fastest-growing group 
of voters in the state (more than 672,000 of them in 2015), and Maryland Republicans, still 
vastly outnumbered and frustrated about not winning more statewide offices, are willing to 
entertain a variety of potential solutions—including opening the primary again, despite the 
lackluster turnout among independents in 2000. Joe Cluster, executive director of the state 
Republican party in 2015, acknowledged that turnout in 2000 was disappointing, but noted that 
the rule change did allow the party to identify thousands of unaffiliated voters who were at least 
somewhat inclined to support Republican candidates (Fritze 2015). 
As in other states, there is a clear divide in the Maryland Republican party between those 
who believe that the elusive path to victory lies with independent voters, and those who believe 
that allowing independents to participate in the primaries merely risks diluting the party’s 
message. Diana Waterman, the state GOP chair in 2013, said that the party clearly needs 
unaffiliated voters: “We aren’t going to win even if every one of our Republicans show up to 
vote” (Cox 2013). Other leaders agreed with Larry Helminiak, who served as second vice 
president of the Maryland GOP. “If you let non-Republicans in, then you’re handing over the 
party,” he said. “Why turn the election over to them?” 
Finally, it is interesting to note that Republicans have enjoyed some limited, surprising 
success in top-of-the-ticket races in Maryland over this period. In 2002, Republican U.S. 
Representative Bob Ehrlich defeated the state’s Democratic Lieutenant Governor, Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend, 52 to 46 percent. Ehrlich was the first Republican elected governor since 
Spiro Agnew, in 1966, and when he lost a re-election attempt in 2006 (53–46%) and then a re-
match with now incumbent Democrat Martin O’Malley in 2010, by a whopping 56 to 42 percent 
(notwithstanding strong Republican national tides), the state seemed back to its blue form. 
However, in 2014, Larry Hogan repeated the trick, defeating yet another Democratic Lieutenant 
Governor, Anthony Brown, 51 to 47 percent. Hogan won the election even though, as discussed, 
Republicans had decided against allowing unaffiliated voters to participate in the 2014 primaries. 
That year was, like 1994, marked by a national swing against the party of a sitting Democratic 
president, but Hogan won a second term in 2018 with a decisive 55–44 win, even as incumbent 
Democratic U.S. Senator Ben Cardin romped to re-election (65–30%).  So, recent elections 
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provide some evidence that the party does not necessarily have to open its primary to 
independents in order to win. Harford County Executive David Craig, who finished second to 
Hogan in the 2014 Republican gubernatorial primary, voiced a similar sentiment in 2013. 
“Republicans can and do win statewide when they put up a good candidate with strong ideas,” he 
said (Cox 2013). It seems the “right” candidate will appeal to a broad range of voters in the 
general election, even if independent voters were not granted the opportunity to select the 
candidate in the primary. 
Idaho: The Conservative Faction Prevails 
For many years, state law in Idaho mandated open primary elections, meaning that voters 
of any party or affiliation could vote in whichever party’s primary election they chose, and they 
could make this decision in the privacy of the voting booth (no public declaration or choice 
required). Idaho had never used a party registration system, and the open, private-choice primary 
law had been in place since at least 1972 (McNitt 1980; Sinclair 2012). This tradition of fully 
open primaries in the state meant that when the Idaho Republicans sought to close their primary 
and filed a lawsuit against the state to do so, it sparked a contentious debate and required major 
changes in the administration of Idaho’s elections.  
The Gem State is deeply, undeniably red in its politics. Both chambers of the Idaho state 
legislature are currently controlled by Republicans—28 to 7 in the senate, 56 to 14 in the 
house—and they hold every major state office. Its entire U.S. congressional delegation is 
Republican (both U.S. Senators and both Representatives in the House). Given this electoral 
dominance, this episode in primary-law revision will mostly be a story about divisions within the 
state Republican party—leaders did not have the same priorities, and we can see how these 
differences played out in the debate over closing the primary. The party as a whole was highly 
successful and occupied a very secure position, but its members did not all want the same thing. 
Summary of the Change 
In June 2007, the Idaho Republican Party Central Committee voted 88 to 58 to adopt a 
resolution calling for a closed primary. The resolution also indicated that the party would file a 
legal challenge if the legislature failed to pass a law allowing closed primaries in the next 
session. No closed-primary law was passed, so the party sued the state and challenged the law in 
federal district court in 2008. The litigation took three years to resolve.  
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In his ruling, U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill reasoned that because the state-
mandated open primary rule allowed substantial numbers of independent voters as well as voters 
of other parties to cross over and participate in the Republican party’s primary, it violated the 
party’s right to freedom of association (Idaho Republican Party v. Ben Ysursa 2011). 
Specifically, he argued that an open primary was barely different from the blanket primary that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had already struck down—both types constitute a severe burden on the 
parties by forcing them to “associate” with nominees who could potentially be chosen by voters 
from an opposing party. And according to expert testimony in the case, crossover voting (or 
“raiding”) is thought to be especially common in one-party-dominant states like Idaho, where the 
dominant party’s primary contest is seen as the only election of consequence (because the winner 
of the primary is almost guaranteed to win the general election). 
The court’s decision required the Idaho state legislature to take action. New legislation 
converting the primary from open to closed was approved just before the end of the 2011 
session. It passed in the Senate 28 to 7 and in the House by a vote of 51 to 16. The law 
established a new, statewide system of party registration. It also stipulates that the parties have 
the choice to open their primaries to independent or unaffiliated voters, as long as they notify the 
Secretary of State’s office 180 days prior to the election (so that no party is forced to hold closed 
primaries against its wishes) (Idaho Code § 34-411A). Idaho’s default primary election rule thus 
switched from open to closed, and it became a party-choice state. Idaho Republicans have used a 
closed primary since 2012, while the Democrats have continued to use an open primary. 
Why Did the Republicans Go to Court? 
One question that immediately arises is why the Idaho Republican Party chose to 
challenge the open-primary law in court instead of simply working with their counterparts in the 
legislature, and requesting that they pass a law to close it. Because Republicans controlled the 
state legislature and held the governorship, they presumably could have overcome any minority-
party opposition. It turns out that the legislature actually made multiple attempts, but none of 
them succeeded.  
In 2007, prior to the party’s rule change, legislators introduced House Bill 185, which 
would have established a semi-closed primary. A semi-closed rule was perceived as a good 
compromise between the then-current open system and the completely closed primary that many 
Republicans wanted: it would allow independents to participate, but prevent crossover voting or 
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raiding by members of the other party (May 2016). However, Ben Ysursa, Idaho’s Secretary of 
State at the time (and a Republican), testified in opposition to the bill, which lacked specific 
details about how the new semi-closed system would be implemented—details that would be left 
up to the Secretary of State’s Office to figure out. Sponsors withdrew the bill after Ysursa’s 
testimony. A similar bill had also been introduced in the Idaho Senate, but it did not advance.  
In the 2008 session, after the Republicans passed their party resolution and legislators 
knew they needed to act if they wanted to avoid a court challenge, more bills were introduced. A 
bill to close the primary with no exceptions did not advance past introduction. Senate Bill 1507, 
which was based on a proposal from the Secretary of State’s office, would have required voters 
to ask publicly for a party’s ballot and have their choice recorded in the poll book. The rule 
would have applied only to parties that wanted to restrict participation; all other parties would 
continue under the existing open-primary system. This option was considered less costly than a 
system requiring party registration, but, according to May’s account (2016), it was a compromise 
that pleased no one—advocates for independent voters said that requiring a public declaration of 
party affiliation would depress turnout, while some Republicans said that it was not enough to 
satisfy the party’s new rule and would not prevent a legal challenge. A third alternative would 
have established a semi-closed primary (i.e., affiliated voters would have to vote in their party’s 
primary, while unaffiliated voters would be able to choose one party’s ballot) and a party-
registration system. It included a provision allowing a party to conduct its own nomination 
process, under any rules it wanted, as long as the party was responsible for administering it and 
paying the costs. This bill was returned to committee and effectively killed, but the provision 
allowing a party to hold its own nominating contest, independent from the state, was added to 
Senate Bill 1507. It passed 20 to 15, but the legislative session concluded before the House could 
consider the bill (May 2016).  
Despite unified Republican control, then, the legislature failed repeatedly to pass a law 
establishing a closed primary. Legislators could not agree on the specific form of the new rules—
some were clearly reluctant to cut out independent voters, while many Republicans were not 
satisfied with the compromise measures, and the state was concerned about the administrative 
costs. So, having waited for legislative action and seeing no results, leaders in the state 
Republican party believed a legal challenge was necessary. 
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Arguments in Support of Closing the Primary 
In its lawsuit, the Idaho Republican Party argued that its First Amendment rights (i.e., 
freedom of association) were being violated by the state’s open-primary law. Specifically, they 
were concerned about raiding: party leaders argued that the open primary allowed Democrats 
and independents to cross over and skew the elections toward candidates who did not truly 
represent the Republican party’s principles and did not have party members’ support.42 Jonathan 
Parker, Executive Director of the Idaho Republican Party, said that rampant crossover voting 
required the party to close its primary: “Our members believe that Democrats were openly 
crossing over, voting in the Republican Party, picking our candidates, and essentially just 
tampering with the process” (Wright 2012). The party adopted the resolution calling for closed 
primaries in 2007 partly because of concerns that Democratic voters had somehow interfered 
with the outcome of a competitive, six-way Republican primary in the 1st Congressional District 
in the previous year (Howell 2007).  
 In addition to emphasizing the harmful effects of raiding, Republican leaders advocated 
closed primaries using another common argument—that political parties have the right to limit 
participation in the primary to members only, and any voter who wishes to have a voice in the 
process should be required to join the party. Parker argued further that partisan voters should 
have the right to choose nominees who represent them, saying, “These are the candidates who 
will be our standard bearers, carrying the torch for the Republican Party in November” (Wright 
2012).  
 Rod Beck, a former majority leader in the Idaho Senate and an active member of the state 
Republican party, drafted the resolution calling for closed primary elections, and advocated 
relentlessly for the party to implement the reform. He believed that a closed primary would help 
the party advance its goals; letting non-Republicans have any say in determining the nominees 
diluted the party’s message (Ridler 2007). He also argued that the Supreme Court had clearly 
                                                
42 Were the Republicans’ fears about raiding justified? Before hearing the case, Judge Winmill asked the party to 
provide evidence of the frequency of crossover voting in the state, and the party commissioned a report from two 
political scientists, Andrew Martin and Kyle Saunders. In his ruling, the judge cited Martin and Saunders’ 
statements that “an effective estimate of the average of crossover voting in the literature comes in at around 10%, 
under the strict definition of crossover voting—of one side’s partisan identifiers voting in another party” (Idaho 
Republican Party v. Ben Ysursa 2011, p. 14) and that crossover voting is more likely to occur in a one-party-
dominant state like Idaho. However, the experts also reported that the amount of Democratic raiding (strategic 
crossover voting) was probably quite small. Nevertheless, the judge concluded that even a 10-percent rate of 
crossover voting was significant, and enough to raise constitutional concerns. 
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recognized the parties’ rights to freedom of association, and the party had every legal right to 
close its primary: “We need to make a decision as to whether we’re simply going to be a 
debating society with social functions, or are we going to be a political party?” He added that 
“the party is in the position to assert itself, and they have the legal basis to back it up” (Howell 
2007). Parker similarly noted that the party had simply asked that its constitutional right of 
association be upheld, and closing the primary was not an attempt to purify the party 
ideologically but instead to allow Republican voters to select the candidates who would run 
under the party’s label in the general election (Miller 2012). 
Arguments Against Closing the Primary 
Ben Ysursa served as Idaho’s Secretary of State during this period (he held office from 
2003 to 2015) and had to defend the state’s open-primary law against claims that it violated the 
party’s rights. Ysursa, a Republican, personally opposed efforts to close the primaries because he 
believed they ran counter to the state’s long history of political independence, and furthermore, 
he did not see what would be gained by the change when Republicans already dominated the 
state electorally. “I don’t believe the Republican Party in Idaho has suffered here under an open 
primary,” Ysursa told The New York Times. “The party has been very, very successful, so I’m 
not sure what we’re trying to gain” (Yardley 2011).  
In its trial brief, the state argued that the evidence presented by both sides in the case 
showed that Idaho’s long-standing primary system had had “no legally significant adverse 
impact to the Republican Party” and that “the party instead has thrived electorally and achieved a 
level of political dominance unmatched in any other state” (trial memorandum, p. 3). The state 
also cited the substantial costs of implementing a new primary election law and the statewide 
system of party registration that it would require. Finally, the state argued that a closed primary 
would not effectively prevent strategic crossover voting because Democratic voters could simply 
register as Republicans.  
In addition to these arguments by the state, several Republican representatives who were 
reluctant to implement a closed primary cited the politically independent nature of Idaho voters. 
Sen. Brad Little (R-Emmett) said that voters “don’t want somebody putting a gun to their head 
telling them they have to register…They’ve told me that. Some of them were guys I thought 
would be delighted to register (as Republicans)” (Andersen 2007). Rep. Dean Cameron (R-Dist. 
26) said he was concerned about the consequences of excluding voters who wish to remain 
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unaffiliated. “They may vote Republican most of the time, but not be a 100 percent, dyed-in-the-
wool Republican. It’s important not to alienate that voter and say we don’t want their 
participation in the primary process” (Darr 2007). 
Intraparty Divisions 
The arguments described above indicate that Idaho Republicans were far from unified in 
their support for a closed primary—in fact, the issue was a significant source of intraparty 
conflict. The state party’s executive director conceded that closing the primary was 
“contentious” within his party (Wright 2012). The faction advocating for closed primaries was 
more conservative, largely unconcerned about excluding independent voters, and wanted to bring 
about reforms more quickly through the courts, rather than waiting for the legislature.  
  Even before the 2008 case was filed, there had been a previous lawsuit in 2007, when a 
group of 72 dissident Republicans filed suit against Ysursa to close the primaries, claiming that 
the legislature would not be able to act quickly enough (i.e., before the May 2008 primary). The 
state party’s leadership did not join the suit, and Republican chairman Kirk Sullivan said that the 
party preferred to make changes legislatively, not through a fight in the courts. The lawsuit was 
ultimately rejected when the judge ruled that the dissident group did not represent the state party 
and therefore did not have the right to sue on its behalf (Russell 2007). 
The dispute over closing the primary also triggered changes in the party leadership in 
2008. Republican Party Chairman Kirk Sullivan was a self-described moderate, and had the 
backing of Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter and other moderate Republican politicians in the state. 
He opposed efforts to close the primary, arguing that the move would disenfranchise Republican-
leaning independent voters who were unwilling to register with a party (Miller 2008). The more 
conservative faction in the party, led by former state senator Rod Beck, argued that Sullivan had 
alienated members with his opposition to the closed-primary rule. Beck and his allies encouraged 
Gov. Otter to drop his support of Sullivan, but Otter refused. Others in the party establishment 
continued to support Sullivan as well, including then-Senate Majority Leader Bart Davis (R-
Idaho Falls), who argued that the party had become stronger and more successful during 
Sullivan’s four years of leadership: “If the goal is to get Republicans elected, we’ve got the right 
general” (Miller 2008). In an upset, Sullivan lost his position to Norm Semanko, 227 to 169 
(Curless 2008). 
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The intraparty debate over closed primaries continued after 2012. Turnout in the Idaho 
Republican party’s primaries that year was historically low, and Governor Otter believed that the 
new closed-primary law was the main culprit (Miller 2012). Some Republicans wanted to reopen 
the primary for 2014, but a committee at the 2012 state party convention passed a resolution 
merely asking leaders to take the initial step of studying the consequences of the closed primary 
more closely, rather than repealing it. Despite these concerns, the Republican party has used 
closed primaries in every election since 2012. 
What About the Democrats? 
Despite Republicans’ accusations that the state Democratic party was openly encouraging 
its voters to cross over, the Idaho Democratic Party’s leadership consistently maintained that 
they did not want their members to participate in the Republican primary. The party’s chairman, 
Larry Grant, called it “a ridiculous notion,” saying that the Republicans had tried to convince 
everyone that they needed to close the primary because “Democrats were being spoilers,” when 
in fact it was the product of in-fighting in the Republican party—the reform was simply “more 
evidence of the continuing effort of the conservatives in the Republican party to purge their party 
of moderates” (Wright 2012). 
In 2011, after the ruling in Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa, the Idaho Democrats voted 
unanimously at their state central committee meeting to keep primary elections open to all 
voters, including independents and Republicans. Grant stated afterward that “not a single person 
on our state central committee was interested in disenfranchising voters,” adding that the party 
would welcome “everyone that has been thrown out of the Republican party by the extremists 
trying to purify their ranks by closing their primary” (Russell 2011). In response to the dominant 
party’s move to limit participation, the minority party tried to use it to win the support of 
independent voters potentially turned off by the restriction. The Democrats have continued to use 
an open primary since 2012 (Idaho Democratic Party FAQs; Russell 2018). 
 So, what can we learn from the case of the Idaho Republicans and their pursuit of a 
closed primary? Unlike the Republican party in Maryland, the party in Idaho was not seeking 
change because its leaders felt electorally vulnerable or were worried about nominating losing 
candidates. On the contrary, their biggest concern was nominating true conservatives who 
represented the party’s values, not moderates who won based on the support of Democratic and 
independent voters. In other words, because of their successes, many Republicans felt that they 
 120 
could afford to lose unaffiliated voters; others in the party, particularly elected officials, clearly 
disagreed. The debate over closing the primary reflected the general ideological divide in the 
party, and in this case, the conservative faction got its way.  
Colorado: Voter-Driven Reforms  
In the November 2016 elections, Colorado voters approved a pair of ballot initiatives, 
Proposition 107 and Proposition 108, reforming the rules of candidate nominations in the state. 
With the passage of Proposition 107, the parties’ presidential caucuses will be replaced with 
primary elections (open to unaffiliated voters) in 2020. Proposition 108 opened primary elections 
for all other offices to unaffiliated voters. These changes are notable because they were decided 
by the voters, despite the opposition of the leaders of both parties. Furthermore, Colorado is a 
competitive state, leaning more Democratic in recent elections, but still purple. In 2014, 
Republican Cory Gardner won a U.S. Senate seat in a statewide election while voters in that 
same election returned Democrat John Hickenlooper to the governor’s office. Approximately 35 
percent of Colorado’s voters are registered as unaffiliated. Neither party is clearly dominant 
(unlike in Maryland and Idaho). This case also illustrates the interesting conflicts that can arise 
when the state legislature is responsible for implementing a voter-initiated reform. 
Previous attempts had been made in the legislature to open the primaries to unaffiliated 
voters and replace the caucuses with presidential primaries, but the bills (HB 15-1354, SB 15-
287) were postponed indefinitely in committee and failed in the 2015 session. In the 2016 
session, a bill to restore the presidential primary also died—it passed the House but was 
postponed indefinitely by a senate committee. A provision to open the primary had already been 
removed from that bill during negotiations with Republicans in the state senate. There were 
efforts to pass reforms in the legislature, but given the frustrations there, it is not surprising that 
advocates decided to try a different path.  
As we will see, the failure to accomplish changes in the legislature and thus leaving it up 
to the voters to decide created complications later in the process. There was some support in the 
legislature for switching from presidential caucuses to a primary, but many legislators were quite 
wary about the idea of opening the primary to unaffiliated voters. Because the legislature did not 
act, it ended up having to implement Proposition 107, which went further than just replacing the 
caucus—it established a presidential primary open to unaffiliated voters (Birkeland 2016). That 
outcome demonstrates the risk of letting initiatives to go to the voters rather than making 
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changes legislatively, where they are more easily controlled. After the presidential primary bill 
failed in 2016, Sen. Bill Cadman (R-Colorado Springs), then-president of the state senate, 
foresaw these problems: “Some folks want to get rid of the caucus system, some folks want to 
open up the primaries (to unaffiliated voters). With some concerns with what could happen 
outside this building with the initiative process, I’d like to be a part of providing a solution that I 
think is appropriate for this state” (Bunch 2016). 
Proposition 107 
I will discuss this measure only briefly, because my focus is on the change in the sub-
presidential primary that occurred. Colorado’s presidential nominating process in March 2016 
was particularly problematic, which helped to generate support for Proposition 107. Not only 
were unaffiliated voters excluded, but the Democrats experienced unexpectedly high levels of 
participation and had to turn away voters, while Republicans canceled their presidential 
preference poll (usually held at the caucuses), and relied instead on district conventions to award 
delegates. To participate in party caucuses in Colorado, voters needed to be registered with the 
party at least two months prior. Caucuses are also potentially confusing and difficult for voters 
(inconvenience, long lines, public declarations/no private choice, etc.). Proposition 107 passed 
with 64 percent of the vote. It established that both parties’ presidential primaries would be held 
before the end of March, and unaffiliated voters would be able to vote in them without declaring 
affiliation with a party. Colorado last held presidential primaries in 1992, 1996, and 2000. 
Proposition 108 
Proposition 108 passed more narrowly with 53 percent of the vote. As proposed, it 
allowed unaffiliated voters to participate in party primaries without declaring an affiliation. It 
also allowed parties to nominate candidates by (closed) assembly or convention instead of using 
a primary, if three-fourths of the party’s state central committee voted to do so. And it allowed 
minor parties to exclude unaffiliated voters from their primaries.  
Before the initiative passed, Colorado had closed primaries, in the sense that unaffiliated 
voters could participate in a party primary, but they had to affiliate formally with the party. They 
could do so at the polls, and become unaffiliated later, but the affiliation requirement was, 
nonetheless, still perceived by some to be unfair. Under the new law, Colorado uses a semi-
closed primary: people registered with a party may vote in that party’s primary, and those 
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unaffiliated with a party may choose which party’s primary they would like to vote in. They 
remain unaffiliated. The rule is statutory, and both parties must comply. 
Because Colorado conducts vote-by-mail elections, unaffiliated voters may choose in 
advance which party’s ballot they want to receive in the mail, and if they do not make a choice, 
they receive both party’s ballots. The accompanying instructions from the Colorado Secretary of 
State’s Office notify all voters that they are allowed to complete only one ballot, and that 
returning both ballots would mean they were both invalidated.  
Arguments in Favor of Proposition 108 
The group leading support for both ballot initiatives was Let Colorado Vote, a PAC 
headed (and mostly funded) by Kent Thiry, CEO of DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc.43 
Colorado’s governor, John Hickenlooper, supported the measure, as did several other politicians 
from both parties, including some of the state’s former governors and U.S. Senators, and Rep. 
Jared Polis, who is the current governor (elected in 2018). The initiative also had substantial 
support from leaders and members of the business community, such as the Denver Metro 
Chamber of Commerce—in fact, Let Colorado Vote was created by the chamber (Denver Metro 
Chamber of Commerce, n.d.). 
Many of the arguments in favor of opening the primaries rested on appeals to democracy. 
Thiry argued that “the notion that a small faction of each party picks the finalist, and the rest of 
the people in the party and all the independents only get to choose between those two extreme 
candidates, that’s just not healthy democracy” (Birkeland 2016). Others argued that getting 
more voters to engage in the political process is generally a positive thing, especially those who 
want to be more involved but are turned off by the two major parties. Colorado has a substantial 
number of independent voters, many of whom believed they should not lose their voice just 
because they chose not to affiliate with a party. Additionally, the leadership of Let Colorado 
Vote emphasized repeatedly that taxpayers should not have to foot the bill for a primary election 
that unaffiliated voters cannot participate in. 
                                                
43 There was abundant speculation that Thiry was planning to run for governor in 2018 and was heavily invested in 
these measures because he thought a more open primary would improve his chances. He even changed his party 
registration from independent to Republican in March 2017. But ultimately, he decided against running in the 2018 
election (Matthews 2017).  
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It was also assumed that more open primary elections would result in better candidates—
“better” usually being defined as more moderate and willing to compromise. Kelly Brough, 
president of the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, said, “We have seen how extremes, 
whether on the right or left, have kept us from making progress. If you could engage unaffiliated 
voters, you could reward politicians who compromise and find solutions on these issues, instead 
of people being penalized for working across the aisle” (Greenblatt 2016). Candidates running in 
a more open primary would appeal to moderates, not the relatively small group of ideological 
extremists who would get to choose them in a closed primary. Thiry also framed his argument in 
terms of the expected consequences of the change, predicting that “what changes is how they 
behave,” adding, “They can do a little governing. The only reason they don’t do that now is 
because they’re worried about getting past their primaries” (Osher 2016). 
Arguments Against Proposition 108 
Much of the opposition to the open-primary ballot initiative rested on the view of the parties as 
private organizations, with rights based on the freedom of association. People who are not a part 
of the organization should not be allowed to choose its leaders, according to Steve House, then-
chairman of the state Republican party. “We’re a membership organization,” House said. “If we 
allow non-members to choose our candidate then what’s the purpose of having a membership 
organization?” (Osher 2016). Furthermore, state party leaders argued that nominating candidates 
is central to a party’s mission, and unaffiliated voters might not share the same values or 
preferences as party members—why should they get to help choose the party’s nominee? State 
Sen. John Cooke (R-Greeley), who opposed Propositions 107 and 108, said, “I don’t want 
unaffiliated voters telling me who my candidate should be. If they want to be engaged, let them 
join a party” (Sealover 2016). 
House and Rick Palacio, the chair of the state Democratic party, were also concerned 
about the effects of an open primary law on party-building and the continued influence of the 






Palacio said he’s worried it would create a “new class of voter” that 
is “fundamentally unfair” to registered Democrats and Republicans. 
Under the proposed change, independent voters could cast a ballot 
in either party’s primary, but Democrats would be forbidden from 
voting in the Republican primary and vice versa. “There is almost a 
disincentive to be affiliated,” Palacio said. 
 
Added House: “If you make it possible to vote in a primary without 
being affiliated … why would anyone be affiliated?” (Matthews 
2016) 
 
As expected, the parties’ leaders expressed concerns about raiding. House said he worried 
about the potential for independent voters to “play games” in party primaries. For example, if 
Democrats fielded only one viable candidate for governor while Republicans had a crowded 
primary field, then liberal-leaning independents might be tempted to vote for the least-qualified 
Republican in order to give the Democrat a better chance in the general election (Matthews 
2016). Independent voters could participate in different primaries in the same year, with the 
passage of both ballot measures. For example, an independent could vote in the Republican 
presidential primary, but then later choose among the Democrats running in every other primary 
race. (The two primaries would be held on separate days; Proposition 107 requires the 
presidential primary be held before the end of March, while Colorado’s sub-presidential 
primaries are held in June.) 
Lastly, regarding the loophole-provision in the ballot initiative that would allow parties to 
nominate candidates using a closed assembly or convention instead of a primary (if three-fourths 
of the party’s state central committee voted to do so), Palacio said that the 75 percent threshold 
was too high to ever be an option: “Whomever wrote it set it up to fail” (Matthews 2016). 
Action in the Legislature 
What happened after the ballot initiative’s successful passage is an illustration of the 
legislature’s power. Voters voiced their support for more open primary elections, but legislators 
attempted to temper the effects of the change as they wrote the new law in spring 2017. The bill, 
SB 305, was introduced by Sens. Kevin Lundberg (R-Berthoud) and Steve Fenberg (D-
Boulder).44 Its introduction just one week prior to the end of the legislative session caused some 
                                                
44 The other sponsors of the bill were House Minority Leader Patrick Neville (R-Castle Rock) and Rep. Mike Foote 
(D-Lafayette). 
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concern that the bill was being deliberately rushed or “fast-tracked” through the process before 
anyone could voice opposition (Ashby 2017a). To supporters of the ballot initiative, there were 
several objectionable provisions in the original bill: first, it called for sending unaffiliated voters 
two separate ballots, not a combined ballot. It also stipulated that a new field would be added to 
voter registration forms to allow unaffiliated voters to indicate which party’s ballot they 
preferred. They would not be required to indicate a preference, but those who did would be sent 
that party’s ballot for all future primaries, unless he or she requested a different ballot. Lastly, the 
party ballot that unaffiliated voters choose would be added to the statewide voter registration 
system, which tracks registered voters and whether they cast a ballot in any election. Critics of 
the bill argued that none of these provisions were in the original ballot initiatives that voters 
approved.  
On the subject of the combined ballot, for instance, the original language of the initiative 
indicated that all parties’ candidates would have their names placed on a single ballot. The 
sponsors of SB 305 argued that separate party ballots were easier to process and less confusing 
for voters, who might mistakenly infer from a combined ballot that they could pick and choose 
candidates from different parties, and then end up having their ballots invalidated. Other 
legislators objected to separate ballots because it was not what the voters had agreed to, and 
argued that trying to preempt confusion that might not even occur was unnecessary. “Now we’re 
going to say, ‘Let’s forget that. Sorry, voters, we don’t buy it. We don’t believe it will work, so 
we’re going to change the process,’” said Sen. Dominick Moreno (D-Commerce City). “We 
haven’t even tried it yet” (Bunch 2017). 
Being asked to check a box on a voter registration form seemed tantamount to declaring a 
party affiliation before the primary—a requirement that the Proposition 108 was meant to 
eliminate. An amendment to the bill removed this specific change to voter registration forms, and 
revised the language so that voters would not considered members of the parties they voted for, 
and would not receive unsolicited ballots from that party in the future (they will be able to 
request new ballots in every election). But, importantly, unaffiliated voters’ choice of party ballot 
is still public information. For some people, this “public declaration” of which party’s ballot you 
chose amounts to a form of affiliation.  
Wayne Williams, Colorado’s Secretary of State, and other officials in his office, argued 
that such transparency is necessary for election integrity and that the state should know who 
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voted in which election. (The leaders of the state parties also expressed support for this measure.) 
Williams said that it allows observers to ensure that votes have been counted accurately and the 
numbers all add up (Hutchins 2017). The sponsors of SB 305 agreed that county clerks needed to 
be able to record in which party the ballots were cast. “If you voted, that’s a public record. And 
to establish what election you voted in is an appropriate part of the public record,” said Sen. 
Lundberg. “Without that, proper auditing of an election is greatly hobbled” (Roberts 2017).  
Some county clerks and election-administration officials disputed these claims, arguing 
that the information was unnecessary, and there was no reason that unaffiliated voters should 
have to disclose publicly which primary they voted in. Amber McReynolds, the director of 
elections in Denver, claimed that the two parties were simply trying to confuse the issue. She 
said that the parties were aiming to find out who voted in which primary, and “that isn’t for 
canvas and auditing, it’s for campaign purposes” (Eason 2017a). McReynolds and others argued 
that the amendment was politically motivated—that is, if voters know they are being tracked in 
this manner, they might decide not to participate in the primary at all. Sen. Owen Hill proposed 
another amendment to make disclosure optional for voters, but it failed.  
Lawmakers reached a deal on SB 305 just before the end of the session, after negotiating 
the terms of the amendment. The final bill included some concessions; for example, it stipulated 
that voters’ ballot choices would last for only one election cycle, and they would not 
automatically receive the same party’s ballot in the next election. But it also retained 
controversial provisions. Unaffiliated voters would still be asked before each primary election if 
they would prefer to receive one party’s ballot to the other (instead of just sending both ballots to 
all unaffiliated voters). The party primary they choose to vote in becomes a matter of public 
record. Specifically, the amendment requires county clerks to record which party’s ballot an 
unaffiliated voter cast, and this information is added to the statewide voter registration system, 
which is part of the public record (Eason 2017b). The bill passed the Senate, 31 to 4, and passed 
unanimously in the House, 65 to 0 (details at leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb17-305). 
Supporters of the initiative were displeased about these provisions, and accused the 
legislators of using their authority to manipulate the bill, and undermine the will of the people. 
“It’s fair to say that the parties like affiliation, and so they are fighting hard to make sure that 
their interests were protected here,” said Jason Bertolacci, a spokesman for Let Colorado Vote 
(Ashby 2017b). John Hereford, the group’s vice chair, described the bill as “an end run” around 
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the voters’ clearly expressed opinion that independents should have the right to vote in the 
primary of their choice without these restrictions: “What these legislators and the secretary of 
state could not accomplish during the election process, they are trying to accomplish through this 
legislation and ‘rule-making,’ which is to weaken and undermine the intent of 107 and 108” 
(Bunch 2017). 
Senate Majority Leader Chris Holbert (R-Parker), an opponent of the ballot initiative, 
countered that the final bill was respectful of the voters’ wishes overall. “I think it is very 
important that we honor the will of the majority of the people who voted…I still view the two 
major parties as private organizations and am frustrated that those private organizations will now 
have a more open and inclusive process to select the candidates who run to represent the people. 
But the reality is that those two ballot questions passed last year” (Ashby 2017b). 
Discussion 
The purpose of this research is to better understand why partisan decision-makers 
sometimes change the laws and rules governing primary elections. As previously noted, it is far 
from clear that there is a “best” type of primary that all party leaders prefer, regardless of state or 
political context, and I examined these cases to identify factors that affect these preferences. 
When (and where) does an open (or closed) primary produce the best outcomes for a party, 
according to the party’s priorities? Answering the question requires figuring out not only when 
and where changes were made, but also whether there was any debate, and if so, what was the 
substantive content of that debate (i.e., what arguments were made, by whom, and which ones 
prevailed). 
What can we learn from these cases? The Maryland example illustrates several of the 
different arguments that have been wielded and weighed by party leaders. As the minority party, 
the Republicans wanted to change their primary rules to gain some electoral benefit—opening 
the primary was meant to give them a better shot at winning more elections, and that 
consideration was more important to (most) party leaders than protecting the party’s identity 
from the influence of non-members. Not all of the arguments were specific to Maryland politics. 
The debate surrounding the Colorado ballot initiatives showed that proponents of more open 
primaries generally argue that it is unfair to exclude unaffiliated or independent voters, and 
allowing more voters into the process would help to increase turnout and engagement and 
produce less extreme candidates. In many legislative districts and even in some entire states, the 
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primary contests are the ones that matter (in the sense that the general election is a foregone 
conclusion), so it is often argued that citizens should be allowed to participate at all stages, 
without having to declare a partisan affiliation. 
The cases in Maryland and Idaho together lend support to the notion that electorally 
dominant parties prefer closed primaries to keep their candidates ideologically pure, while 
minority parties prefer open primaries to gain competitiveness (I did not say much about the 
Maryland Democrats, but they seemed utterly uninterested in opening their primary, which 
would be consistent). The behavior of the Idaho Republicans suggests that the more extreme 
faction in the party (if there is one) especially prefers a closed primary. The Idaho example also 
highlights the divisions that can occur between partisan members of the state legislature and 
leaders of state party organizations—while the state Republican party was mostly supportive of a 
closed primary, Republicans in the legislature were more ambivalent about it, and they were able 
to change the law only when a court ruling compelled them. Given their powerful position in the 
state, Idaho Republicans did not need to worry as much about winning elections and could 
instead prioritize the party’s rights. I think this is a priority for all parties, to some extent, but 
most are not able to emphasize it as much as the Republican party in Idaho can. Even if one is 
not terribly concerned about widespread raiding, having an open primary fundamentally alters 
the purpose of primary elections. An open primary allows voters who refuse to align themselves 
formally with a party (for whatever reason) to still have some power over that party’s choice of 
nominee.  
Lastly, Colorado: It is an interesting case, and different from the other two, because 1) the 
Democrats and Republicans are about equally competitive in Colorado, and 2) neither of the 
state parties was pushing for a change in primary-election enfranchisement. Instead, the voters 
initiated the reform. But based on how this change was implemented by the legislature, partisan 
elected officials did not simply acquiesce to the voters’ wishes. Instead, they used their 
lawmaking authority to maintain some control over the conduct of the primaries. Their actions 
demonstrate that decisions about the type of primary are important to party elites (in this case, 
partisan legislators), and even when change is imposed on them by an external force, they use the 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have examined the variation in primary-election enfranchisement 
laws across the states. Each state is chiefly responsible for regulating its primary elections, 
resulting in a wide variety of systems. The factors associated with this variation have not been 
studied much and are largely unknown, and we also lack a firm understanding of why changes in 
the rules occasionally occur. Defining which voters are allowed to participate in the primaries is 
a critical decision for party leaders and partisan elected officials, so one way to understand the 
variation is to consider what their objectives are. Enfranchisement rules reflect their goals and 
their beliefs about how best to achieve them. Those goals are likely to vary depending on the 
political context in the state and the roles of the decision-makers in the party (whether they are 
elected representatives or heads of party organizations).  
 At first glance, it seems that there is little substantive information in the results of the 
cross-sectional analyses. Previous research suggests that two-party competition, the 
organizational strength of the parties, and other political characteristics of the states should be 
important explanatory variables, but here they are not associated with the type of primary—or 
not in a straightforward manner, at least. But the lack of statistically significant relationships 
does not necessarily mean that these factors are irrelevant or play no role in the choice of 
primary type; it simply means that there is not a clear pattern in the data (e.g., Republican parties 
prefer closed primaries, states that allow direct democracy use open primaries, etc.). There is a 
logic underlying these choices, but it is far more complex than I expected, and it is not easily 
identified or understood using statistical methods alone.  
 What is it about these patterns and processes (cross-sectional variance in rules, the 
adoption of the primary, reforming primary laws) that complicate our attempts to study them 
statistically? Regarding the models of primary adoption in Chapter 4, it appears at first that 
neither of the most common explanations on offer in the extant literature—pressure from 
progressives or party self-interest—fits the data well. However, this result could be less because 
both hypothesized explanations are inaccurate than because these concepts are exceedingly 
difficult to measure and operationalize. If the independent variables selected by Lawrence, 
Donovan, and Bowler and used in the analyses reported here are not capturing the concepts they 
are intended to measure, then it is quite difficult to estimate a useful statistical model of primary 
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adoption. The California historical case illustrates the numerous challenges involved in selecting 
appropriate variables and making coding decisions. The progressive-centered theory of primary 
adoption in fact aligns rather closely with California’s experience: the state had a robust 
progressive movement during the early 1900s, which clearly influenced its adoption of the direct 
primary; Hichborn’s descriptions and the roll-call evidence support this claim. However, as 
discussed in the chapter, neither of the two indicators of progressivism in Lawrence et al.’s 
model, the use of office-block ballots and direct democracy, had been legally established in 
California at the time it adopted primary elections. Despite the strength of its progressive 
movement, California is not considered a progressive state in the model because the independent 
variables employed to measure the concept do not capture it. 
There are also alternative ways to code the dependent variable that would be no less valid 
than Lawrence et al.’s measure (the year of the first mandated, statewide primary). One could use 
the year that a state enacted its first formal, direct primary law, even if it applied only to a few 
offices or cities, or could, instead, use the year that a state enacted “complete” primary laws that 
covered most or all elected offices. Some states (including California and Illinois) passed 
multiple primary laws that were struck down by the courts before working out a version that was 
allowed to stand. The dependent variable could be coded based on the year of the first attempt 
instead of the year of successful establishment. In the end, one still has to pick a year, but it 
would be helpful to estimate models with alternative dependent variables, given that we know 
that some of the variation is missed when the dependent variable is dichotomous in nature (i.e., it 
indicates, in a given year, that a state either uses the direct primary or it does not; it does not 
account for failed attempts or extent of coverage). One final note about the dependent variable in 
this chapter: Recall that California enacted legislation to establish direct democracy and require 
office-block ballots in 1911, just two years after adopting the primary. The fact that the state 
adopted all three progressive reforms at approximately the same time suggests that this research 
could benefit from using a more broadly defined dependent variable, such as an index that 
captures the presence or absence of these and other related reforms (direct election of senators, 
women’s suffrage, etc.), instead of the primary alone.  
Another complicating factor is that changes of this kind occur rarely and slowly, and they 
may be reversed. Bills attempting to reform primary elections can be introduced in the legislature 
and fail multiple times before they are passed (as seen in Colorado and Idaho). Changes that 
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seem easy to make—in states with unified governments, for example—sometimes follow a 
convoluted path to enactment. Laws may be passed but then struck down by the courts, as in 
California. Or the laws may be repealed. New York passed direct-primary legislation in 1913 but 
then abolished the statewide primary in 1921; Indiana adopted the direct primary in 1915 and 
repealed it in 1930 (Boatright 2019). 
Simple statistical associations are also difficult to establish when there is so little 
consensus on the precise effects of primary rules. Party leaders have expected consequences in 
mind when they argue for or against changes, but they do not always understand the true 
consequences of the rules, and even when they share the same goal, they frequently disagree on 
the best path to reach it. The effects of reforms, especially new ones, are hard to predict, and rule 
changes often do not produce the effects that party leaders expected. Those who advocated for 
opening the primary in Colorado predicted that doing so would increase participation by 
independent voters and thus result in more moderate nominees, but this outcome is far from 
guaranteed. If two parties or states enact the same reform (e.g., an open primary), we cannot 
assume that they both did so for the same reasons.  
In summary, difficult measurement, slow changes, and other complications conspire 
against simple statistical analyses. I have offered some explanations for the null results of the 
statistical models, but to be clear, those explanations do not mean that I am abandoning this kind 
of analysis altogether just because of the thorny estimation issues. It is difficult to estimate the 
effects of two-party competition and other factors on the type of primary, but not impossible. 
The cross-sectional models could be enhanced first by adding more years and data points. A 
longitudinal dataset would provide information about patterns over time, which seems 
particularly important given what we know about the (sometimes) slow process of reform. 
Identifying other independent variables would also be beneficial, to ensure that each one captures 
the intended concept as fully as possible.  
However, the case studies are an equally essential component. The statistical results 
might not tell us much, but for good reason—the details, which matter quite a lot, are missing. 
The cases help us identify potential reasons why the models yield null results, and they 
demonstrate that there are patterns or relationships, even if those are not apparent in the 
statistical analyses. The stories underlying changes in primary-election enfranchisement are 
complicated, and understanding the relevant details requires investigating the history of specific 
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instances of change. It is true that the three cases in Chapter 5 are a sample, not the full set of 
changes that have occurred in recent decades. But they suggest patterns to look for in other states 
where changes in the type of primary have been made or are being considered. The various 
arguments made by politicians and party leaders in the examples I studied were mostly not state-
specific. I strongly suspect that they are employed in other states where the parties are operating 
under similar circumstances. 
One conclusion I draw from the cases is that different actors can have different 
preferences regarding the type of primary, even if they belong to the same party. Leaders of the 
party organizations are likely to be more interested in protecting the party’s identity, rights, and 
influence; members of the legislature or other representatives will focus on electoral concerns 
and the ways in which changing the composition of the primary electorate will affect them. We 
must be precise when discussing the goals or priorities of “the party.” In Idaho, the presence of 
Republican super-majorities in the legislature suggest that change should have occurred easily, 
but the party actually struggled to pass legislation to close the primary. There were divisions 
between Republican legislators and party activists as well as deep divisions within the party 
organization. The Idaho example indicates that factions (primarily in the dominant party) play an 
important role in influencing change. We should also expect dominant parties to favor and 
prioritize the nomination of candidates who represent the party ideologically. 
The case of the Republicans in Idaho also shows how party leaders’ goals shift when the 
main goal—winning elections—has been achieved. Being in a secure electoral position allows 
them the luxury of focusing on nominees’ ideological or partisan purity. Raiding is also a larger 
concern in the dominant party. Even in the southern states, where open primaries are the norm, 
some Republican party leaders are now advocating for, or at least considering, a switch to closed 
primaries. In Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, members of the electorally dominant 
Republican parties are proposing bills in the legislature and passing party resolutions to close 
their primaries, mostly because they are concerned that Democratic voters are influencing the 
selection of Republican nominees (when they have no intention of voting for those candidates in 
the general election). On the Democratic side, Hawaii has had open primaries since 1980, but in 
recent years the state Democratic party has been pushing to close its primary—behavior we 
might expect from a party with a very strong majority. These are all attempted changes, and may 
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be unlikely to happen any time soon, but the stories seem consistent with changes that have 
occurred in other states. 
Leaders of parties that are in weaker positions electorally believe that expanding the 
franchise will engage more voters and increase their chances of winning. They have a strong 
incentive to court independent voters; it seems that a closed primary is a kind of privilege that 
party leaders can afford only when they feel like they do not need the support of independents. 
Much like the Maryland Republicans in 2000, Republican party leaders in Connecticut during 
the 1980s argued for an open primary because they claimed that doing so would make them more 
competitive with the Democrats. Again, it is far from clear that this predicted effect would have 
occurred (the CT Republicans did not give themselves enough time to find out), but it was the 
main reason publicly advanced for the reform.  
Finally, in Colorado, the legislative wrangling over the details of the semi-closed primary 
law shows how partisan legislators can continue to exercise their authority when a restriction is 
externally imposed on them. It was clearly not the parties’ choice to adopt a semi-closed 
primary, and their response to the change is revealing. Many legislators opposed the reform, so 
they included provisions that the voters did not explicitly approve to maintain some control in 
the new system. It might seem puzzling that Colorado’s parties did not seek to overturn the new 
law in court, but perhaps they chose not to because they were able to influence the form that it 
took, using their power over the legislative process. That is merely conjecture, but if true, it 
would be consistent with the argument that party elites adapt to reforms meant to weaken them.  
Taken together, the analyses of 1) the present-day variation in primary election suffrage; 
2) the initial adoption of the direct primary in the states; and 3) selected changes in the type of 
primary that have occurred in recent decades all lead to the notion that primary elections are an 
institution that firmly resists straightforward narratives, elegant theories, and easy 
explanations. Nevertheless, there are several broader themes and conclusions to be drawn from 
this research.  
First, there are more actors involved in this process of setting primary-election 
enfranchisement than one might expect. Elected officials and party leaders generally have 
decision-making authority, but changes in enfranchisement have also been instigated by judicial 
rulings, and the electorate (in states where it is empowered to do so) has voted to approve 
reforms as well. It may also be the case that a political party is divided into factions—either 
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based on ideology (i.e., the moderate and extreme factions in the party have conflicting 
preferences), or because leaders of the party organization prefer one rule while the party’s 
elected officials prefer a different rule. The presence of multiple political actors who are all 
potentially invested in the type of primary but have different powers or roles in the system means 
that rule-making generally should not be thought of as the result of a simple two-player game 
between (for example) the Democrats and Republicans in the state. 
Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in expectations, which means that decision-
makers’ preferences can be far more complicated than originally thought. It is not easy to say 
that leaders in Democratic-controlled states clearly differ from those in Republican-controlled 
states, or that states with a tradition of strong party organizations clearly differ from states that 
have had weak parties historically. As noted previously, there is evidence to suggest that 
electorally dominant parties prefer closed primaries (e.g., Idaho Republicans) while weaker 
parties (e.g., Maryland Republicans) prefer open primaries. But this logic does not tell us what 
type of primary we should expect to observe in states where both parties are competitive, and it 
does not prove that the relationship between competition and type of primary is linear. Again, 
these preferences for one type of primary or another appear to be dependent on multiple factors. 
Leaders’ expectations are highly conditional, and they vary across time and across states. Those 
who propose changes and those who resist them all have ideas, and make claims and arguments, 
but these beliefs about the consequences of a change can be inconsistent, and they may or may 
not be borne out after the proposed reform is enacted. For instance, if Democrats in one state 
push for a change, and achieve it, but then do not appear to gain from it as they claimed they 
would, Democrats in the next states to advocate the same reform might do so based on a different 
theory of what it will accomplish. Reforms often have unintended or unforeseen consequences, 
and states that adopt changes based on their predecessors’ experiences may not have learned the 
right lessons.  
Finally, primary election laws and rules, like many other political institutions, are highly 
prone to inertia and difficult to change. Changes are rare, and they may occur very slowly (i.e., 
with long lags), particularly if they require partisan supermajorities in the government or a great 
deal of legislative time and effort. Even states with direct democracy provisions do not 
necessarily enjoy a quick and easy path to change, because the courts and the parties 
(organizational leaders and elected representatives) can all use their authority to thwart the 
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people’s attempts to change the rules. A strong preference for reform among the masses or the 
politicians may exist, but it does not guarantee that change will soon be forthcoming. This 
tendency toward inertia makes changes very difficult to explain or predict.  
Because of the general inertia and infrequent changes in the type of primary, a natural 
goal for future research is to determine not just when a state adopted the direct primary and 
which variables potentially influenced the decision to adopt it, but also identify the specific 
enfranchisement rule that was established at the time of adoption. The political context in a state 
at the time it initially adopted the primary may have shaped the selection of the enfranchisement 
rule. Features of the states’ present-day political and institutional context appear only weakly 
related to the type of primary currently in use, but, particularly in the states where the rule has 
not changed much since the primary was first enacted, a more appropriate question might be: 
How did these (or other) political variables influence the state’s type of primary when it was 
originally determined? It is possible that a state that has had lopsided two-party competition in 
recent decades was much more electorally competitive in the past—that is, in the distant past 
when the laws of the primary were first set. In this situation, the current level of competition and 
the current type of primary could appear unrelated, but perhaps there is a relationship between 
the historical levels of competition and the current type. Primary-election enfranchisement is 
undoubtedly a challenging subject to study. It requires knowledge of historical facts and 
particulars that may easily appear trivial at first, but there are important lessons to be learned 
about partisan elites, preferences, and institutional change if we are willing to pay careful 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Table A.1: Variables Associated with Type of Primary, Democratic Party 
 D (all types), n = 50 D (“other” type omitted), n = 46 
Southern state     1.71 * (0.77) 
    1.74 * 
 (0.77) 






   1.96 * 
(0.95) 
   1.99 * 
 (0.94) 
   2.24 * 
(1.01) 
  1.80 
  (0.96) 
1.76 
(0.94) 
State law    1.36 * (0.62) 
    1.35 * 
  (0.61) 
  1.78 ** 
(0.66) 
   1.26 * 
(0.60) 
   1.25 * 
(0.60) 
   1.40 * 
(0.65) 
   1.40 * 
(0.64) 
   1.82 * 
 (0.72) 
     1.37 * 
  (0.65) 
   1.36 * 
(0.64) 
Pres. vote margin ___  
___ 
 
































  (3.69) 
___ 
 
No. of shifts ___  
  0.03 





  0.03 
  (0.13) 
___ 
 
  0.04 







Direct initiative  1.10  (0.65) 
  1.22 









  0.73 







Initiative (early) ___  
___ 
 
















Party strength  3.31  (2.51) 
  2.44 
  (2.51) 
4.81  








  (2.89) 
2.41  
  (3.22) 
1.21  
  (2.94) 
–0.55  
  (2.89) 
TPO score –0.24   (0.20) 
–0.24 
  (0.20) 
–0.31 
  (0.21) 
–0.30 
  (0.20) 
–0.31 
  (0.21) 
–0.25 
  (0.21) 
–0.25 
  (0.21) 
–0.30 
  (0.22) 
–0.28 
  (0.21) 
–0.30 
  (0.22) 
Threshold coeffs           










  (3.20) 
–0.03 




  (3.11) 
–0.55 
  (1.59) 
















  (3.05) 
0.73 
(1.59) 



















Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  
** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05 
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Table A.2: Variables Associated with Type of Primary, Republican Party 
 R (all types), n = 50 R (“other” type omitted), n = 47 
Southern state     1.97 * (0.80) 
    2.16 ** 
 (0.82) 






  2.39 * 
(0.99) 
   2.60 * 
 (1.03) 
   2.26 * 
(1.00) 
  2.23 * 
  (1.00) 
2.43 * 
(1.05) 
State law    2.37 ** (0.67) 
    2.55 ** 
  (0.71) 
  2.42 ** 
(0.68) 
   2.32 ** 
(0.66) 
   2.50 ** 
(0.70) 
   2.30 ** 
(0.71) 
   2.53 ** 
(0.76) 
   2.34 ** 
 (0.72) 
    2.30 ** 
  (0.71) 
   2.52 ** 
(0.75) 



































  (3.65) 
___ 
 
No. of shifts ___  
  0.26 





  0.25 
  (0.14) 
___ 
 
  0.26 







Direct initiative  0.43  (0.66) 
  0.45 








  (0.70) 
  –0.01 


























Party strength –2.88  (3.89) 
  –2.53 










  (5.08) 
–4.33 
  (4.76) 
–4.69  
  (4.64) 
–4.59  
  (4.95) 
TPO score –0.22   (0.20) 
–0.12 
  (0.21) 
–0.28 
  (0.21) 
–0.27 
  (0.21) 
–0.17 
  (0.22) 
–0.21 
  (0.21) 
–0.12 
  (0.22) 
–0.28 
  (0.22) 
–0.28 
  (0.22) 
–0.18 
  (0.23) 
Threshold coeffs           




  (2.04) 
–1.44 




  (4.08) 
–0.16 




  (3.91) 
–0.56 
  (2.41) 
















  (3.89) 
0.79 
(2.42) 



















Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  






Table A.3: Variables Associated with Type of Primary, Pooled Sample 
 All states and parties, all types, n = 100 
Southern state     1.98 ** (0.56) 
   1.75 ** 
(0.55) 
    1.85 ** 
 (0.55) 






State law    2.00 **  (0.47) 
   1.77 ** 
(0.44) 
    1.84 ** 
  (0.45) 
  1.93 ** 
(0.46) 
   1.68 ** 
(0.43) 
   1.75 ** 
(0.44) 











Folded Ranney score ___  
–1.29 






  (2.32) 
___ 
 
No. of shifts ___  
___ 
 
  0.14 





  0.14 
  (0.09) 
Direct initiative 0.81  (0.46) 
 0.79 
 (0.45) 
  0.83 


















Party strength 1.86   (2.06) 
0.71 
 (1.95) 
  0.40 







TPO score –0.24   (0.14) 
–0.23 
  (0.14) 
–0.18 
  (0.14) 
–0.31 * 
  (0.14) 
–0.29 * 
  (0.14) 
–0.24 
  (0.15) 
Threshold coeffs       
Closed | Semi-closed 1.89 (1.26) 
–0.34 




  (1.26) 
–1.77 
  (2.11) 
0.41 
(1.10) 
Semi-closed | Open 3.12 (1.28) 
0.88 




















Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  





Table A.4: Variables Associated with Type of Primary, States Plus Extra Parties 
 All states plus parties with different primaries, n = 55 
Southern state     2.02 * (0.79) 
   1.77 * 
(0.76) 
    1.82 * 
 (0.76) 






State law    2.05 **  (0.64) 
   1.75 ** 
(0.59) 
    1.74 ** 
  (0.60) 
  1.92 ** 
(0.63) 
   1.61 ** 
(0.58) 
   1.57 ** 
(0.57) 











Folded Ranney score ___  
–1.42 






  (3.18) 
___ 
 
No. of shifts ___  
___ 
 
  0.11 





  0.10 
  (0.12) 
Direct initiative 0.82  (0.62) 
 0.82 
 (0.62) 
  0.90 


















Party strength 3.52   (2.62) 
2.28 
 (2.47) 
  1.70 







TPO score –0.21   (0.20) 
–0.21 
  (0.20) 
–0.18 
  (0.20) 
–0.30 
  (0.20) 
–0.29 
  (0.20) 
–0.27 
  (0.20) 
Threshold coeffs       
Closed | Semi-closed 2.67 (1.70) 
0.04 




  (1.74) 
–1.44 
  (2.68) 
0.57 
(1.40) 
Semi-closed | Open 3.91 (1.74) 
1.25 




















Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  




APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table B.1: Dates of Presidential Primaries or Caucuses and Sub-Presidential Primaries, 2016 
State Presidential Sub-Pres. State Presidential Sub-Pres. 
Iowa  February 1 June 7 (continued)   
New Hampshire February 9 September 13 Illinois March 15 March 15 
Nevada (Dems) February 20 June 14 Missouri March 15 August 2 
S. Carolina (Reps) February 20 June 14 North Carolina March 15 June 7 
Nevada (Reps) February 23 June 14 Ohio March 15 March 15 
S. Carolina (Dems) February 27 June 14 Arizona March 22 August 30 
Alabama March 1 March 1 Idaho (Dems) March 22 May 17 
Alaska (Reps) March 1 August 16 Utah March 22 June 28 
Arkansas March 1 March 1 Alaska (Dems) March 26 August 16 
Colorado March 1 June 28 Hawaii (Dems) March 26 August 13 
Georgia March 1 May 24 Washington (Dems) March 26 August 2 
Massachusetts March 1 September 8 Wisconsin April 5 August 9 
Minnesota March 1 August 9 Wyoming (Dems) April 9 August 16 
N. Dakota (Reps) March 1 June 14 New York April 19 June 28 
Oklahoma March 1 June 28 Connecticut April 26 August 9 
Tennessee March 1 August 4 Delaware April 26 September 13 
Texas March 1 March 1 Maryland April 26 April 26 
Vermont March 1 August 9 Pennsylvania April 26 April 26 
Virginia March 1 June 13 Rhode Island April 26 September 13 
Wyoming (Reps) March 1 August 16 Indiana May 3 May 3 
Kansas March 5 August 2 Nebraska (Reps) May 10 May 10 
Kentucky (Reps) March 5 May 17 West Virginia May 10 May 10 
Louisiana March 5 November 8 Kentucky (Dems) May 17 May 17 
Maine (Reps) March 5 June 14 Oregon May 17 May 17 
Nebraska (Dems) March 5 May 10 Washington (Reps) May 24 August 2 
Maine (Dems) March 6 June 14 California June 7 June 7 
Hawaii (Reps) March 8 August 13 Montana June 7 June 7 
Idaho (Reps) March 8 May 17 New Jersey June 7 June 7 
Michigan March 8 August 2 New Mexico June 7 June 7 
Mississippi March 8 March 8 N. Dakota (Dems) June 7 June 14 





Table B.2: Variables Associated with Type of Presidential Nominating Contest 
 Democrats n = 50 
Republicans 
n = 50 
Southern state        2.80 **  (0.90) 
      2.91 ** 
 (0.86) 
     2.86 ** 
(0.90) 
     3.15 ** 
(0.89) 











  (0.03) 
___ 
 

























  (4.08) 
–1.83  
  (3.94) 
TPO score    0.43 * (0.20) 
    0.48 * 
 (0.20) 
     0.44 * 
  (0.20) 
     0.54 * 
  (0.21) 
Threshold coeffs     




  (2.18) 
  0.96 
  (2.03) 
Closed | Semi-closed 2.25  (1.70) 
3.15 
(1.45) 
  0.96 
  (2.18) 
  2.85 
  (2.06) 
Semi-closed | Open 3.21 (1.73) 
4.14 
(1.50) 
  1.67 
  (2.18) 
  3.58 
  (2.06) 
Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  





Table B.3: Variables Associated with Type of Presidential Nominating Contest, Pooled Sample 
 All states and parties, all types, n = 100 
Southern state         2.80 **   (0.63) 
       2.92 ** 
  (0.62) 
       2.99 ** 
  (0.61) 
       3.15 ** 
  (0.66) 
       3.30 ** 
  (0.65) 
        3.40 ** 
   (0.65) 
State law   0.53   (0.41) 
  0.62 
  (0.40) 
  0.67 
  (0.41) 
  0.59 
  (0.42) 
  0.68 
  (0.41) 
  0.74 
  (0.42) 











Folded Ranney score ___  
–0.67 






  (2.39) 
___ 
 
No. of shifts ___  
___ 
 
     0.20 * 





    0.23 * 
 (0.10) 
Direct initiative   0.41   (0.47) 
  0.39 
  (0.48) 
  0.38 












     0.98 * 
  (0.48) 
     1.03 * 
  (0.49) 
   1.09 * 
(0.48) 




  (1.99) 
 0.33 
 (2.07) 
  0.81  
  (2.02) 
0.08 
(2.06) 
TPO score       0.43 **  (0.14) 
      0.43 ** 
 (0.14) 
      0.50 ** 
 (0.14) 
      0.52 ** 
 (0.14) 
      0.53 ** 
 (0.15) 
     0.60 ** 
(0.15) 
Threshold coeffs       

































Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  





Table B.4: Variables Associated with Type of Presidential Nominating Contest, States Plus Extra Parties 
 All states plus parties with different contests, n = 57 
Southern state         3.00 **   (0.91) 
       3.10 ** 
  (0.88) 
     3.11 ** 
(0.87) 
       3.40 ** 
  (0.94) 
       3.58 ** 
  (0.91) 
     3.51 ** 
(0.90) 
State law   0.38   (0.55) 
  0.49 
  (0.53) 
0.47 
(0.53) 
  0.45 
  (0.56) 
  0.57 
  (0.54) 
0.54 
(0.54) 











Folded Ranney score ___  
–2.93 






  (3.25) 
___ 
 











Direct initiative   0.57   (0.64) 
  0.43 
















  1.19 
  (0.68) 
1.17 
(0.67) 







  2.42  
  (2.47) 
1.09 
(2.52) 
TPO score     0.44 *  (0.20) 
    0.46 * 
 (0.20) 
   0.48 * 
(0.20) 
     0.55 ** 
(0.21) 
       0.61 ** 
  (0.23) 
     0.59 ** 
(0.21) 
Threshold coeffs       
Caucus | Closed 0.79 (1.61) 
–0.96 






  (2.64) 
2.42 
(1.46) 






















Cells are ordered logit coefficients from cumulative link models, with standard errors in parentheses.  





Table B.5: Variables Associated with Type of Nominating Contest (Composite Measure), 2016 
 Dems n = 50 
Reps 
n = 50 
Both Parties 
n = 100 
Southern state       0.74 ** (0.21) 
     0.74 ** 
(0.21) 
       0.75 ** 
  (0.21) 
       0.83 ** 
  (0.20) 
       0.77 ** 
  (0.14) 
     0.75 ** 
(0.15) 
State law    0.33 (0.17) 
   0.33 
(0.17) 
       0.52 ** 
  (0.18) 
       0.52 ** 
  (0.16) 
       0.42 ** 
  (0.12) 
     0.44 ** 
(0.12) 





    0.09 * 
  (0.04) 
     0.07 * 
  (0.03) 
___ 
 



























  0.11 
  (0.17) 
  0.12 
  (0.12) 
0.11 
(0.13) 




  (1.03) 
–0.76  
  (0.95) 
–0.10  
  (0.54) 
0.05  
(0.58) 
TPO score 0.04 (0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
  0.03 
  (0.06) 
  0.08 
  (0.06) 
  0.06 
  (0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Intercept 0.11 (0.42) 
0.10 
(0.40) 
  0.78 
  (0.57) 
  0.18 





       
Adj. R-squared 0.20 0.20   0.29   0.37   0.31 0.27 
Cells are coefficients from OLS models, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable ranges from 0 (where the state party uses a caucus and a 
closed primary) to 1.75 (where the state party uses an open primary for all nominating contests). 




APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
Table C.1: Votes on Amendments to Direct Primary Law in CA Assembly and CA Senate 
 Assembly n = 77 
Senate 
n = 32 
Hichborn progressivism score ___   4.57   (0.85) ___ 
  6.30 
  (2.81) 
NOMINATE score –1.01   (0.47) 
___ –0.82 
  (0.48) ___ 
Republican–Union Labor –0.31   (0.44) 
  0.23 
  (0.57) 
  0.25 
  (0.53) 
–0.45 
  (0.97) 
Democratic –0.26   (0.46) 
  0.13 
  (0.55)  
  0.18 
  (0.51) 
–1.45 
  (1.45) 
San Francisco ___ ___ –1.46   (0.50) 
___ 
Margin of victory in previous election   0.74   (1.08) 
–0.05 
  (1.42) 
  0.73 
  (1.13) 
–0.85 
  (3.49) 
Number of terms served –0.39    (0.20) 
–0.06 
  (0.25) 
–0.40  
  (0.21) 
___ 
Age   0.02   (0.02) 
  0.01 
  (0.02) 
  0.01 
  (0.02) 
–0.02 
  (0.06) 
Intercept –0.33   (0.74) 
–3.06 
  (1.07) 
  0.16 
  (0.78) 
  0.22 
  (4.33) 




APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5 
 
The following description of Proposition 108 appeared in the 2016 Colorado elections 
voter guide. The full text of all Colorado ballot initiatives and the state voter guide can be found 






Shall there be a change to the Colorado Revised Statutes concerning the process of selecting 
candidates representing political parties on a general election ballot, and, in connection 
therewith, allowing an unaffiliated elector to vote in the primary election of a political party 
without declaring an affiliation with that party and permitting a political party in specific 
circumstances to select all of its candidates by assembly or convention instead of by primary 
election? 
 
Summary and Analysis  
 
Background. Under current law, a voter must be affiliated with a political party in order 
to vote in that party’s primary election. Unaffiliated voters, sometimes referred to as independent 
voters, are not registered members of any political party. An unaffiliated voter may affiliate with 
a political party at any point up to, and including election day, and be eligible under current law 
to participate in a party’s primary election. In Colorado, primary elections to select party 
nominees for state, county, and federal offices other than president (nonpresidential primaries) 
are held on the last Tuesday in June in even-numbered years. These primary elections are 
conducted by county election officials at a cost of about $5.0 million every two years.  
 
Primary election process open to unaffiliated voters. Under Proposition 108, voters will 
no longer be required to affiliate with a political party in order to vote in a party’s 
nonpresidential primary election. Instead, unaffiliated voters will receive a combined ballot that 
shows all candidates for elected office for each political party. The combined ballot must clearly 
separate candidates for each political party, and unaffiliated voters may only vote in contests for 
one political party. If a voter selects candidates of more than one political party on the combined 
ballot, his or her ballot will not be counted. In counties that determine that a combined ballot is 
not practical, unaffiliated voters will receive separate ballots for all major political parties 
participating in the primary election and may return the ballot for one party.  
 
Option for closed party nominations. The measure allows political parties, which are 
private organizations, to opt out of holding a primary election that is open to unaffiliated voters. 
Instead, they may choose to nominate candidates in an assembly or convention that is limited to 
 159 
voters affiliated with that party. The decision to opt out of holding a primary election must be 
made by the party’s state central committee by a three-fourths majority vote.  
 
Impact on minor parties. Under current law, the Democratic and Republican Parties, 
having met certain vote thresholds in prior elections, are classified as major parties; all other 
parties, such as the American Constitution Party, the Green Party, and the Libertarian Party, are 
classified as minor parties. Under Proposition 108, minor parties participating in the primary 
election will be included on the combined ballot sent to unaffiliated voters. However, a minor 
party may opt to exclude unaffiliated voters from participating in its primary election. In such 
cases, only voters affiliated with the minor party will receive that party’s primary election ballot. 
The provision allowing the exclusion of unaffiliated voters only applies to minor parties. 
 
Arguments For  
1) Proposition 108 gives unaffiliated voters, who are Colorado taxpayers, the opportunity to vote 
in publicly financed primary elections. Unaffiliated voters make up more than one-third of all 
registered voters in the state. Proposition 108 gives unaffiliated voters a role in selecting 
candidates for the general election and makes voting in primary elections easier and more 
accessible for these voters.  
 
2) Allowing unaffiliated voters to participate in primary elections may result in candidates who 
better represent all Coloradans. In a closed primary, voter participation is typically low and the 
candidates selected often appeal to a small number of their party’s more active members. 
Opening the primary election may result in candidates who are more responsive to a broader 
range of interests.  
 
Arguments Against  
1) Proposition 108 uses a combined ballot system for unaffiliated voters that will likely result in 
about 7 percent of unaffiliated voter ballots not being counted, which could change election 
winners, and would raise costs for taxpayers. On a combined ballot, unaffiliated voters must vote 
for only one party’s candidates. People who vote for candidates in both parties will have their 
ballots disqualified, and their ballots will not be counted. In Washington state, where combined 
ballots are used, 7 percent of ballots are disqualified. This can change election results, and may 
result in contested elections and litigation. Producing and processing a separate combined ballot 
only for unaffiliated voters creates administrative and financial burdens for counties, especially 
smaller or rural counties.  
 
2) Colorado law already allows unaffiliated voters who wish to vote in a political party’s primary 
election to easily change their party affiliation at any point during the election, up to and 
including on election day. Political parties are membership organizations that have the right to 
select their own candidates without influence from people who choose not to affiliate with the 
party. 
 
 
